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Much emphasis is placed today by 'new-age' management theorists and 
education policy makers alike, on the value of 'collective' learning in creating more 
effective learning environments. Such environments are believed to be more effective 
at encouraging the development of particular skills that are deemed necessary in 
helping create the type of citizen needed to satisfy the economic imperatives of our 
'New World Order', These same interested stakeholders also believe that the most 
effective medium for achieving these 'leadership' type skills is through the use of 
teams or some similar form of 'learning organisation', However, the work of Chris 
Argyris would suggest that without those initiating and those participating in co-
operative learning, changing what he refers to as their Modell 'theories of practice 
espoused theories and theories-in-use', the co-operative learning initiatives advocated 
by theorists and policy makers alike will fail to achieve the desired outcomes. 
This research dissertation presents the findings of an investigation of the 
literature into the question of whether the use of student project teams helps create a 
more effeetive learning environment for the development of the sort of skills referred 
to above or are they, as Argyris suggests, helping reinforce Modell 'theories-in-use' 












Chapter 1 - Introduction 
"Having little facility with leadership skills such as feedback, dialogue or 
conflict management we were left to manage the situation with our various skilled 
incompetencies. These included issue avoidance, unilateral face-saving and covert 
coalition building" (Holmer 2001:590) 
"Let's split up into groups" 
Peter Senge (1994) suggests that most of us at one time or another have been 
part of a great team (p. 4), but from my own experience and those of my fellow 
students to whom I have spoken, I am much more familiar with the type of experience 
expressed by Holmer, which is quoted above. Why is it that in spite of the fact I 
consider myself a team player, with many memorable experiences coming from when 
I've been engaged in teamwork, do I now have such a sinking feeling every time I 
hear the words "let's split up into groups"? 
I am a middle-aged former corporate CEO attending the University of Cape 
Town (UCT) in order to gain a recognised qualification in education, which I hope 
will help me in my new career as an adult educator. My introduction to co-operative 
learning at UCT was in 2000 when I participated in a programme The Advanced 
Diploma for the Educators of Adults. This is a post-graduate programme and since I 
do not have a degree I gained acceptance to the programme via a selection procedure 
for adult educators with appropriate 'experience'. The student body was a diverse 
group with post-graduate students comprising three quarters of the group and coming 
both from education and the business world; together with students like myself who 
had obtained entry through the selection process. As one might expect backgrounds 
varied considerably not only in respect of occupation and educational background but 
also age and cultural heritage. 
In spite of this diversity some members of faculty had little hesitation for 
various reasons in uttering those frightening words "let's split into groups"! Most of 
the time the groups were formed to discuss a paper that each person was supposed to 
have read; or to decide how to present a plan or a proposal for the achievement of 
some task. It was also common practice that one member of each group would be 
required to interpret and present the groups findings or opinions to the rest of the 











more often than not seemed to be undertaken reluctantly by the same people in the 
class irrespective ofthe group in which they were participating. 
The groups themselves were formed at random, which brought back memories 
of my childhood where I was subjected to 'the popular choice' method of group 
selection together with all the self doubts that went with not being selected first or 
being left unwanted and the subsequent humiliation of having to plead to be included. 
Or worse still, having an adult impose your presence on a somewhat unfriendly or 
even hostile group of peers. 
Perhaps a somewhat less humiliating approach was to 'count off in the 
numbers of the size ofthe groups required. For example if five was to be the preferred 
group size the class would count off from one to five with the result that all the 'ones' 
would sit together and the 'twos' etc., etc. One got the impression that this method 
was considered a more equitable approach than ')ustjoin up with the people next to 
you", a somewhat abbreviated form of the 'popular choice'. Unfortunately, if you 
didn't have your wits about you, you would suddenly find that all those next to you 
had joined with all those next to them, and once more, humiliation - you were on your 
own! 
Avoiding discomfort 
To the writer, a somewhat puzzling aspect of this phenomenon of splitting up 
into groups, was the attitude of the students - myself included. Neither the legitimacy 
of the groups nor the rationale behind the 'group' approach was ever questioned. This, 
in spite of the fact that as adults we were expected to behave in virtually the same 
manner as we had as children and regrettably as many children are still treated today. 
We all just accepted this behaviour and did as we were instructed, never voicing any 
of the dissatisfaction we felt. Holmer (2001) suggests that this type of behaviour is 
consistent with our "learned, culturally ingrained habits of avoiding discomfort" (p. 
594). But the defensive habit that most consistently and insidiously inhibits learning is 
that of repressing our own ideas, opinions and concerns, which we are all too willing 
to do, according to Holmer, rather than risk being seen as uncooperative. She further 
suggests that by dismissing our own perceptions we fail to see that our own 
complicity in group dysfunction contributes to a sense of helplessness and cynicism 











Another somewhat puzzling aspect of this same condition was that of the 
attitude of the various faculty members who choose to adopt a 'group-work' 
approach. At no time was I confident that there was a 'method to this madness'. 
However, my opinions would vary from a very negative view that the use of this 
approach was an abdication of responsibility for finding an effective learning 
mechanism for the chosen subject matter; to a more forgiving view that it was an 
approach, which was considered in educational circles to be politically correct -
"Group work rather than directive teaching is one of the features of People's 
Education that was absorbed into contemporary policy" (Chisholm 2000:28). 
It seemed evident to me that the use of student groups by faculty was 
something that was accepted, as it was by students without question. And although 
there seemed to be no malicious intent, it did appear to be done with little or no 
consideration for even the most fundamental issues regarding student integration, 
particularly mature postgraduate students of such different demographic and 
psychographic backgrounds. To the best of my knowledge, at no time during the 
course of the two-year programme were any students ever questioned as to the 
effectiveness or otherwise of any of the group work employed; even, I hasten to add, 
for the course that was given to members of the programme to improve their inter-
personal effectiveness within groups. 
The diversity of the class and the indiscriminate manner in which groups were 
formed did little to make my introduction to groupwork at UCT a pleasant one. 
Initially I experienced a fairly high degree of animosity within some of the groups in 
which I participated. From a demographic perspective I was at one extreme ofthe 
diversity continuum being the only white male in the entire class and an upper 
middle-class avowed capitalist to boot; a fact, which didn't go unnoticed amongst 
some of my 'previously disadvantaged' female colleagues. Fortunately, as is so often 
the case, socially generated group prejudices tend to dilute as people get to know one 
another as individuals. I believe most of the class began to realise that what we had in 
common regarding our attitudes towards issues such as a desire to be better educators, 
was of more importance than our demographic differences. An example of this was 
given to me by a female colleague who during the second year of our programme 










was subsequently able to bridge the perceived demographic gap between us and 
become a friend. 
"Practice fields" 
In contrast to the experience of the advanced diploma, my previous exposure 
to co-operative learning on a formal basis had been in the academic world of business, 
initially at the Graduate School of Business, University of Cape Town, hereinafter 
referred to as 'the GSB'. To give the reader some idea of the difference in the two 
contexts adult education at the University of Cape Town just six years after South 
Africa's first democratically elected government came to power and the same 
university's business school during the 1970's - I should like to look at some of the 
latter's demographics. 
I have already referred to the diversity of the student body on the advanced 
diploma course, educators who came from almost every section of South Africa's 
multi-cultural society, a true reflection of our 'Rainbow Nation'. The business school 
on the other hand, during the nineteen-seventies, was a very different environment, 
comprised of students who had much more in common both from a demographic and 
a psychographic perspective, particularly with regard to business ideology and work 
expenence. 
For example, at the Programme for Management Development (PMD) in 1972 
the class comprised eighty-five white middle-class males representing supposedly, the 
cream of Southern African businesses' junior to middle management. Each delegate 
paying for the three-week course the equivalent in today's money of between R 43000 
and R46000 (depending on the accommodation preferred) for the privilege of 
participating. Similarly in 1976 at the inaugural Advanced Management Programme 
(AMP) of the same school; out of a total of sixty delegates there were fifty-nine white 
males and one white female; this time representing what was then considered to be the 
cream of South African senior corporate management and at a cost ofR63000 for a 
two-week programme. 
A preferred method of instruction at the GSB is the case-study method using 
predetermined groups of six members each on a rotation basis throughout the duration 
of the programme. I have no personal knowledge as to how the school selected the 











from a particular discipline within the business community to the group. To me, this 
appeared to further promote a degree of unity within the groups. What also appeared 
to help promote a degree of unity was that each group had a specific task to perform, 
which was always related to a business issue. These groups by and large, functioned 
in a similar manner to that which I had previously experienced amongst competent 
management bodies in organisations with which I had been associated. I would 
submit that this business school 'case study' approach is similar to what Senge, 
Kleiner, Roberts, Ross, and Smith (1994) refer to as "Practice fields": 
In sports and in the performing arts, two settings in which teams 
consistently enhance their capabilities, players move regularly 
between a practice field and the real game, between rehearsal and 
performance. It is impossible for us to imagine a basketball team 
learning without practice or a chamber music ensemble learning 
without rehearsal. Yet, that's exactly what we expect to occur in our 
organisations (Senge et al. 1994:35). 
Although I was unaware of these words at the time, the GSB did equip me for the 
future not to have too many unreasonable expectations in respect of my own working 
environment. 
Ensuring social harmony 
It was with this background that I entered a Master's programme at UeT in 
the first year of the new millennium. The programme that I had chosen comprised 
coursework and a minor dissertation. The coursework I chose was spread over four 
different subject modules, two in each of the university's semesters. These were to be 
completed at a pass rate level of 60% or better in order for aspirant Masters students 
to gain permission to write a minor dissertation in order to complete the degree. 
Throughout the course of the first three modules I had chosen, as had been the 
case in the Advanced Diploma, students were regularly asked by faculty to form 
groups of three or four persons, to perform a variety of work, from critiquing papers 
to making class presentations. Once again these experiences for me were rarely 
pleasurable or worthwhile as a learning experience. But I kept my dissatisfaction to 
myself, since none of the tasks to be performed appeared to have any direct impact on 











However a climax was reached in October of2002. Whilst participating in my 
fourth course module, the course convenor announced that part of the individual 
assessment for this particular module would be decided on the results of an 
assignment, which was to be completed by the students 'working in teams'. When I 
asked the course convenor why this mode of practice was being employed, the 
response given was that the content of the project seemed to lend itself to co-operative 
work and that the use of this method of instruction was strongly encouraged within 
the education department. 
The course convenor admitted that she had had no formal training as a 
facilitator in co-operative learning and as on previous occasions, the selection ofthe 
various groups was purely arbitrary. 
From my perspective, this experience was most unsatisfaetory and I believe 
little if any learning took place. The group of which I was a member comprised four 
students, all of whom seemed to have little in common with each other. We all came 
from very different social, cultural, political and economic backgrounds and the only 
unifying factor was the task that we as a group were expected to perform. In this 
regard I had no previous technical knowledge or experience of the task, so I felt very 
much the 'outsider' and as a result abdicated a lot of responsibility for the task's 
completion. 
However what seemed most important to the group was successful social 
interaction. This could be evidenced in the way we conducted our project meetings 
with everyone bringing food and drink to ensure a successful 'party'. However, our 
endeavours to ensure "social harmony", I suspect were often at the expense of 
valuable criticism being withheld - "Without sufficient skills development, teams are 
likely to succumb to tendencies to maintain social harmony at the expense of the 
inter-personal risk taking leadership that is necessary to maximise creativity and 
effectiveness" (Holmer 2001:592). 
Nurturing a culture of co-operation 
Having informally discussed the issue of co-operative learning with friends 
and other students it would appear that I am not alone in my dissatisfaction of the co-
operative learning concept. However my view does seem to be in sharp contrast to the 











Department of Education, as put forward in their policy documents. For example it 
states in the Revised National Curriculum Statement, that there is a strategy to nurture 
a culture of communication and participation (emphasis mine) in our schools, by 
working effectively with others as members of a team (RNCS 2002:7-11). Also, as 
mentioned earlier on page 10 of this report, the Review Committee on Curriculum 
2005, chaired by Chisholm, highlight as one ofthc curriculum's main features 
"groupwork rather than directive teaching" (Chisholm 2000 chapter 3:2). 
There seems little doubt that the reason for education's enthusiasm is that the 
policy makers believe that co-operative learning through teams will help create the 
kind of citizen who has "the ability to participate in society as a critical and active 
citizen" (p. 8) and who can, amongst other things 
• Identify and solve problems and make decisions using critical and 
creative thinking. 
• Organise and manage themselves and their activities responsibly and 
effectively. 
• Collect, analyse, organise and critically evaluate information (Policy 
Overview C2005, p. 11). 
This belief that group work will produce these outcomes is in sharp contrast 
with my own experience in higher education but ironically not entirely outside my 
experience within the business community. 
To summarise: the concept of some form of collective learning seems to enjoy 
popularity amongst policy makers because it is believed to be the best method for 
developing the sort of 'leadership' skills that students will require as citizens in the 
'new' South Africa of the twenty-first century. However, from my own experience, 
although I have had some success in a business environment, I have generally found 
that working in teams is normally problematic. 
For the writer this raises several issues. Is my own experience unusual? Am I 
the exception rather than the rule? Is co-operative learning through teams the 
preferred choice of most students and members of the business community? 
But what if on the other hand I'm not so unusual? What if most people find 











if so, what then is needed to make the co-operative learning experience more 
pleasurable and more productive? 
Research methodology 
Given the above background to my interest in the topic, I was left to consider 
an appropriate method to take my enquiry further. I decided that I would maximise 
my learning by largely concentrating on a literature survey that would allow me to 
explore the topic in more detail from a variety of angles instead of trying to exceed to 
the demands of this minor dissertation by trying to include an additional small 
empirical study. I decided to place my own experience against my learnings from the 
literature review. 
My research starts with an investigation of the literature on current learning 
theory. The objectivism/subjectivism debate and the widespread popularity of 
constructivism in its various forms are introduced. I looked at these in some detail in 
order to understand how and why the various theories might support a collectivist 
approach to learning. During this investigation I realised that not everyone was 
entirely satisfied with constructivism. Much ofthe criticism came from quarters that 
seemed to be influenced by the developments in science particularly those areas that 
have seemed to developed out of quantum mechanics creating in academia what is 
now referred to as New science (Wheatley 1992). 
In chapter three I look at some ofthe reasons why constructivism in its present 
form fails to answer some of the questions raised by the New Science. I then look at 
the main categories within science that appear to be providing reasons for the 
questions that are being raised. In this regard I look at quantum theory; evolutionary 
biology; superstring theory; chaos and complexity and the idea of a unifying force in 
physics the Zero Point Field. With this understanding I then investigate two of the 
new learning theories that have to some extent been motivating by science's recent 
discoveries namely enactivism and evolutionary educational psychology. I have 
investigated the underlying principles of these relatively recent theories and how they 
associate learning with a collective environment. 
My research into learning theory, both current and the latest developments, 
strongly confirm support for collective learning environments albeit for somewhat 











co-operate but how should we co-operate. With this question in mind I end chapter 
three by offering a distinction for two different types of collective learning 
environments. 
With the knowledge that learning theory was supportive of collective learning 
environments, I proceeded to investigate the literature on what forms collective 
learning or organisational learning environments take. In chapter 4, I concentrate on 
the practice-orientated literature, which refers to all organised collective learning 
environments as learning organisations. In the case of small collectives these are 
generally termed groups or teams whereas large collectives such as companies or 
institutions are termed learning organisations. What is most significant is that the 
literature, whilst drawing a distinction between learning by the individual within a 
group and learning by the group, by and large does not distinguish between the 
principles involved in creating successful learning environments irrespective of size. 
As a result of this my research does not distinguish either and shows that the 
principles required for successful student project teams are virtually the same as for 
successful corporations or institutions. 
In chapter 5, my research switches to an investigation of what are possibly the 
two major motivating factors for the enthusiasm expressed for collective learning by 
both educational policy makers and management theorists alike. Firstly, the globalised 
nature of our modem world and the demands that it is making on members who wish 
to participate economically to be competitive in the production of knowledge. And 
secondly, the 'new capitalist' order that some theorists believe is responsible for this 
economic imperative. Both of these phenomena I look at in some detail before 
investigating the claim of an unholy alliance, which could possibly be one 
explanation, albeit a most unsatisfactory one (particularly to dedicated educators) for 
the unlikely enthusiasm expressed for the same learning concept by two former 
protagonists. 
In chapter 6, I tackle the main issue of my research. I try to find some rational 
explanation why, in spite of all the apparent theoretical, economical and social 
support for the concept of collective learning environments, do I and from my 
investigation of the literature, so many others, find teamwork so problematic. An 
issue, which is well expressed by Hackman (2002:236) "How can we reconcile the 











picture that emerges from scholarly research on group performance? And how do 
teams generate the benefits for their organisations that are claimed for them, or do 
they not?" 
My research on this issue is almost exclusively based on the work that has 
been carried out over the last thirty years by Argyris and Argyris and Schon. The 
reason for this is that the literature is inattentive to the difficulties that are posed by 
the idea of groups learning. It treats the benefits of collective learning as a widely 
acceptable principle whilst not giving serious consideration to the processes that 
threaten its validity and to the difficulties of its implementation. Writers on collective 
learning tend to focus on what the literature refers to as first-order errors whilst 
selectively ignoring second-order errors which are the behavioural designs that make 
people systematically unaware ofthe behaviour that underlies the production and 
reproduction of first-order errors. I believe that it is these very issues that are at the 
root of why I and so many others find collective work problematic and it is these very 
issues which Argyris and Schon have spent most of their lives researching. These 
matters which are the focus of chapter 6 and which seem to have been selectively 
ignored in the literature also seem to have been similarly treated by educational policy 
makers and management theorist alike. 
Having found what I consider to be a rational explanation for my own possibly 
irrational behaviour in respect of working co-operatively, I investigate in chapter 7, 
some of the circumstances where collaboration is effective and look at some of my 
own experiences as a means of making this determination. I also look at the issue of 
how the role of the educator fits into this new popular concept and the contribution 
the educator is able to make towards creating co-operative learning environments that 
develop collaboration. I then present what Argyris and Schon believe can be done to 











Chapter 2 - Towards a concept of co-operative learning 
A paradigm shift to the socialisation of pedagogy 
There seems to be little doubt of the influence that recent developments in the 
world of cognitive science are having within the realms of education in our new 
globalised environment: 
The discipline of psychology has traditionally been responsible for 
developing viewpoints on thinking and learning and translating 
these into educational practice. Over the last few decades however, 
a new 'megadiscipline' has emerged to subsume many of the chores 
of psychology. This megadiscipline is 'cognitive science' ... 
focused on the nature of thinking and intelligence of animal, human 
and artificial minds (Gee, Hull and Lankshear 1996:53). 
Until fairly recently the most dominant ideology in education was that which 
Duffy & Jonassen (In Kanuka and Anderson 1999) refer to as 'instructivism' (also 
known as objectivism). Basically an instructivist/objectivist approach to education is 
to systematically identify what is to be taught, determine how it will be taught and 
evaluate the instruction to determine if it was effective. The instructionist position 
stresses the importance of using an instructional systems design model where the 
learning objectives are clearly defined. However this methodology has come in for 
much criticism in recent years in that "students are often unable to make use of their 
class-room based learning in their lives outside of school" (Davis, Sumara and Luce-
Kapler 2000: 173). 
Gee and his colleagues also supports the perceived inadequacies of the 
instructional methodology pointing out that students master only basic, rote, low-level 
skills at best and although they may be able to pass tests and carry out basic 
computations, they really do not understand in any deep way, what they are doing 
(Gee et a1. 1996:55). 
It should also be noted that within this conception, learners are not encouraged 
to develop their own understandings or interpretations of what they perceive as it is 
the role of the instruction - that is the teacher and the instructional designer - to 
interpret it for them. In simple terms objectivism holds that learners are the passive 











A polarised methodology, which with the support of cognitive science is 
gaining popularity amongst educators, is that which Kanuka and Anderson (1999) 
refer to as 'constructivism'. 
Constructivist learning theories try to understand how we construct knowledge 
by addressing three key issues what does it mean to know something; how do we 
come to know it; and how does this knowledge influence our thinking processes? The 
constructivists argue that the systematic processes offered by instructionists are 
problematic since there is nothing systematic about how we learn or construct 
knowledge. It is therefore not surprising that most students have little real 
understanding of what they have learned when in our teaching, we "discount the 
reality of the ambiguous, complex, and continually changing world in which we live" 
(Kanuka and Anderson 1999:4-5). 
Opposing perspectives 
Conceptions of learning, borrowing from the idea of Pratt (1992), are like 
other conceptions, anchored in cultural, social, historical and personal realms of 
meaning. To "learn" means different things depending upon one's values, beliefs and 
intentions in other words on one's philosophy. This idea is nowhere more evident 
than in curriculum design. How content will be presented and sequenced is most often 
determined in response to what type oflearning is to take place and in the philosophy 
of the designer: in other words, how the designer believes people learn (Shoffner et al. 
2002:7). 
Curriculum design and learning theory, are grounded in the philosophy of 
knowledge production, which at its roots is a choice today between a traditional 
instructivistlobjectivist view, whereby knowledge exists independently of the learner 
and a constructivist/subjectivist view, which claims that all knowledge is created by 
the learner. Perhaps it is necessary to take a look at these opposing ideologies in a 
little more detail. 
InstructivismlObjectivism 
As mentioned above at the one end of the knowledge continuum lies 
objectivism, which according to Shoffner et al. (op. cit.), advocates that the world is 
completely and correctly structured in terms of entities, properties and relations. They 











therefore knowledge, exists in the world external to the individual and his or her 
experiences and that the structure ofthis meaning can be structured for the learner. 
Although objectivists accept that experience and interpretation may bias an 
individual's understanding of knowledge, the goal is to strive for complete and correct 
understanding, and for all learners to gain a similar understanding (Shoffuer et al. 
2002:7). 
Slightly further along the knowledge continuum is cognitivism which Shoffner 
et al. suggest was the great experiment in instructional design of the 1990s. Educators 
in wishing to distance themselves from behavioural psychology, which was seen as 
too controlling, moved towards cognitive psychology, which recognised that most 
people developed a method of processing information that they integrated into their 
own 'mental models'. Shoffner et al submit that this development resulted in critical 
thinking skills becoming of major significance in education. Although the basic 
ideology remains, in that truths are absolute in terms of what people are supposed to 
learn, cognitivism provided opportunity as to how learners should arrive at these 
truths (p. 8). 
As Kanuka and Anderson (1999) point out, the instructional model of design 
can be useful to designers to systematically identify what is to be taught, how it will 
be taught and be able to evaluate the instruction to judge whether or not it is effective 
(p. 4). Also critical in this perspective is setting clearly defined learning outcomes 
after determining what is already known and what is to be learned. Once objectives 
have been identified they are progressively sequenced from lower order to higher 
order learning. The learner is therefore assessed equitably with evaluation tools that 
measure the behaviours described in the stated objectives. Following this system 
encourages curriculum designers to focus on the needs and abilities of the individual 
learner resulting in the development of effective learning activities (p. 3-4). 
At the opposite end of our spectrum lies constructivism. 
Constructivism/Subjectivism 
Von Glaserfeld (1989) describes constructivism as an alternative theory of 
knowing. It is the belief that knowledge is personally constructed from internal 
representations using experience as a foundation. From a constructivist point of view, 











by the world, as opposed to the instructivist view in which meaning exists 
independently in the world external to the individual (Shoffuer et a1. 2002:8). 
Perhaps an even more significant difference between the two paradigms for 
educators is in respect of content dependency. An instructionist approach to learning 
design generally focuses on domain-independent learning methodologies whereas 
constructionists claim that there is no such thing as content-independent knowledge or 
skills and that all learning must be 'anchored' in some real-world meaningful context. 
This aspect is emphasised by Rogoff (1990) who regards context as "inseparable from 
human actions in cognitive events or activities" (p. 27). She also adds that in a 1982 
paper she argued: 
In the contextual perspective, meaning and context are not elements 
that can be handled separately or derived from adding elements 
together. Context is not so much a set of stimuli that impinge upon a 
person as it is a web of relations interwoven to fonn a fabric of 
meaning (Rogoff 1990:27). 
It is much easier for educators, suggests Kanuka and Anderson, to foHow an 
instructivist systems design model, which promises soundness and enduring academic 
approval, than to grapple with the complexities of our 'ill-structured' world in which 
we have to function as proposed by the various constructivist ideologies (Kanuka and 
Anderson 1999:5). 
A quartet of constructivist dimensions 
The major fonns of constructivism fall along two dimensions. The first 
dimension defines the constructivist position along a continuum between an 
understanding of reality as being objective at one end, and subjective at the other. 
Where educators fall in this first dimension will influence not only how knowledge is 
constructed (i.e., what are we trying to understand?) but also the way educators will 
facilitate learners to construct these understandings in the learning process. 
The second dimension considers that knowledge is either socially constructed 
or individually constructed and examines the degree to which social, contextual, and 
cultural factors detennine this knowledge construction. As with the first dimension, 
where educators fall will influence their teaching and learning practices. Specifically, 











emphasis that will be placed on social interaction, group process, and the learning 
and practising of socio-linguistic skills (emphasis mine )(Kanuka and Anderson 
1999:7). 
Despite the differences of each position along these two dimensions, they 
nevertheless have certain key issues in common. For example that we each construct 
knowledge based on what we already know and that learning is an active rather than a 
passive process (emphasis mine). The following diagram illustrates where each of 
these positions is located in relation to the other positions and the labels that are 
frequently applied to each position within the literature. 
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Constructivism -'flavour of the month' in education 
It has been argued, according to Argyle (1991), that co-operation is central to 
human existence yet educational institutions seem least characterised by co-operative 











developing interest in the use of "co-operative groups" as effective learning contexts. 
This interest he suggests has largely been fuelled by "the increasing realisation of the 
link between learning and social interaction" (p. 50). Bennett also claims that it is now 
"commonly agreed" that the foundation of learning and development is "co-
operatively achieved success" (p. 52). The two theoretical perspectives that are 
motivating this reform are two of the constructivist frameworks which I have 
discussed above and which are commonly referred to in educational parlance as the 
"cognitive constructionist approach" of Bruner and Piaget and the "social 
constructionist approach" ofVygotsky (Bennett 1994:51-52). It is perhaps prudent 
because of their current claimed dominance in motivating educational policy that I 
research these and their practical implications in a little more detail. 
Cognitive constructivism a developmental approach from cognitive 
psychology 
Arguably one of the most influential theorists with regards to education, 
certainly during the last century, was Jean Piaget, who as a biologist and philosopher 
interested in the study of knowledge, developed a theoretical framework, which he 
referred to as 'genetic epistemology' but which is probably more commonly known as 
the "cognitive developmental approach". Piaget's theory is dependent on the claim 
that learners are active contributors to their own cognitive growth, which according to 
Lloyd is basically what gave rise to the term constructivist theory (Lloyd 1995 :4-5). 
Another major contributor to cognitive constructivism is Jerome Bruner, 
particularly in an American context, where Lloyd claims that he was the most 
influential cognitive psychologist for the latter part of the twentieth century. Bruner is 
credited with inventing the term 'scaffolding' since he believes that without the 
support of concerned helpers, progress for learning will be limited. He also believed 
that without instruction the leamer's spontaneous activities could not be transformed 
into rational thought since "cognitive development is essentially a shared activity" 
(emphasis mine) (Lloyd 1995:28). 
What is consistent within cognitive constructivism is that they are concerned 
with changes that will happen as a result of new information that is inconsistent with 
current beliefs. They also maintain that there is a true world that we aspire to 











understandings of what the truth must be. Thus as Kanuka and Anderson emphasise, 
constructing knowledge is an evolutionary process through which reality can be 
understood and although this view focuses on the individual it does not deny the 
importance of social interaction (Kanuka and Anderson 1999:9). The evolutionary 
reference in relation to cognitive constructivism we shall investigate a little later. 
Practical implications 
Instructional methods in this view try to confront the learner with situations 
that make the inherent inconsistencies in the learners' naive model plain and challenge 
the learners either to construct better models or at least to ponder the merits of 
alternatives presented by the teacher (Perkins in Kanuka and Anderson 1999:9). 
Based on this assumption, educators need to provide instructional methods such as 
case studies, debates, individual and group summarising, and team teaching using 
heterogeneous grouping since it is recognised, claims Kanuka and Anderson, that 
interaction with peers who have different ability levels and backgrounds are a main 
source of conflict that can stimulate this process (p. 10). 
Social constructivism - an approach from social psychology 
The most prevalent form of constructivism, according to Kanuka and 
Anderson, is social constructivism, the theory of Lev Vygotsky (1896 - 1934) that 
emphasises the influence of cultural and social contexts in learning (Vygotsky in 
Kanuka and Anderson 1999: 15). The role of instruction for Vygotsky, is the 
continuation of culture, which requires that the immature person learns and the mature 
teach. In this regard he coined the term "zone of proximal development" (ZPD), 
which refers to the level of potential development as determined through problem 
solving under guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers (Lloyd 1995 :21). 
Thus as Bennett claimed earlier, co-operatively achieved success is at the heart of 
Vygotsky's thinking. 
The social constructivist perspective whilst acknowledging that multiple 
realities exist, believe it is possible for us to have shared meanings and 
understandings. This is in line with Vygotsky's view of meaning negotiated through 
conversation: 
The most significant moment in the course of intellectual 











practical and abstract intelligence, occurs when speech and practical 
activity, two previously completely independent lines of 
development, converge (Vygotsky 1987:24). 
Thus according to the social constructivist perspective, knowledge of 
reality is constructed through shared meanings and shared meanings are 
arrived at through social negotiation using language (Vygotsky in Kanuka 
and Anderson 1999:16). The process of negotiation according to Kanuka and 
Anderson is how we construct knowledge and ifthe process of negotiation 
results in agreement, then this agreement is our reality (Kanuka and 
Anderson 1999:16). 
Practical implications 
Kanuka and Anderson suggest that this position of constructivism provides 
few specific guidelines for instruction. Understanding occurs through interaction with 
the environment. What is learned cannot be separated from how it is learned, thus 
suggesting that knowledge is not just within the individual, but part of the entire 
context. Based on these assumptions, the emphasis in instruction is on the importance 
of helping learners engage in 'generative' rather than 'passive' learning activities (p. 
16). Students need to engage in argumentation and reflection as they try to use and 
then refine their existing knowledge whilst attempting to make sense of alternate 
points of view (The Cognition and Technology Group at Vanderbilt in Kanuka and 
Anderson 1999: 16). 
Since knowledge is constructed through social negotiation, discussion is of 
prime importance in this instructional methodology. Small group discussions and 
brainstorming are examples of instructional methods that can allow learners to 
examine their understandings through other individuals. Learners should also be 
encouraged to test their ideas against alternative views and alternative contexts 
(Kanuka and Anderson 1999: 17). 
Co-operative learning is another method that can provide opportunities for 
generative learning - "Cooperative learning creates an opportunity to form 
communities of inquiry that provide learning environments that encourage critical 











Chapter 3 - Learning through the insights of a 'New Science' 
Constructivism - not everyone's panacea 
In the book "How people learn: Brian, mind, experience, and school", by The 
National Research Council of America (2000), the claim is made that the revolution in 
the study of the mind that has occurred in the last three or four decades is having its 
effect in education. A new theory of learning is coming into focus that leads to very 
different approaches to the design of curriculum, teaching, and assessment than those 
often found in schools today. Equally important, they emphasise, is the growth of 
interdisciplinary inquiries and new kinds of scientific collaborations have begun to 
make the path from basic research to educational practice somewhat more visible: 
Thirty years ago, educators paid little attention to the work of 
cognitive scientists, and researchers in the nascent field of cognitive 
science worked far removed from classrooms. Today, cognitive 
researchers are spending more time working with teachers, testing 
and refining their theories in real classrooms where they can see 
how different settings and classroom interactions influence 
applications of their theories (National Research Council of 
America 2000: 1 ). 
What the council claims is even more striking is the variety of research 
approaches and techniques that have been developed and the ways in which evidence 
from many different branches of science are beginning to converge. They believe that 
the story we can now tell about learning is far richer than ever before, and it promises 
to evolve dramatically in the next generation. Some examples they cite are: 
• Research from cognitive psychology has increased understanding of the 
nature of competent perfonnance and the principles of knowledge 
organisation that underlie people's abilities to solve problems in a wide 
variety of areas. 
• Research on learning and transfer has uncovered important principles for 
structuring learning experiences that enable people to use what they have 











• Work in social psychology, cognitive psychology, and anthropology is 
making clear that all learning takes place in settings that have particular sets 
of cultural and social norms and expectations and that these settings 
influence learning and transfer in powerful ways. 
• Neuroscience is beginning to provide evidence for many principles of 
learning that have emerged from laboratory research, and it is showing how 
learning changes the physical structure of the brain and, with it, the 
functional organisation of the brain. And 
• Collaborative studies ofthe design and evaluation oflearning 
environments, among cognitive and developmental psychologists and 
educators, are yielding new knowledge about the nature of learning and 
teaching as it takes place in a variety of settings. In addition, researchers are 
discovering ways to learn from the "wisdom of practice" that comes from 
successful teachers who can share their expertise (p. 2-3). 
In order to gain a better understanding of these issues I should like to investigate the 
scientific developments in a little more detaiL 
A new reality in a paradoxical universe 
In the twentieth century, physicists faced for the first time, a serious 
challenge to their ability to understand the universe. Every time they 
asked nature a question in an atomic experiment, nature answered 
with a paradox, and the more they tried to clarify the situation, the 
sharper the paradoxes became. In their struggle to grasp this new 
reality, scientists became painfully aware that their basic concepts, 
their language and their whole way of thinking were inadequate to 
describe the atomic phenomena. Their problem was not only 
intellectual but involved an intense emotional and existential 
expenence. 
It took these scientists a long time to accept the fact that the 
paradoxes they encountered are an essential aspect of atomic 
physics .... Once this was perceived, the physicists began to learn to 











they found the precise and consistent formulation of quantum 
theory. 
The effect on the physicists' view of reality was truly shattering. 
The new physics necessitated profound changes in concepts of 
space, time, matter, object, and cause and effect; and because these 
concepts are so fundamental to our way of experiencing the world, 
their transformation carne as a great shock (Capra in Wheatley 
1992:3-4). 
These early twentieth century revelations cited by Wheatley in the realms of 
physics are according to Gee et al now causing whole swaths of academic disciplines 
to retool themselves around common themes: "All are now intensely concerned with 
unpredictable properties that emerge out of myriad bits and pieces interacting within 
complex systems" (Gee et al 1996:50). 
This view is supported by Marsick and Watkins (1999) who claim that 
scholars lately have been looking at social systems organisations, institutions etc. 
through the lens of chaos and complexity theory (p. 204): 
Complex non-linear systems like ecologies or organisations are 
characterised by multiple systems of interaction that are both 
ordered and chaotic ... random disturbances can produce 
unpredictable events and relationships that reverberate throughout a 
system, creating novel patterns of change ... despite all of the 
unpredictability, coherent order always emerges out of the 
randomness and surface chaos (Morgan in Marsick and Watkins 
1999:205). 
Perhaps we can begin to understand why by first considering briefly from an 
enlightenment perspective some ideological issues that are raised by relativity, 
quantum and chaos and complexity theories. For this purpose I draw on the opinions 
of philosopher John Searle, mathematician Roger Penrose, physicist Brain Greene and 
scholars Victoria Marsick, Karen Watkins and Victor MacGill. 
An atomic challenge to enlightenment thinking 
John Searle writes that from the time of the scientific revolutions of the 











educated person to believe that he or she could come to know the important things 
about how the universe works. From the Copernican Revolution, through Newtonian 
physics, the theory of electro-magnetism and Darwin's theory of evolution, our 
universe made sense and was becoming even more accessible through the steadily 
increasing growth of knowledge and understanding. This belief argues Searle required 
making a distinction between two metaphysical realms namely the mental and the 
spiritual on the one hand and the physical or material on the other; often referred to as 
Cartesian dualism (Searle 1999:2-3). 
However in the early decades of the twentieth century a number of events, not 
least the catastrophe of the First World War challenged this enlightenment vision both 
about the nature of things and about our ability to comprehend that nature. Searle 
maintains that this challenge came from various quarters. The most pertinent to our 
discussion seems to be firstly, Einstein's theory of relativity, which challenged our 
most fundamental assumptions about time and space and matter and energy. Then we 
had Kurt Godel seemingly striking a blow against mathematics with his 
incompleteness proof Godel claimed that although there are true statements in 
mathematical systems they cannot be proven within the same systems. And finally 
quantum theory, which seemed to show that physical reality at the most fundamental 
level is indeterministic and that the conscious observer, in the very act of observation, 
is in part creating the very reality he or she is observing (Searle 1999:3). 
Searle in his criticism of the attack, emphasises the view put forward by 
Wittgenstein who he claims was arguably the most influential philosopher of the 
twentieth century. Searle suggests that many take Wittgenstein to have shown that our 
discourse is a series of mutually untranslatable and incommensurable language games 
"We are not engaged in one big game in which there are universal standards of 
rationality in which everything in intelligible to everyone but rather in a series of 
smaller language games each with its own inner standards on intelligibility" 
(Wittgenstein in Searle 1999:4). 
Also according to Searle, several anthropologists who have claimed that there 
is no universally valid rationality but rather that different cultures have different 
rationalities supports Wittgenstein's idea. This and similar versions of relativism have 











Postmodemists claims Searle, see themselves as challenging the enlightenment vision 
(p.4). 
Searle responds to these challenges against the enlightenment vision by 
suggesting that the real change since the nineteenth century is not that the world has 
become more unintelligible but rather that one has to be somewhat smarter and know 
a lot more. For example to understand contemporary physics you need to know a lot 
of mathematics. Relativity theory, he continues, is not a refutation of traditional 
physics but its extension, requiring us to think in "counter-intuitive" ways about space 
and time. It is worth remembering, Searle emphasises, that Newtonian mechanics also 
seemed paradoxical in the seventeenth century. 
However Searle does concede that quantum theory, especially on some 
interpretations, appears to present a serious challenge to the enlightenment vision and 
that he is not technically competent to make a serious assessment of its significance. 
He does however distinguish between the claim that quantum theory shows 
indeterminacy in the relationship of micro to macro levels on the one hand and the 
claim that it shows that reality does not have an existence independent of observers on 
the other. 
Searle believes that we simply have to accept a certain level of statistical 
indeterminacy in micro-macro relations as a fact about reality since there is nothing in 
the actual results in quantum physics that forces us to a conclusion that the conscious 
observer creates in part the reality observed. Such paradoxes are not in the actual 
results of experiments but in the varying interpretations ofthe results. He supports his 
views by citing "Paradox lost: Images ofthe quantum" by P. R. Wallace (1996). 
Quantum theory - a curious state of affairs 
Someone else who seems to share Searle's views on quantum theory and who 
is arguably better informed on the subject, is Roger Penrose, Rouse Ball professor of 
mathematics at Oxford. Penrose emphasises that phrases such as 'Heisenberg's 
uncertainty principle' are often invoked to suggest that there is a certain vagueness or 
even irrationality of behaviour at the quantum level (particles, atoms, molecules, 
chemical bonds, superconductors, lasers and other similar phenomenon) is in fact 
highly misleading. There is, according to Penrose, a mathematically very precise 











state vector, or wave Junction, evolves in a completely deterministic - and indeed 
cornputable -- way, in accordance with a well-defined equation, the famous 
Schrodinger equation" (Penrose 1999: 169). 
Penrose also clarifies what Searle argued earlier; that the lack of determinism 
comes in only when a 'measurement' is made, which normally involves the 
magnification of a quantum-level event to the large-scale "classical" leveL Penrose 
explains that it is at this stage that the rules are changed and that a "probabilistic 
element" is introduced involving the strange notion of "wave function collapse", 
which Penrose refers to as "state-vector reduction". But, he emphasises, at the 
quantum level itself, "determinism and computability hold true - according to the 
standard procedures of quantum theory" (p. 169). He does however concede that this 
seemingly odd behaviour is a highly controversial matter even amongst physicists. 
As present day physics is presented there are, according to Penrose, two quite 
different levels of physical description. On the macroscopic level, we have 
"classical" physics the physics of Newton, Maxwell and Einstein. This is, as 
Penrose points out, a deterministic physics and is computable. Whereas on the 
SUbmicroscopic level of molecules, atoms and particles, another completely different-
looking description takes over, namely "quantum" physics. "Quantum physics is 
characterised by the fact that different alternative histories of behaviour seem to 
coexist in some strange kind of superposition"; this being what Penrose claims 
constitutes the "state vector or wave function". He also claims that these 
superpositions of alternatives remain superposed so long as the system stays at the 
quantum level and the evolution of the system is again deterministic and computable 
taking place in accordance with Schrodinger's equation. The non-determinism of 
standard quantum theory occurs only when effects get magnified from the quantum to 
the classical level at which point the state-vector reduction is deemed to take place, 
whereby the state-vector is considered to "jump discontinuously from one state to 
another" (p. 170). 
Penrose does however stress that there are many different attitudes to this 
"curious state of affairs". Some physicists such as Niels Bohr regard the state 
vector not as describing any kind of quantum-level reality but as being merely a 
mechanical convenience useful for making predictions. Others would take the state-











reduction phenomenon as some kind of approximation or illusion. Yet others are 
apparently driven to the logical conclusion that the superposed alternatives must still 
exist at the macroscopic level, but for some reason "we are not aware of them, there 
being 'parallel universes' in which all these superposed alternatives (including copies 
of ourselves) are supposed to coexist" (p. 170). 
American physicist Henry Stapp argues that quantum waves collapse when 
intelligent brains select one among the alternative quantum possibilities as a basis for 
future action and that "this causal efficacy allows consciousness to serve a biological 
purpose (Stapp in Papineau 2000: 125-126). 
And finally, there is the viewpoint to which Penrose himself subscribes and 
that is that the Schrodinger equation is only an approximation to some yet largely 
unknown physical theory, which straddles both the quantum and classical levels 
(Penrose 1999: 170-171). 
Brain Greene (2000) of Columbia and Cornell Universities believes that a 
unifying theory already exists, namely "Superstring" theory. And at the risk of 
causing more confusion than clarity, I shall try, by using the writings of Greene, to 
give a brief description of the basic idea behind this relatively new concept, which for 
my research, I believe is important for me to understand. 
Superstring theory - a brief description 
String theory as it is generally referred offers a powerful conceptual 
paradigm in which, for the first time, a framework answering the 
questions that arise between the quantum and classical levels of 
physics has emerged. String theory proclaims that if we could 
examine sub-atomic particles - electrons, protons neutrons quarks 
etc. - with even greater precision, a precision many orders of 
magnitude beyond our present technological capacity, we would 
find that each particle is not in fact a point but instead consists of "a 
tiny one-dimensional loop". "Like an infinitely thin rubber band 
each particle contains a vibrating, oscillating, dancing filament that 
physicists ... have named a string" (Greene 2000:14). 
Einstein, who found the existence of two distinct forces - gravity and 











his life in search of a "unified field theory" that he hoped would show that these two 
forces are really manifestations of one grand underlying principle. WeB according to 
Greene, Einstein was simply ahead of his time and now almost a century later his 
dream of a unified theory has become the "Holy Grail" of modem physics. 
From one principle - everything at its most microscopic level consists of 
combinations of vibrating strands string theory provides a single explanatory 
framework capable of encompassing all forces and all matter. String theory proclaims 
that observed particle properties are a reflection of the various ways in which a string 
can vibrate. Just as the strings on a violin have frequencies at which they prefer to 
vibrate, the same holds true for the loops of string theory. Each of the preferred 
patterns of vibrations of a string in string theory appears as a particle whose mass and 
force charges are determined by the string's oscillating pattern. 
The electron is a string vibrating one way whilst the quark is a string vibrating 
another and so on. Far from being a collection of chaotic experimental facts, particle 
properties in string theory are the manifestation of one and the same physical feature: 
the resonant patterns of vibration - the music so to speak of fundamental loops of 
string. 
According to Greene the same idea applies to the forces of nature as well; and 
hence everything, all matter and all forces, is unified under the same rubric of 
microscopic string oscillations the notes that strings can play. For the first time in 
the history of physics we have a framework with the capacity to explain every 
fundamental feature upon which the universe is constructed (Greene 2000:14-16). 
Chaos and complexity 
Finally with regard to the theories adding substance to the phenomenon of "the 
New Science" is that which is referred to by Marsick and Watkins (1999) as "the 
chaos/complexity metaphor". I should point out that I have learnt from my research 
that in a scientific context the term chaos has a slightly different meaning than it does 
in its general usage as a state of confusion. It would appear that in scientific terms, 
chaos refers to an apparent lack of order in a system, which nevertheless still obeys 
particular laws or rules: 
Complex non-linear systems like ecologies or organisations are 











ordered and chaotic ... random disturbances can produce 
unpredictable events and relationships that reverberate throughout a 
system, creating novel patterns of change ... despite all of the 
unpredictability, coherent order always emerges out of the 
randomness and surface chaos (Morgan in Marsick and Watkins 
1999:205). 
Chaos refers to a special kind of behaviour found in certain physical systems 
and was discovered at the beginning of the twentieth century by physicist Henri 
Poincare (Trump 1998). The two main components are 1) that systems, no matter how 
complex they may be, rely upon an underlying order, and 2) that very simple or small 
systems and events can cause very complex behaviours or events. The extreme 
sensitivity to initial conditions mathematically present in the systems studied by 
Poincare has come to be called dynamical instability or simply chaos. 
Although Poincare's work was considered important by some other farsighted 
physicists of the time, many decades would pass before the implications of his 
discoveries were realised by the science community as a whole. It was not until the 
early 1960s that Edward Lorenz, a meteorologist, whilst running computerised 
equations to theoretically model and predict weather conditions, found that having run 
a particular sequence and deciding to replicate it, the results were radically different 
from his first outcomes. Lorenz had not in fact entered precisely the same number, 
.506127, but had rounded the figure to .506. 
According to all scientific expectations at the time, the resulting sequence 
should have differed only very slightly from the original trial, since measurement to 
three decimal places was considered to be fairly precise. As the two figures were 
considered to be almost the same, the results should have been very similar. But 
repeated experimentation proved otherwise and Lorenz had 'proved' Poincare's 
theory that the slightest difference in initial conditions made predictions of past or 
future outcomes impossible. 
For the uninitiated like myself, who might find these milestone theories 
somewhat confusing, I hope enough has been said to demonstrate the possibility for 
numerous interpretations that are immediately available to both the conscientious and 











decisions in all forms of social organisational and institutional systems, including 
education. 
I should now like to have a look at how some of the ideas initiated by these 
twentieth century theories have been interpreted by some theorists interested in 
improving the workings of our "complex" social systems in our new globalised, 
postmodemist world. 
The New Science 
Relativity, quantum mechanics and chaos/complexity theories all challenge 
our thinking about observation and perception, participation and relationships, and the 
influences and connections that are created across large and complex systems. This is 
the view of Margaret Wheatley (1992) who it would appear from my review of the 
literature is a front-runner in her support of "the New Science", especially in what it 
might achieve if incorporated into organisational or institutional social systems. She 
further claims that self-organising structures as found in nature; demonstrate new 
relationships between autonomy and control, showing how a large system is able to 
maintain its overall form and identity only because it tolerates great degrees of 
individual freedom (p. xi-xii). 
It is because of these ideas that Wheatley is convinced that there is a simpler 
way to "lead" organisations, which requires less effort and produces less stress than 
that which is currently practised. She further emphasises that the "layers of 
complexity", the "sense of things beyond our control" and in fact possibly out of 
control, are but signals of our failure to understand a deeper reality of organisation or 
institutional life and in fact life in general. We need to stop seeking after the universe 
of the seventeenth century and begin to explore what has become known to us in the 
twentieth century and I hope even more so in the twenty-first (p. 3). 
Wheatley proposes that the New Science where the underlying currents are a 
movement toward holism, toward understanding the system as a system and giving 
primary value to the relationships that exist among seemingly discreet parts; where 
particles come into being and are observed only in relationship to something else and 
do not exist as independent "things" provides the answers. These unseen 
connections between what were previously thought to be separate entities are she 











MacGill also emphasises this importance of the interconnectedness of 
complex systems, claiming that the connections, no matter how obtuse, have several 
inherent characteristics, which help us understand the world about us and form the 
foundation of a vision that can greatly enhance human life (MacGi1l2004:3). 
Morrison (2002) who claims that "complex adaptive systems" cause new 
elements to form and new phenomena, new structures and new rules of behaviour to 
occur also takes up this sentiment. The example he gives is emergence: 
the old system is unable to adapt and so it dies, and a new system 
emerges from its ashes which is better suited to the situation being 
faced. The efforts to change the system simply by changing its 
leadership do not work; self-organisation cannot be mandated it 
emerges spontaneously and of its own accord (Morrison 2002:22). 
Morrison however takes issue with the terminology as it is often referred to in 
chaos/complexity theory. He questions the term 'complex adaptive system' for its 
systems driven, cybernetic, mechanistic connotations. The term "complex responsive 
process", is preferred as it conjures up the idea of human relations, which for 
Morrison, is at the heart of chaos/complexity theory as it applies to human social 
systems and combines the agency and mutual influence of individuals and groups. 
Indeed he points out that thinking of an organisation as a system has to be replaced, 
within chaos/complexity theory, by thinking of the organisation as "the processes of 
people relating to, and interacting with, each other over time" (Morrison 2002: 12). 
The concept of emergence used by Morrison is also emphasised by Wheatley. 
She cites Prigogine for his work demonstrating the capacity of certain chemical 
systems to regenerate to higher levels of self-organisation in response to 
environmental demands. This Wheatley suggests, demonstrates the capacity ofliving 
systems to respond to disorder (non-equilibrium) with renewed life, showing that 
disorder (chaos) can playa critical role in giving birth to new, higher forms of order 
(Wheatley 1992: 11). 
Wheatley also believes that the new science is making us more aware that the 
yearning we have for simplicity is one we share with all natural systems as is "the 
primacy of relationships". This prompts her to ask the question that if the "physics" of 











beginning to rethink our ideas about how we manage our lives in relational terms. I 
would argue from my understanding of the literature that this issue of relationships is 
of great significance in the New Science (p. 13). 
In this regard Wheatley proposes that the phenomena experienced in quantum 
mechanics, which she believes is the most successful theory ever developed in 
physics, may also apply to somewhat larger objects like humans more than was 
originally thought. For example, human brain cells are sensitive enough to register the 
absorption of a single photon and thus according to Wheatley, sensitive enough to be 
influenced by the whole panoply of odd quantum-level behaviour (p. 31). She also 
claims that in the quantum world, relationships are not just interesting to many 
physicists, they are all there is to reality. For example, Stapp describes elementary 
particles as " a set of relationships that reach outward to other things" (Stapp in Capra 
1983:81). Wheatley also points out that particles come into being ephemerally, 
through interactions with other energy sources (p. 32). 
Bateson is another Wheatley reference who speaks of "the pattern that 
connects", and urges us to stop teaching facts -- the "things" of knowledge - and focus 
instead on relationships as the basis for all definitions. With relationships we give up 
predictability for potentials: 
Several years ago I read that elementary particles were "bundles of 
potentiality". I have begun to think of all of us in this way, for 
surely we are as undefinable, unanalysiable and bundled with 
potential as anything in the universe. None of us exists independent 
of our relationships with others. ... What is critical is the 
relationship created between the person and the environment. That 
relationship will always be different will always evoke different 
potentialities. It all depends on the players and the moment 
(Bateson in Wheatley 1992:34). 
This causes Wheatley to proclaim that we can no longer, in this "relational 
universe", study anything as separate from ourselves. Particles remain as fuzzy 
bundles until they are observed. Only then do they become a thing (At the moment the 
wave packet collapses, quantum phenomena give way and Newtonian physics re-











On this issue Wheatley also cites Wheeler, a noted physicist, as saying that in 
a participative universe we do not, as some have suggested, create reality, but instead 
we are essential to its coming forth. We evoke a potential that is already present. The 
environment remains uncreated until we interact with it; there is no describing it until 
we engage with it "Abstract planning divorced from action becomes a cerebral 
activity of conjuring up a world that does not exist" (Wheeler in Wheatley 1992:36-
37). 
To live in a quantum world according to Wheatley, we will need to change 
what we do. We will need to stop describing tasks and instead facilitate "process ". 
We will need to become knowledgeable at how to build relationships, how to nurture 
growing evolving things. She also emphasises that all of us will need better skills in 
listening, communicating and facilitating groups, since these are the skills that build 
strong relationships and as "the era of the rugged individual has been replaced by the 
era of the team player" these skills become essential (p. 39). 
This issue of essential skills for building relationships discussed by Wheatley 
is a good example of what Argyris (1999) refers to as one ofthe "gaps" in the 
literature on group learning. Whilst prescribing the desirability of these essential skills 
Wheatley unfortunately makes no reference as to how they are to be acquired. I 
investigate this critical aspect in chapter 4 of my research report. 
The last issue in the New Science to which I should like to draw attention is 
another issue that Wheatley appears to believe is of significant importance and is 
derived from what has come to be known as "Field Theory". 
Field theory - a social perspective 
Space everywhere is now thought to be filled with fields invisible, 
non-material structures that are the basic substance of the universe . 
. .. Although we know a great deal about the way fields affect the 
world as we perceive it, the truth is that no one really knows what a 
field is. The closest we can come to describing what they are is to 
say that they are spatial structures in the fabric of space itself 
(Wheatley and Talbot in Wheatley 1992:40-46). 
My research would suggest that this is no longer the case. Lynn McTaggart 











of physics" (as described earlier by Greene p. 30 of this report) by "A small band of 
scientists dotted around the globe ... not satisfied to simply carryon with quantum 
physics by rote" (p. xxi). 
McTaggart points out that this "small band" of scientists, requiring better 
answers to many of the large questions left unanswered, have picked up where the 
pioneers of quantum left off and are probing deeper. Their particular area of interest is 
that which is referred to in quantum physics as "the Zero Point Field" - an ocean of 
microscopic vibrations (see the discussion on Superstring theory p. 30 this report) in 
the space between things: 
If the Zero Point Field, this ocean of microscopic vibrations, were 
to be included in our conception of the most fundamental nature of 
matter, then the very underpinning of our universe would be a 
heaving sea of energy one vast quantum field. If this were true, 
everything would be connected to everything else like some 
invisible web (McTaggart 2003:xxi). 
These same scientists also claim that we all are made from the same basic 
material; that on our most fundamental level, living things, including human beings, 
are in fact packets of quantum energy constantly exchanging information with this 
inexhaustible energy sea. Information about all aspects of life, from cellular 
communication to the vast array of controls of DNA, relayed through an information 
exchange on the quantum level. Even our minds, in their opinion, operate according to 
quantum processes. This would suggest that all human perception occurs because of 
interactions between the subatomic particles in our brains and the quantum energy sea 
- the Zero Point Field (p. xxi-xxii). 
McTaggart also suggests that fundamentally this group of scientists have 
provided evidence that "all of us connect with each other and the world at the very 
undercoat of our being". Added to this she claims that there may be such a thing as a 
"life force" flowing through the universe what has variously been called "collective 
consciousness", an idea borrowed by enactivists, or "the Holy Spirit", a concept 
which is somewhat more widely accepted (p. xxii). 
Wheatley (1992) suggests that an image she has found effective in helping one 











fish. If for example we were unaware of the medium of water in which fish swim, we 
would probably look for explanations of their movements in terms of one fish 
influencing another. If however we observed all the fish deflecting in a regular 
pattern, we might begin to suspect that some other medium was influencing their 
movements. We could test for the presence of this medium by creating disturbances in 
it and noting the reactions of the fish (Wheatley 1992:50). 
An intriguing concept in biology 
Sheldrake according to Wheatley, has created a somewhat controversial and 
intriguing concept of fields in biology that relates to social organisation. He has 
postulated the existence of "morphic" fields that govern the behaviour of species. 
These fields, claims Sheldrake, are built up through the accumulated behaviour of 
species members. "The form resides in the morphic field, and when individual energy 
combines with it, it patterns behaviour without the need for laborious learning of the 
skill" (Sheldrake in Wheatley 1992:51). 
As one can imagine this would suggest that field images could become quite 
significant when applied to social organisations and their members. Or as Wheatley 
describes it "quite provocative"! 
We agreed that we could feel good customer service by just walking 
into the store. We tried to get more specific by looking at visual 
cues, merchandising layouts, facial expressions - but none of us 
could explain the sure sense we had (p. 53). 
Wheatley also emphasises the point that within any form or size of social 
organisation the need for organisational clarity about purpose and direction is a 
wonderful candidate for field theory. It is in linear fashion, she continues, that we 
have most often conceived of vision as thinking into the future, creating a destination 
for a particular social group. This is a very strong Newtonian image, but what if, as 
she suggests, we changed the science and looked at vision as a field? What if we saw 
a field of vision that needed to permeate social institutional space, rather than viewing 
vision as a linear progression? Ifwe think of ideas as fields, we will have a better 
metaphor for understanding why concepts control as well as they do (p. 54-55). 
Wheatley is also quite emphatic in stressing why this work of field creation 











bothered to create a field of vision that is coherent and sincere, then she believes that 
people will inevitably encounter other fields; ones that have been created 
unintentionally or casually. She emphasises the claims ofField theory by reminding 
us that space is never empty (emphasis mine). If we say one thing but do another then 
we create dissonance in the very space of any social organisation in which we 
participate (p. 56). 
The issue of dissonance is one of great significance and one I shall return to in 
some detail in chapter 6, when discussing Argyris' "theories of practice", a view that I 
hope will go a long way in explaining why dissonance is so prevalent in all types of 
relationships. 
All of these developments in the study oflearning have, according to The 
National Research Council of America (2000:3), led to an era of "new relevance of 
science to practice". In my own research I have had the opportunity oflooking at 
some of these new developments and the criticisms of constructivism that have to a 
large extent prompted their development: 
Constructivists reject mentalist and cognitivist models of personal 
knowledge that are based on metaphysical assumptions. Instead of 
describing knowledge in terms of internal models of an external 
world, constructivists speak more in terms of potentials to action. 
This point is pivotal. For constructivists, bodily action is not 
evidence of understanding - it is understanding (Davis 2004: 131). 
A number of criticisms of constructivism have arisen and these 
make some aspects of the theory problematic ... These criticisms 
are not all of equal importance, and nor do they detract from the 
value of the theory, but they imply that a more encompassing theory 
oflearning is desirable (Begg 1999:3). 
Only the principles of evolutionary educational psychology will be 
able to provide a much needed anchor for guiding educational 
learning research and practice since it is the only perspective that 
readily accommodates basic observations that elude explanation by 












The more "encompassing theory of learning" to which Begg refers, is 
enactivism, which according to Breen, Agherdien, and Lebethe (2003) comes from 
the writings of Varela, Thompson and Rosch and is based on the work of Merleau-
Ponty and ecological understandings from chaos and complexity theories. Davis who 
Begg believes has developed the "notions of enactivism" in a practical way has 
interpreted the work within the context of mathematics education. Begg further 
emphasises that Davis, having worked with colleagues from other disciplines, makes 
his work relevant to subjects other than mathematics and since his 1996 publication 
his ideas have developed further (Davis in Begg 1999). 
I suggest that these two somewhat complementary theories, enactivism and 
evolutionary educational psychology (EEP) are both excellent examples of the "new 
knowledge about the nature oflearning and teaching" that is being produced from the 
collaborative studies of cognitive and developmental psychologists and educators, 
working together. I should now like to take the opportunity of looking at these two 
theories in a little more detail and how they might influence collective learning. 
Enactivism - a problem of relationship 
In his latest book "Inventions of teaching: a genealogy", Brent Davis (2004) 
places enactivism within the framework of what he refers to as "the notion of 
interobjectivity" (Davis 2004: 145). According to Davis this notion is radically 
different from the notion of objectivity within empiricist science. In fact Davis 
proposes that interobjectivity can be presented as a direct challenge to the 
metaphysician's desire for objective or observerless observations. One major 
conceptual influence for this departure from modernist thought can be traced to 
phenomenology and the work of Merleau-Ponty (p. 146): 
His principle influence was perception, which he understood as an 
interface between actor and acted-on. For him a sensory perception 
was an instance of unification of perceiver and perceived, not a 
separation (p. 146). 
This view supports the claim that Breen et a1. (2003) make in that "enactivism 
attempts to find a middle way between the mental and the physical by suggesting that 












Within his notion of interobjectivity where enactivism resides, Davis refers to 
two closely related branches of thought that have risen to prominence namely 
"complexity science and ecological discourses" (p. 150). Unlike analytic science, 
complexity science, according to Davis, is defined more in terms of its objects of 
study than its modes of investigation. He also points out that the phenomena that are 
studied by complexity science share two key qualities: 
First, each is adaptive that is, a complex system can change its 
own structure in response to internal or external pressures and is 
thus better described in terms of evolutionary processes than in 
terms of the laws of physics. More precisely, a complex system 
embodies its history in its structure. Second a complex phenomenon 
is self-organising, meaning that it is composed of and arises in the 
so-called implicated activities of individual agents. It is not the sum 
of its parts an object; it is the product of its parts and their 
interactions - an interobject (emphasis mine )(p. 151). 
Complexity scientists, claims Davis, often describe such adaptive, self-
organising phenomena as learning systems ( emphasis mine), where learning is 
understood in terms of "ongoing, recursively elaborative adaptations through which 
systems maintain their coherences within dynamic circumstances". Such phenomena, 
according to Davis, are able to present collective possibilities that are not represented 
in the individual agents and can arise and evolve without goals, plans or leaders (p. 
151). 
New ways of talking 
As a result of these developments Davis believes that new ways oftalking 
about knowing and knowledge are emerging - "ways that are explicit in their 
acknowledgement of the biological roots of personal knowing, the cultural roles of 
collective knowledge and the more-than-human contexts of human activity" (p. 153). 
Out of this he claims has surfaced enactivism; redefining cognition in terms similar to 
the scientific definition of complexity. In enactivism, cognition is understood as 
"ongoing processes of adaptive activity". One implication of this is that thinking is 











all "active processes" that are part of a person's ongoing behaviour "The processes 
of cognition are the processes of life" (p. 153). 
Begg draws attention to how enactivism contrasts with constructivism in that 
constructivism emphasises knowing rather than knowledge. With constructivism 
knowledge is viewed as a human construct which Begg suggests is evaluated in terms 
of whether it fits with the experience ofthe knower (Begg 1999:12). Begg also cites 
Davis as emphasising that both radical and social constructivism are based on the 
modernist separation of self from other and self from world. This Begg claims is 
because constructivism sees knowledge as something, "an object" as Davis puts it; 
and therefore it has to be assigned a location (Davis in Begg 1999:13). But Bateson 
claims that there is no such thing - "it is not knowledge-as-object but knowledge-as-
action" (Bateson in Begg 1999:12-13). 
This emphasis on "knowledge-as-action" Begg suggests, ties in with the 
enactivist perspective that "collective action is not for individual sense-making but as 
a location for shared meanings and understandings" (Begg 1999:13). 
Another critical issue of enactivism for Davis is that it rejects the assumption 
of a "core, essential, inner self'. Personal identity is seen to come about in "the 
complex mix of biological predisposition, physical effect, social circumstance, and 
cultural context" as a person copes with the "contingencies of existence". Life and 
learning therefore, are understood in terms of "exploration of ever-evolving 
landscapes of possibility and of selecting actions that are adequate to situations" 
(Davis 2004:154). 
However the quality of enactivism, which makes it a theory that Davis submits 
"spans" the gap, albeit a rather small one, between complexivist and ecological 
sensibilities, is its concern for ethical action (emphasis mine )(p. 155). Complexity 
science has managed to maintain aspects of the "detached modem scientific attitude" 
and as a result tends not to concern itself with questions of meaning On the other 
hand, an ecological perspective is very much concerned with meaning: 
Departing from most environmentalist discourses, which continue 
to frame humanity's relationship to the more-than-human in terms 
of management and overseeing, deep ecology begins with the 











words the role of humanity is not understood in terms of 
stewardship, but of mindfulness and ethical action (p. 156). 
Following this line of thought Davis suggests that in being aware of their 
selves and of nature, humans are one of the means by which nature is conscious of 
itself. Human thoughts, he continues, are not merely about the cosmos; they are parts 
of the cosmos - and so the universe changes when our thoughts change. The defining 
feature of this perspective is for Davis, "an attitude of respect and entanglement" with 
all living forms. This attitude has been "picked up" in the term "participatory 
epistemology", which Davis maintains is used to refer to any theory that asserts that 
all aspects ofthe world, animate or inanimate, participate with humanity in the 
ongoing project of knowledge production. "The whole is understood to enfold from 
and to be enfolded in the part(icipant). In a word, within participatory epistemologies, 
the central issue is meaning (p. 159-160). 
Practical implications 
Breen et al. cite Dawson in describing enactivism as "laying a path while 
walking" (Dawson in Breen et al. 2003 :229): 
It is concerned more broadly with the collaborative construction of 
a collaborative world. Concern is focused on the ecological 
interface of mind and society rather than on a solitary mind trying to 
make sense of an ontological given. It involves both of becoming 
part of an ongoing existing world and the shaping of a new one 
(Breen et at. 2003 :228). 
Certainly from this description and what Davis has had to say above, there 
seems little doubt as to the importance of the concept of participation within the 
enactivist perspective; an aspect of the theory, which is of particular relevance to the 
issue of collective learning. 
A powerful new way of thinking about identity 
Davis claims that both complexivist and ecological discourses, which form the 
basis of enactivism, might be described as responses to the modem neglect for 
context. He also suggests that there is ample evidence of this when one considers 
scientific technologies that are deployed in ignorance of their environmental 











disease rather than the support of good health; in legal systems that protect individual 
rights and ignore collective responsibility; and in educational systems structured 
around age-appropriate (versus situation - or person-appropriate) standardised 
curricula (Davis 2004:161). 
But another and perhaps more relevant problem, at least for this research, is 
the long-standing practice of "fragmenting topics into isolated concepts" and teaching 
the resulting parts in prescribed sequences in the hope that learners will "pull it all 
together". "This tendency to fragmentation and reduction - whether the human body 
or a body of knowledge - represents a failure to appreciate the difference between 
things that are complicated and phenomena that are complex (Davis 2000: 174). 
For Davis, complicated systems are those that are fully understood through a 
knowledge of their parts, such as clocks, car engines and computers whereas complex 
systems such as climates, the immune system, human beings and societies, cannot be 
fully understood through examination of their components, largely because their 
components are similarly alive or dynamic (p. 174). 
This recent realisation has brought forth "a powerful new way of thinking" 
about human identities, which has particular relevance to the concept of working in 
groups. According to Davis, the thinking includes the belief that "self-identification" 
is not always about distinguishing between an "I" and a "not-I" but rather that most 
events are about becoming part of a "we". He also submits that most of one's 
activities are "framed by the groups and cliques with which one identifies, as are the 
opinions and perspectives that orient one's interpretations". In this regard he appears 
to support the view that "attitudinal change seems to be a fluid and non-conscious 
integration of sensibilities, assumed in much the same way that accents and 
mannerisms tend to be taken on (or lost)" (p. 174-175). 
This phenomenon, Davis submits has often been witnessed by parents and 
teachers who have observed children undergo dramatic changes in personality as they 
"hook up" with different groups. In the classroom this is evidenced when groups of 
"good students" are separated from groups of those less-able and different groups 
form. When this occurs, different attitudes and different behaviours usually emerge, 











Regrettably, research into identity, Davis claims, has been overwhelmingly 
oriented by the modernist assumption that identity resides in the individual and so 
there has been relatively little inquiry into how such group identifications occur. But 
whilst there has been little formal enquiry, Davis believes, that people categorise 
themselves as an "us" at least as much as they categorise themselves as a "me" and 
are also able to represent group opinion while still exercising individual choice. He 
supports this contention by referring to an evolutionary psychology perspective, 
which suggests that the tendency of humans to identify both as an "us" and a "me" is 
linked to the fact that humans are social creatures whose survival depends on their 
capacity to form cohesive collectives (p. 175): 
After the human lineage split from the chimpanzee lineage some six 
million years ago, the size of human groups began to increase. The 
increase in group size meant that forming alliances became even 
more important for survival. For our ancestors, forming alliances 
and friendships was just as vital as eating the right food. Those that 
lacked the ability to form alliances and friendships were in as much 
danger as those who lacked the ability to detect predators (Evans 
1999:64). 
Classroom contexts 
Whilst these ideas challenge the modernist concept that identity is contained in 
a physical body, rather than part of a more complex "culturallbiological system"; 
enactivism rather than deny individual consciousness, experience or subjectivity, 
relies on the uniqueness of individuals: 
In order for complex systems to remain viable, there must be 
diversity amongst the agents that comprise the system. Tremendous 
creativity and novelty have been shown to arise from such 
individuality, as expressed in the context of a larger system (Davis 
2004: 175-176). 
This point as Davis emphasises, is of particularly relevance in classroom 
contexts. He highlights the debate around whose interests should be served by 
schooling; the student's or society's, which he claims, places the individual and the 











enacted in the classroom where the educator (cast as the representative of society) is 
positioned at odds with the students (representing their own interests)(p. 176). 
However Davis believes that some educators have demonstrated that a 
different way of thinking about the relationship between the individual and the 
collective can support very different classroom experiences. The key to this he 
suggests "is to work with the human predisposition to identify with groups" 
(emphasis mine). As an example Davis suggests some sort of shared "project" as a 
basis for establishing "a sense of collectivity" (p. 176). One can get a better 
understanding of this aspect suggested by Davis in some of the work being done by 
educators such as Breen at the School of Education, University of Cape Town. The 
School has recently introduced a course called "Researching Teaching", which tries to 
include much ofthe theory and practice of enactivism as described by Davis. 
It is important to note that educational practices from an enactivist perspective 
bcgin with the realisation that learning is not so much a deliberate act as it is an aspect 
oflife: 
Every moment of life is a learning event, a creative participation in 
the complex choreography of existence. Teaching is all about 
effecting transformation. In encouraging particular sorts of 
understandings, the teacher is supporting the development of 
particular worldviews and modes of perception. The associated 
classroom experiences are biological-and-social events (Davis, 
Sumara and Luce-Kaplan 2000: 178). 
Conditions for "complex co-activity to arise" within groups 
Davis himself believes that each event ofleaming entails a "physical 
transformation of the brain" and therefore a "different brain" meets subsequent events 
of learning a position that Wheatley (1992) identified with earlier. He also maintains 
that on a biological level, personal learning is not about acquisition, processing or 
storing, but rather it's about what he refers to as "emergent processing". From an 
enactivist perspective to ignore or downplay the biological is to "seriously restrict any 
discussion of what learning is and how it might happen". Davis however emphasises 
that "this is not to say that the biological must be given priority, merely that humans 











slowed video recordings of people in conversation "reveal a complex choreography of 
action" of which they are unaware. What he finds surprising is that "this extraordinary 
process of coupling one's actions to another's can occur without conscious 
knowledge" (Davis 2004: 165-167). 
To Davis, this behaviour demonstrates that we are biologically and not just 
culturally predisposed to engage with others in ways that he believes can properly be 
called "teaching". However, such behaviour is rarely apparent from "engagements 
with a subject matter", but rather from what Davis refers to as "the continuous project 
of fitting in" - in other words socialisation, an issue which is discussed in more detail 
in the next section on "educational evolutionary psychology" (p. 168). 
What is also of particular interest with regard to group work is that in Davis' 
opinion "for complex co-activity to arise (within a group) that surpasses the 
possibilities of agents on their own, there must be a certain level of diversity among 
them". It is this variation Davis claims that is the source of "novel responses". He also 
claims that: 
it is argued to be the reason behind, for instance, the vast amount of 
unexpressed DNA in the human genome, the range of vocational 
competencies in a community, and the biological diversity of the 
planet. When a complex system is faced with a problem, an 
adequate solution might be found in these pools of diversity (Davis 
2004:168). 
However what is crucial to the concept that I refer to as collaboration within a 
co-operative learning environment, is that such diversity, according to Davis, is only 
useful to the extent that "it can be appreciated by other agents in the system" (e.g. 
other members of a team). Which brings us to a second key issue for groups that to 
which Davis refers as "redundancy": 
To engage in joint activity, to 'structurally couple', agents must 
have sufficient common ground to be able to interact. In fact in 
most cases they need to be much more the same than different 
because a system's robustness is linked to its agents abilities to 











Davis concludes his thoughts on this particular aspect of the enactivist 
perspective on learning, by emphasising how important a tool the issue of diversity is 
in the classroom, as highlighted in the cognitive constructivist view of learning above 
(page 21). But what is of particular significance is that although the condition of 
diversity will more often than not be met, some work might be necessary to ensure 
"adequate redundancy": 
To engage in productive discussions, some familiarity with issues or 
some common experiences would be necessary. Such background 
or the provision of opportunities to develop such background is 
one important category of pedagogical decision making (Davis 
2004:168). 
I would submit that from my own experience this is an aspect that is not given 
nearly enough attention from a "pedagogical decision making" perspective and that 
Davis' final comment is much more in keeping with the 'constructivist' approach with 
which I am much more accustomed "One way of ensuring that complexity will not 
emerge is to remove all limitations" (Davis 2004: 165-169). 
I should now like to take a closer look at collective learning as "the 
continuous project of fitting in" and how the social and biological is emphasised in 
the second new development that I have investigated educational evolutionary 
psychology. 
Evolutionary educational psychology (EEP) 
Not all cognitive scientists feel comfortable with the role that constructivism 
plays in the determination of educational policy since it leaves certain important 
issues unresolved. For example, Jeremy Genovese (2003) claims that constructivists 
assume that all learning unfolds as part of a developmental process which more often 
than not, causes them to endorse leamer-centred approaches to learning at all levels. 
He also claims that they assume that "intrinsic" motivation is always possible and as a 
result "downplay" the importance of acquiring a knowledge base (Genovese 
2003:133). 
This view is supported by Geary, another cognitive scientist, who proposes 
that only the principles of evolutionary educational psychology will be able to provide 











claims the only perspective that "readily accommodates basic observations that elude 
explanation by other theoretical perspectives such as constructivism" (Geary 
2002:340). 
Educational principles from an evolutionary perspective 
Geary (2002) points out that EEP is the study of the relationship between 
evolved systems of folk or common knowledge and "inferential and attributional 
biases" as these relate to academic learning in today's society. He also claims that the 
principles of natural and sexual selection are increasingly being used to guide 
theoretical and empirical work both in the behavioural and social sciences. Nearly all 
of this research, according to Geary, has focused on social behaviour and cognitive 
mechanisms that are thought to be features of our behaviour, which are evident in all 
cultures, a classic example being language (p. 317). 
But this search for universal adaptations has generated both controversy and 
substantive theoretical and empirical advances, whilst at the same time drawing 
attention away from an equally important issue the relationship between evolved 
social and cognitive biases and the expression and acquisition of culturally specific 
behaviours and cognitions (Finn in Geary 2002:317-8). What is of particular 
relevance to our modem society claims Geary, is the relationship between evolved 
social and cognitive biases and a learner's motivation and ability to learn (emphasis 
mine)(p.318). 
Premises and principles of EEP 
EEP claims that natural selection has resulted in us having an evolved 
motivational disposition that attempts to gain access to and control of the resources 
that have "covaried" with our survival and reproductive outcomes during the 
evolution of our species. Geary claims that these resources fall into three broad 
categories ...... social, biological and physical. He also claims that our cognitive systems 
have also evolved to process information in these domains and to "guide control 
related behavioural strategies". This combination of cognitive, inferential and 
attributional systems defines that which we refer to as "common sense knowledge of 
psychology, biology and physics". As a result ofthis, EEP claims that people are 
biologically biased to engage in activities that recreate the ecologies of human 











cognitive systems, which define our common sense knowledge of psychology, 
biology and physics and flesh out these systems so that they are adapted to our local 
ecology (p. 328). 
Thus, according to Geary, the EEP principles that have been developed as a 
result of these basic premises are as follows: 
1. Scientific, technological and intellectual advances emerged from the 
above mentioned premises which resulted in gaps between the common 
sense or folk knowledge and the theories and knowledge bases of the 
associated sciences and disciplines. 
2. Centres for learning are likely to emerge in societies in which scientific 
and technological advances create gaps between common sense 
knowledge and the competencies needed for successful1iving (e.g., 
employment) in the society. The function of these learning centres will 
be to organise the activities of learners so that they acquire the 
competencies that close the gap between common sense knowledge and 
the occupational and social demands of the society. These academic 
competencies EEP refer to as "biologically secondary abilities" and are 
built from the primary (i.e., evolved) cognitive systems that comprise 
common sense knowledge, as well as other evolved domains such as 
number. 
3. Learners are innately curious about and motivated to actively engage and 
explore social relationships and the environment, biases that are directed 
towards information and activities associated with common sense 
knowledge. But the motivation to engage in activities that will develop 
common knowledge will often conflict with the need to engage in 
activities that will lead to the mastery of academic competencies. 
4. The inherent cognitive systems and learner initiated activities that foster 
the development of primary abilities, such as language, will not be 
sufficient for the acquisition of secondary abilities such as reading and 
writing. It is therefore predicted that the need for instruction will be a 
direct function of the remoteness of the secondary ability to the 












For many constructivists, as I have already mentioned above, intrinsic 
motivation is always possible and they downplay the importance of acquiring a 
knowledge base. Iran-Nejad for example calls for classroom activities that "permit 
multiple sources of control to interact with the natural (emphasis mine) learning 
process that creates knowledge" (Iran-Nejad in Genovese 2003:133). Whilst Pulaski 
asserts that "the ability and eagerness to learn is our greatest educational resource 
(Pulaski 1971 :205), and Senge who expresses this issue even more strongly "not 
only because it is our nature to learn but we love to learn" (Senge 1994:4). These 
views are in sharp contrast to the supporters of an evolutionary perspective. Pinker for 
example believes that: 
Education is neither writing on a blank slate nor allowing the 
learner's nobility to come into flower. Rather, education is a 
technology that tries to make up for what the human mind is 
innately bad at. Learners don't have to go to school to learn to walk, 
talk, recognise objects, or to remember the personalities of their 
friends, even though these tasks are much harder than reading, 
adding or remembering dates in history. They do have to go to learn 
written language, arithmetic and science because these bodies of 
knowledge and skill were invented too recently for any species-
wide knack for them to have evolved (Pinker 2002:222). 
Genovese (2003) points out that if this evolutionary perspective is correct then 
we would expect that as learners move through their compulsory schooling and from 
a curriculum centred on concrete operationallbiologically primary abilities to one 
centred on formal operationallbiologically secondary abilities that student motivation 
would shift from intrinsic to extrinsic. This according to Genovese is exactly the 
pattern that we find. He cites Steinberg as claiming "we know that early on children 
are highly intrinsically motivated and naturally curious, and they need little in the way 
of extrinsic rewards to motivate them to participate energetically in classroom 
activities" (Steinberg in Genovese 2003:134). 
But Steinberg also notes that regardless of what parents and teachers wish, 











adolescence and beyond. In a survey that Steinberg conducted, he points out that the 
most common reason given by students for trying hard was not a genuine interest in 
the material but getting good grades in order to get into college (Steinberg in 
Genovese 2003:134). 
Genovese however does concede that constructivist theorists have contributed 
many useful ideas to make instruction more interesting and meaningfuL Nevertheless 
since they fail to distinguish between biologically primary abilities and biologically 
secondary abilities they do not recognise that there are situations where these 
techniques may fall short. He criticises the fact that constructivists have erred in 
accepting an inadequate understanding of how cognitive skills develop and that they 
have made the mistake of elevating a delimited set of instructional techniques into an 
overarching philosophy of teaching. On the other hand, a pedagogy informed by 
evolutionary psychology will, Genovese believes, try to root teaching in a modern 
evolutionary understanding of cognitive development and recognise that much 
academic learning will continue to be "hard work" requiring serious extrinsic support 
(p. 134). "A family, peer group, and culture that ascribes high status to school 
achievement may be needed to give a learner the motive to persevere toward effortful 
feats oflearning whose rewards are apparent only over the long term" (Pinker 
2002:223). 
This culture advocated by Pinker does not unfortunately appear to be in vogue 
at present certainly not amongst students. Geary (2002) claims that surveys of 
learner's attitudes indicate that they value achievement in sports much more than 
achievement in any academic area. This result he also claims is hardly surprising as 
learners, especially males, spontaneously organise their social activities around group-
level competition, such as team sports. But the motivation for this behaviour has 
unfortunately got little to do with co-operation (emphasis mine) as constructivists 
might suggest but rather, "is a reflection of an evolved (emphasis mine) motivational 
disposition that results in the practice of group-level warfare" (p. 339). This non-
academic activity, as Geary points out, is in line with EEP's forth principle, which 
claims that "student's inherent motivational and activity biases will often conflict with 
the goals of academic learning" (p. 334). 
Geary also emphasises that the instructional implications are especially 











objective. Firstly as both he and Pinker suggest, the need to learn many academic 
competencies must come from the demands of the wider society and not the inherent 
interests of the learner. A second implication and one that seems significantly 
contrary to radical constructivism in particular, is that learning and instructional 
activities must, to some degree, be responsible for organising the behaviour of 
learners so that they engage in activities that they would otherwise not engage in. 
In essence, instructional materials, lesson plans and 
teachersllecturers/facilitators must organise and guide the learner's academic 
development since it cannot be assumed that student's "natural curiosity" will 
result in an interest in all academic domains or the motivation needed to engage in 
the activities that will foster the mastery of these domains (emphasis mine) (Geary 
2002:334). 
And so the question is not should we; but how should we? 
There seems little doubt that a social perspective is considered indispensable 
in current learning theory and not just by the two most popular constructivist theories 
cognitive and social constructivism - but by their critics as well. The cognitive 
theorists submit that instructional methods that employ case studies, debates, group 
summarising and team teaching using heterogeneous groups are appropriate methods 
of instruction. They further support any interaction with peers of different ability 
levels and backgrounds claiming that these environments often create conflict, which 
provides opportunities for learning. 
On the other hand their social constructivist opponents emphasise 
generative/active learning environments rather than passive ones where discussion is 
equally of prime importance. Small group discussions together with brainstorming are 
two of their most popular examples. The social constructivists also opt for "co-
operative learning", which they submit is another method that provides opportunities 
for generative/active learning to take place. 
While constructivists support co-operative environments as providing 
opportunities for learning, enactivists, as I believe is evident from my 
discussion on pages 40-41 above, consider it as having a somewhat more 











Collective action is not for individual sense-making but as a 
location for shared meanings and understanding ... instead of 
seeing learning as "coming to know", one envisages the learner and 
the learned, the knower and the known, the self and the other, as co-
evolving and being co-implicated (Davis in Begg 2000:12-13). 
However whilst there may seem to be little difference towards the importance 
of co-operation in creating learning environments between constructivism and 
enactivism in spite of their ideological differences, this is not the case with EEP. 
Although EEP also seems to support the concept of socialisation it does so from a 
perspective of a motivational tool rather than a learning one. Nevertheless the social 
aspect is once more considered of significance. 
But in all ofthis research, with the possible exception of the enactivist 
perspective, the emphasis has been on individual learners co-operating with each 
other to develop their own individual learning abilities within a social context. There 
has been little reference to groups of learners working together to achieve an objective 
for the group rather than for each individual within the group. It would appear that the 
co-operative context is associated with a collection of individuals working 
independently within a group environment on their own learning and using other 
members of the group as a resource for that learning. Contexts such as small group 
discussions, brainstorming, debates, group summarising and even case studies 
amongst peers and/or together with more knowledgeable others, are environments 
where the various constructivist learning theories, such as Vygotsky's ZPD, Burner's 
idea of scaffolding or Collins, Brown and Newman's (1989) concept of cognitive 
apprenticeship are in theory, able to be practised. The objective in most ifnot all of 
these contexts is to help develop individual learning independently of other learners. 
But if we are to give any credence to what the EEP theorists have to say then 
the creation of these types of co-operative learning environments, whilst being 
enthusiastically received by learners, will merely provide opportunities to develop 
what Geary refers to as our "biologically primary abilities", since "people are 
biologically biased to engage in activities that recreate the ecologies of human 
evolution" (Geary 2002:328). Some of these ecologies are listed by Evans (1999) as; 
forming alliances and friendships, reading other people's minds, communicating with 











But these same contexts will not necessarily provide effective learning 
environments if they are expected to develop "biologically secondary abilities", which 
EEP supporters claim need to be acquired in a formal education environment such as 
the more traditional 'instructivism' mentioned at the beginning of chapter 2: "the 
motivation to engage in activities that will develop common knowledge will often 
conflict with the need to engage in activities that will lead to the mastery of academic 
competencies" (Geary 2002:328). 
How then will this play out when the focus of the learning in a social context 
is not for the benefit of the individual learner directly but rather indirectly as a 
member of a group, where the learning required of the individual is for the ultimate 
benefit of the collective? 
In evaluating this aspect of learning theory I will investigate how the literature 
differentiates between a social environment, which encourages each individual learner 
to 'co-operate' with other learners to develop independently and a social environment 
where individual learners 'collaborate' to achieve a learning outcome for the group as 
a whole. 
Co-operation or collaboration - a distinction 
As pointed out by Southwood and Kuiper (2003) in their paper "A journey 
towards collaboration", the choice and understanding of the terms that are used to 
describe the different forms of collective work are all too often not attended to. Since 
the two key terms co-operation and collaboration can be used differently in various 
cultures and languages I am also aware that the terms are often used interchangeably. 
It is therefore important for me to define the way in which I now understand and use 
these terms in the rest of my research since their distinction is criticaL As Southwood 
and Kuiper point out that whilst there is little doubt that co-operation is necessary for 
collaboration to occur, not all co-operation is necessarily of a collaborative nature. 
Thus it is possible to co-operate without collaborating but on the other hand it is not 
possible for collaboration to occur without co-operation (Southwood and Kuiper 
2003:12). 
In my research, the term co-operation is used when referring to 
learning within a social context, such as a group or team, when the purpose is the 











emphasised by eonstructivist ideology outlined above. In this concept the group 
benefits through the collective improvement ofthe group members. All members of 
the t,TfOUp help one another and are able to work towards a common purpose but in a 
context where the primary motivations of each group member are not compromised, 
even unintentionally, at the expense of greater group effectiveness. 
This behaviour I submit is widespread and for most of us perfectly normal. It 
can be witnessed daily in almost all social contexts whether it be sport; the arts and 
entertainment; business; community service or academia. As Pinker points out in his 
book "The Blank Slate", human co-operation is rooted in the logic of reciprocity: 
The idea that people are instinctively communal is an important 
precept of the romantic doctrine of the Noble Savage. It figured in 
the theories of Engels and Marx that primitive communism was the 
first social system; in the anarchism of Peter Kropotkin; in the 
family-of-man utopianism ofthe 1960's and in the writings of 
contemporary radical scientists such as Lewontin and Chomsky 
(Pinker 2002:255). 
However the real alternative to "romantic collectivism", according to Pinker, 
is the recognition that social generosity comes from a complex collection of thoughts 
and emotions, which he emphasises, gives it a very different psychology from the 
communal sharing practiced by "social insects, human families and the cults that try 
to pretend they are families" (Pinker 2002:255), 
According to Pinker this suggestion was originally proposed by Trivers who 
showed that a deceptively simple principle follow the genes can explain the logic 
of each of the major kinds of human relationships. On this premise Trivers argues that 
a person's desire to benefit the group at the expense ofthe individual is unlikely 
among people who are not related as it is open to abuse by "cheaters" who are able to 
benefit from others without contributing in return (Trivers in Pinker 2002:255). 
However, Trivers also showed that a measured reciprocal altruism can evolve 
amongst reciprocators who have helped others who have helped them and who shun 
or punish others who have failed to help them. In this regard Pinker claims that 
humans are well equipped for the demands of reciprocal altruism. They remember 











and have an eagle eye and a flypaper memory for cheaters. But the tragedy of 
reciprocal altruism, as Pinker points out, is that "sacrifices on behalf of non-relatives 
cannot survive without a web of disagreeable emotions such as anxiety, distrust, guilt, 
shame and anger" (p. 256). Yet it is these very emotions, as we shall see later in 
chapter 6, that according to Argyris, are at the root of our Model 1 theories of action. 
This view illustrated by Pinker is supported by Jones who refers to this 
phenomenon quite simply as "the WIIFM" or "what's in it for me factor" (Jones 
1996:81). 
Collaboration on the other hand, I use to refer to a social context, in which the 
purpose of the learning that takes place is for the development of the group as a 
whole. The purpose of individual development is to improve the individual's ability to 
contribute to improving the greater efficiency of the group. I submit that this type of 
learning will only come about when the individual group members come to accept 
and/or believe that ultimately the greater effectiveness of the group/team will be to 
each individual member's benefit. The most significant difference between my 
interpretations of the two terms is that whilst the behaviour required for co-operative 
learning is, as described by Pinker (2002), completely 'natural' to us as a species-
collaboration is not. Collaboration involves behaviour, which for most of us needs to 
be learned. To illustrate this critical distinction between individual and group learning 
within a social context and some of the issues that this distinction highlights, I should 
like to recount a personal experience in sport from a high school environment that I 
hope will emphasises these various issues: 
The year my eldest daughter commenced high school I was asked if 
I would be prepared as a parent to contribute to the activities of the 
school by coaching some of the senior girls' "field" hockey. 
Reluctantly I agreed and was rewarded by being given the schools' 
third and forth teams to coach. Most of these young women being 
senior scholars with only one or perhaps two more years of 
schooling to complete, had accepted the fact that they were unlikely 
to ever achieve higher honours on the hockey field than their current 
level. In fact most gave the impression that they had reached their 











of achieving satisfaction by being a member of a highly 'successful' 
hockey team. 
However as a coach and a bit of a perfectionist, not to mention 
egoist, I had a somewhat different agenda. Although it was a 
voluntary position and at a very different level to that to which I 
was familiar; as an educator I was still determined to try and 
facilitate the most effective team environment possible. 
After our first practice game, which I used to familiarise myself 
with the girls various skills, namely individual hockey skills; 
knowledge of the rules ofthe game of hockey and last but by no 
means least, their team collaboration skills - I realised that if they 
were to develop as an effective hockey team a lot of work was 
necessary. 
I think the girls realised how serious I was about the game and my 
coaching assignment when I told them that no matter what the 
weather was like - rain, hail or snow - there would be hockey 
practice. Their standard up to that point was a fair weather one. 
My approach to coaching the teams was to concentrate on three 
aspects of training. Basic skills for individuals; the rules of the 
game; and the development of team skills, which were at that stage 
almost non-existent. I soon realised that the main reason for this 
were the 'traditional' methods of coaching adopted by the school. 
These I had witnessed whilst watching the first and second teams 
who were coached by the school's HOD; a position the incumbent 
at the time had held for many years. There was little doubt in my 
mind that team selection was based almost entirely on a girl's 
individual abilities with little or no regard for her team contribution 
skills. 
In the game of field hockey, as is the case in many similar types of 
sport, there is a belief that the ball can usually travel a lot faster than 
the players can run with the ball. So the adage is let the ball do the 











when one observes their behaviour on the playing field one could be 
forgiven for thinking that they had never heard of it! 
However my own experience had been that the more a team 
practiced this adage the more effective the team would be. But to 
carry out this concept, individual players basic skills pushing the 
ball; hitting the ball; stopping the ball and passing the ball to a 
fellow player accurately needed to be in place and the better these 
basic skills are, the better chance one has of being a more effective 
team member. The first part of our training sessions therefore, was 
always devoted to developing these basic skills. 
The second part of training was devoted to developing knowlcdge 
of the rules of the game and finally, of paramount importance, the 
development of team participation/collaboration skills. 
At this point I can honestly say that improving basic skills and 
knowledge of the rules of the game, although hard work presented 
little problem. But developing team col1aboration skills was a whole 
new story. 
At first I tried just "telling" the girls what to do. For example I 
would say "Don't run with the ball. Stop and pass it". But no 
matter how many times I said it, it just didn't make a difference. 
These girls had been playing this game for at least five years and 
they were skilled at the way they played it even if the way they 
played was not skilful! They had learnt the game and the rules 
according to the more traditionally accepted practice as 
demonstrated by the first team coach. So what was I to do? Their 
seemed to be only one option - change the rules. Make it illegal to 
play the game the way they were skilled at playing it. 
If I wanted these young women to use the ball and not to run with it 
I chose the rules of another sport of which most them were familiar 
- netbalL In netball it is illegal to move when you have the ball and 
it is also illegal for you to tackle the person with the ball. One tries 










encourage distribution by moving into empty space where you are 
able to receive the ball. Funnily enough similar ideology espoused 
in hockey but oh so rarely practiced. Hence, we started playing 
hockey according to 'netball rules'. 
It took a few weeks and a lot of whistle blowing and "free hits" but 
eventually their previously entrenched behaviour changed and a 
team started to emerge. When the official season started the team's 
success was on a small scale but as confidence grew in their new-
found team collaboration skills, the level of the team's success 
became enormous. So much so that in a challenge match between 
the third team and the school's first team, the third team won! But 
in spite of this not one 'third team' member was considered for 
promotion or selected for representative hockey since there were no 
'third team' players with outstanding individual skills just a highly 
efficient team that broke every hockey record for the season. 
With this relatively simple example of the distinction within learning theory 
let us now take a closer look at what the literature has to say about learning that is for 












Chapter 4: On organisational learning 
The work that has been done on group or organisational learning as it is most 
commonly referred to in the literature, can be divided, according to Argyris (1999), 
into two main categories: the practice orientated, prescriptive literature of "the 
learning organisation" and the predominantly sceptical literature of "organisational 
learning" produced by academics. Although they differ in certain respects they do 
corne together over key issues such as what makes organisational learning "desirable" 
or "productive"; the nature ofthe threats to productive organisationalleaming and 
their attitudes as to whether and how such threats may be overcome (Argyrls 1999:1). 
But before investigating these issues in more detail I should like to look at 
how the literature describes the most commonly referred to entities that comprise 
organisational learning. We start with arguably the most frequently used term when 
referring to collective environments teams. 
Teams - "a practice in group level warfare" (Geary 2002) 
As mentioned earlier, Geary (2002) suggests that young people, especially 
males, spontaneously organise their social activities around group-level competition 
such as "team" sports. He also submits that this is as a result of an evolved 
motivational disposition, which results in the practice of group-level warfare (p. 339). 
I have to admit that having watched a game of international rugby at Cape Town's 
Newlands Rugby Stadium recently, this "practice" does not seem to be limited to 
young people. 
Watching the rugby after having been involved with my research for several 
months I found it interesting to observe the behaviour of the various players in respect 
ofleaming theory. There appeared to be constant conflict amongst the individual 
players with regards to them behaving in a way that was beneficial to their team and 
behaving in a way that would possibly bring personal glory. The team's objective was 
to score as many points as possible by performing certain procedures, which required 
each team member to behave in a certain manner in order to complete the procedure 
to the team's benefit. However it was quite evident that many team members could 
not resist, on numerous occasions, the opportunity of behaving in a way that if 











instances, their attempts at personal glory were not only unsuccessful but were to the 
detriment of the team. 
One view in the literature that defines the concept of "team" as being distinct 
from other social groups is that of Richard Hackman (2002): "Teams are groups 
whose task requires them to work together to produce something - a product, service, 
or decision for which members are collectively responsible and whose acceptability is 
potentially accessible" (p. 42). 
Hackman emphasises the distinctive nature of teams by pointing out that 
members of groups, who perform their work alongside each other with the only thing 
they share being a supervisor or facilitator, are not teams but what he refers to as co-
acting groups. Although each member has an individual job to do, the job's 
completion is not dependent on what is done by other members of the group. As a 
result, a great deal of work today is performed by sets of people who are called teams 
but who are in fact co-acting groups. 
Hackman suggests that the reason for this is that those in control "harbour the 
hope that they can harvest the widely touted benefits of teamwork while continuing to 
directly manage the behaviour of individual members". This hope however for 
Hackman is misplaced; he suggests that if you want the benefits of teamwork, you 
have to give the team the work. Either design the work for a team or design it for 
individuals. If done well either strategy, according to Hackman, can yield fine results 
(p.42). 
This view of Hackman's is elaborated on by Kormanski and Mozenter 
(1987:255) who also claim that "some work groups technically are not teams". Citing 
Reilly and Jones they note that there are four essential ingredients that need to be 
present for team behaviour to exist: 
1. The team members must have mutual goals or a reason to work 
together. 
2. Members must perceive a need for an interdependent relationship. 
3. Individuals must be committed to the team effort. 
4. The group must be accountable to a higher level (Reilly and Jones in 











There is a subtle but nevertheless significant difference between these two 
views. On the one hand Hackman describes a team as a group that is defined by a 
common purpose, whereas Komanski and Mozenter are defining a team by certain 
types of behaviour. If one supports Hackman's view that the criterion for identify a 
team is collective purpose, then we open the door to a large variety of possible team 
performances. On the other hand if we accept Komanski and Mozenter's view then 
we are limiting teams to groups that perform in a particular way. 
In defence of Hackman's view, I would suggest that all of us at one time or 
another have been members of a team where not all of the members behaved 
according to the criteria suggested by Komanski and Mozenter but we still believed 
we were part of a team even if it was a rather poor one. 
In support of their argument Komanski and Mozenter cite Karp's example of a 
sports team as I myself did earlier. The team's reason for working together is defined 
by the goals and overall purpose of the team. Whilst individual members have specific 
assignments for which each is independently responsible; each team member must 
depend on all other members in order to complete their assignments. Lack of 
commitment to team efforts creates dissension and reduces overall effectiveness. 
Finally the team is usually operating within a higher structure such as a league (Karp 
in Komanski and Mozenter 1987:255). 
Once again I draw your attention to the sports event at Newlands Rugby 
ground that I mentioned above and the numerous occasions whereby team members 
acted in their own interests to the detriment of the team. Nonetheless a team they 
were, in spite of their reduced effectiveness. This difference of opinion regarding 
definition is of particular significance when it comes to our next concept a learning 
organisation. 
Great teams - learning organisations 
"Most of us at one time or another have been part of a great team ... what we 
experienced was a learning organisation". So says Peter Senge, widely regarded as the 
person who popularised the term that is currently used throughout both the popular 
and academic literature when referring to an effective co-operative learning 
environment - a learning organisation (Senge 1994:4). What is of significance in 











concept of a learning organisation or what is perceived, as a "great team", is most 
definitely dependent on performance. For example, an organisation that has a 
common purpose of satisfying the public with whom it deals might well be considered 
a team, but unless it performs in an exceptional manner it cannot as Senge has 
determined, be considered a learning organisation. So perhaps Komansky and 
Mozenter's method for defining teams would be more appropriate in defining 
effective teams or learning organisations. 
The position that Senge adopts, that a learning organisation can be any size; 
from a basketball team to a university; with its qualification entirely dependent on 
how it functions, is the position that I have adopted in this research report. That is that 
the criteria to 'reach for' that are stipulated in the literature to achieve team 
effectiveness, are the same criteria that define learning organisations, and vice-versa. 
Having looked at how the literature on organisational learning defines learning 
organisations I shall now consider how the literature views the key issues that make 
organisational learning "desirable" or "productive"; the nature of the threats to 
productive organisational learning and whether and how such threats may be 
overcome (Argyris 1999: 1). 
A culture of transcendent values 
In their paper "Communities of Commitment: The Heart of Learning 
Organizations", Kofman and Senge (1993) claim that developing new organisational 
capabilities requires deep reflection and testing. It also raises certain questions, which 
they submit have been at the heart of their work for many years and are the driving 
force behind a new vision of organisations capable ofthriving in a "world of 
interdependence and change". The sort of organisation they have come to refer to as 
learning organisations (p. 14). 
However, when they talk about a learning organisation they are not describing 
an external phenomenon but are "taking a stand for a vision"; for creating the type of 
organisation that they would truly like to work in and which they feel will be able to 
thrive in our modem world. With this idealistic approach the principles in which they 
believe learning organisations should be grounded are hardly surprising: 












(2) a set of practices for generative conversation and coordinated action; and 
(3) a capacity to see and work with the flow of life as a system (p. 28). 
It would appear that Kofman and Senge are not alone in their thoughts of a 
'visionary' approach. Guille and Young cite Easterby and Smith in claiming that the 
literature has an action orientation and is geared towards creating an ideal type of 
organisation in which learning is maximised (Easterby and Smith in Guile and Young 
1998:2-3). Or as Zuboff cited by Matthews and Candy expresses it - "The truly 
successful organisation is a learning organisation, and one of its principle purposes is 
the expansion of knowledge ... that comes to reside at the core of what it means to be 
productive" (Zuboff in Matthews and Candy 1999:49). Matthews and Candy expand 
on this interpretation using the words ofFord: 
A learning organisation is one where individuals, teams and the 
organisation itself are continually learning ... In a world 
characterised by multi-dimensional and often multi-directional 
changes, the long-term survival of enterprises is increasingly 
dependent on their ability to continually meet old and new customer 
demands; to learn how to effectively use new technologies; to learn 
to develop new work organisations; and to learn how to change 
their balance of skills and knowledge (Ford in Matthews and Candy 
1999:59). 
Matthews and Candy also claim that it is apparent that conventional views of 
learning are inconsistent with the development of learning organisations, especially 
those views that consider learners as isolated individuals without a social context. 
Accordingly they propose six principles of a humanistic/socialistic nature, which they 
claim need to be practiced ( emphasis mine): 
1. Individuals must be thought of and treated as purposeful beings. 
2. It is important to see individuals within their social context. 
3. It is important to acknowledge and accept that learning takes place 
within communities of practice, through sharing knowledge and 
through conversation (a very social constructivist point of view). 











5. It is vital to see our knowledge society as needing to be grounded in 
democratic principles which value and invite the contributions and 
influence of all citizens for the "common good". 
6. And finally the inextricable interconnectedness and reciprocal 
relationships between and among different levels of learning (1999:60-
61). 
A similar but perhaps slightly more practical definition is given by Garvin 
(1993) who states that a learning organisation is one that is skilled at creating, 
acquiring, and transferring knowledge and at modifying its own behaviour to reflect 
new knowledge and insights. In order to accomplish this, it is necessary for an 
organisation to be continuously engaged in five main activities, which he lists as 
follows: 
1. Systematic problem solving, which rests heavily on the philosophy of the 
"quality movement" whose underlying ideas include relying on the 
scientific method, rather than guesswork for diagnosing problems; 
insisting on data rather than assumptions as background for decision 
making; and using simple statistical tools for organising data and 
drawing inferences. 
2. Experimentation with new approaches, which involves the searching for 
and testing of new knowledge and unlike problem solving, 
experimentation is usually motivated by opportunity and expanding 
horizons, not by current difficulties. 
3. Learning from past experience entails organisations reviewing their 
successes and failures and recording the lessons learned in a manner that 
employees find open and accessible. 
4. Learning from others since not all learning comes from reflection and 
self-analysis. 
5. Transferring knowledge quickly and efficiently throughout the 












Garvin does however concede that this is a surprisingly stringent test for it 
rules out a number of obvious candidates as learuing organisations such as many 
universities, for although they have been effective at creating or acquiring new 
knowledge they are notably less successful in applying that knowledge to their own 
activities (Garvin 1993:78-91). 
This view is also raised by Freed (2001) when she quotes Marchese as 
commenting that "an organisation full oflearners doesn't add up to a learning 
organisation" (Marchese in Freed 2001: 16). Freed adds that there are many obstacles 
to colleges and universities undergoing the kind of organisational transformation 
suggested by people like Garvin and Senge, not least of which is the scepticism 
among faculty, staff and administrators about the value of doing so. The main reason 
for this scepticism, according to Freed is how a paradigm that was embraced by 
commercial organisations as a strategy for staying competitive can be applied in a 
non-commercial environment in which the mission goes way beyond serving a 
customer and staying profitable. Freed does however concede that although most 
people in higher education might see the value of staying competitive, most would 
agree that it can't be at the expense of the central mission to build knowledge in a 
variety of fields and improve learning for all students. 
Freed also argues that although these concerns of academia are 
understandable, they grow more out of a lack of understanding about what it really 
means to be a learning organisation than out of informed evaluation of what the 
principles oflearning organisations have to offer. She admits that she and Klugman 
discovered in their research that "rather than undermine the mission of higher 
education, principles of organisational quality and learning can greatly enhance the 
ability of colleges and universities to fulfil their missions" (Freed 2001: 16). 
The principles that Freed believes can be attributed to learning organisations, 
were revealed in their research when they looked at the work of Collins and Porras 
(2000). According to Freed Collins and Porras discovered "several timeless qualities" 
that identified exceptional institutions. They are: 
• They have core values that form solid foundations that don't change 











• They are driven by more than making money. Although money is 
necessary for an organisation's survival it is not their primary 
objective. 
• They focus on continual1y improving themselves rather than beating 
the competition. 
• They learn from their failures (Collins and Porras in Freed 2001:16-
17). 
Learning from failure reminds us that there are those in the literature that are 
wary of the threats to productive organisational learning and whether and how such 
threats may be overcome (Argyris 1999:1). 
Group learning - a category mistake? 
Guille and Young, whilst acknowledging that the concept of "the learning 
organisation" has increasingly been presented to both private and public sectors as a 
way for companies and other organisations to come to tenns with global economic 
and social changes, it has all too often been presented as a "management tool" for 
developing the inner cognitive abilities of employees, rather than as an aspect of any 
social interaction. They point out that this latter view of learning would involve quite 
di fferent questions being asked about what it means for an organisation to treat 
learning as its major priority (Guille and Young 1981). 
They are also critical of the literature on learning organisations in that it is 
"notoriously diffuse and lacking systematic conceptualisation" and that there have 
been few attempts to subject "the vast range of conceptualisations" to any fonn of 
analysis or to produce criteria to discriminate between learning organisations and non-
learning organisations (p. 2-3). 
Guille and Young agree with Argyris in that the concept of learning, in the 
learning organisation literature, is largely descriptive and prescriptive and is 
frequently being used to describe the achievement of a desirable end result and to 
establish a link between generating changc and identifying the process and nature of 
that change (Garvin in Guille and Young 1998:4). As a good example of this, they 
cite Senge's work in which he argues, that transfonning organisations involves 











encourage all participants to constantly develop their capacity for learning and 
innovating, and to adapt their behaviour and understanding to this "mental model" 
(Senge in Guille and Young 1998:5). They also claim that one ofthe "great strengths" 
of Senge's work is its recognition that representation is not exclusively individual and 
private but is also shared in cultural patterns of thought and action. However they also 
point out that Senge, albeit unintentionally, has reinforced the idea that learning is an 
individual process analogous to infonnation processing and therefore not involving 
changes in social relationships (Guille and Young 1998:5). 
Argyris picks up on this aspect of the learning organisational literature when 
he claims that some writings on "the learning organisation" like those of Schein, 
Senge, and the "sociotechnical theorists" whilst making significant contributions as 
"guides" to the kinds of organisational structures, processes, and conditions that may 
function as "enablers" of productive organisational learning, are "inattentive to 'the 
gaps' emphasised in the arguments of the learning sceptics" (emphasis mine). 
Argyris also submits that writers on the 'learning organisation' tend to focus on what 
he refers to as "first-order" errors and tend to be selectively inattentive to "second-
order" errors. Second order errors are due to the organisational designs that make 
people "systematically unaware" of the behavioural phenomena that underlie the 
production and reproduction of "first-order" errors. Examples that are cited by 
Argyris are "defensive routines, mixed messages, taboos on the discussability of key 
issues, games of control and deception and organisational camouflage": 
Reflection on such phenomena and the "theories-in-use" that 
underlie them is essential, to both the task of explaining the 
limitations of organisational learning and to the design of 
interventions that can overcome those limitations (emphasis 
mine)(Argyris 1999:6). 
To the writer, it is these very issues that seem to be neglected ifnot in 
fact ignored not only in the literature as emphasised by Argyris himself but 
also in the practice of collective learning. This issue I hope will become more 
evident from my research. 
Guille and Young also emphasise that social and cultural accounts of 











literature, sometimes do occur. They cite one "celebrated" example as that of Non aka 
who argues that knowledge production involves learning to master a "spiral process" 
whereby tacit knowledge becomes codified and then re-integrated into practices 
where new kinds oftacit knowledge is developed (Nonaka in Guille and Young 
1998:5). This is of course a very Vygotskian and subsequently social contructivist 
concept, causing Guille and Young to further argue that the problem with 
individualistic conceptions of learning is they neglect the extent to which learning is 
"first and foremost" a human activity and therefore about social relations and people 
participating in different types of community. They cite Lave to emphasise this 
contention: "Psychological theories ofleaming, which conceive of learning as a 
special mental process, ultimately impoverish and misrecognise it". This invariable 
results in groups blaming individuals for their failure to learn (Lave in Guille and 
Young 1998:6). 
Tacit knowledge and community participation are also issues raised by 
Matthews and Candy (1999). They believe that the distinction, which is able to be 
made between individual knowledge consciously held and that which is tacit or 
implicit is of particular relevance in the study of groups, since there is "social 
knowledge", which can also be considered as either explicit or tacit. For example, 
much workplace knowledge Matthews and Candy submit is collective, taken for 
granted, yet at the same time socially shared: 
Collective knowledge is embedded in social activity in ways that 
are relatively hidden from, or invisible to, the actors involved. This 
invisibility often makes it difficult for individuals to talk about and 
to share consciously what they know. Spender notes that dynamic 
concepts are not only held collectively but also generated and 
applied collectively within a pattern of social relationships (Spender 
in Matthews and Candy 1999:54). 
It is these social relationships that are referred to by Lave (1996) as 
"communities of practice". 
Matthews and Candy also point out that much of the process of generating, 
distributing and applying knowledge, actually occurs in group settings, wherein a 











although learning is viewed as an activity of people within organisations, some 
authors including Choo (1995), de Geus (1997), Dixon (1992), Hedberg (1981) and 
Huber (1996) have come to the view that organisations, including teams or groups 
within organisations, are capable oflearning. They do however admit that to embrace 
such an idea is to some extent an "affront to common sense" since they seem to 
believe that in the final analysis "only people can actually learn". They are however 
unable to leave it at that and add that "there is no denying that groups of people 
(including organisations) can change ... and accordingly it is appropriate to use the 
term 'learning organisation' to refer to such entities" (Matthews and Candy 1999:54-
59). 
Matthews and Candy's thoughts are echoed by Argyris: 
When we begin by assuming that individuals are the only proper 
subjects of learning and that we know what we mean when we say 
that individuals learn, then we are likely to be puzzled and disturbed 
by the notion that learning may also be attributed to groups or 
organisations. Indeed some researchers have argued, as Geoffrey 
Vickers did, that if the term, "organisational learning", means 
anything, it means learning on the part of individuals who happen to 
function in an organisational setting. From this perspective, to say 
that an organisation learns is to commit what philosopher, Gilbert 
Ryle, called a "category mistake" (Argyris 1999:7). 
Yielding to the phenomenon we refer to as organisational learning 
The final comments on the concept of organised collective social 
environments such as groups, teams, organisations and institutions being capable of 
learning I have reserved for Argyris. From the literature I have researched I find his 
views to be the most appropriate as to how I have come to understand this somewhat 
controversial issue. 
Argyris maintains that contemporary researchers in the fields of organisation 
and group theory seem relatively untroubled by sentences in which "group or 
organisation" is the subject and "learning" is the predicate. Fiol and Lyles (1985) 
define learning, whether undertaken by individual or group agents, as "the process of 











March (1988) claim that groups learn when they "encode inferences from history into 
routines that guide behaviour" (p. 319), and Huber (1989) proposes that "an 
organisation or group has learned if any of its components have acquired information 
and have this information available for use, either by other components or by itself', 
on behalf of the organisation or group (p. 3). 
According to Argyris a research tradition, which is becoming increasingly 
influential in group learning theory (as it appeared to be in individual learning theory), 
is the work of Campbell (1969) and Nelson and Winter (1982), which draws on the 
language of evolution, adaptation and natural selection. Researchers in this tradition 
see organisational or group learning as a process in which whole organisations or their 
component groups adapt to changing environments by generating and selectively 
adopting different organisational or group routines. It should be noted that the agents 
who generate and select internal variations are collective entities variously labelled as 
teams, departments, etc. 
However, Argyris claims that it is of significance, in any of the theories on 
group or organisational learning, whether the entities defined are taken to be uniquely 
appropriate, or at least sufficient, for the study of group or organisational adaptation 
and learning, or whether they are seen as needing to be complemented by a view that 
reveals how individuals enter into these processes. Many researchers, according to 
Argyris, particularly those who are sociologically orientated and who see group 
learning as a "intraorganisational" phenomenon, avoid the difficulties of "bridging the 
gap" between individual and organisational phenomena, by consistently treating 
agents and processes of group learning at "a relatively high level of social 
aggregation" (Argyris 1999:7-8). 
In contrast to this, Argyris insists that a theory of group or organisational 
learning must take account of the interplay between the actions and interactions of 
individuals and the actions and interactions of higher-level group or organisational 
entities. Unless a theory of group learning satisfies these criteria, Argyris believes that 
it cannot contribute knowledge that is useful to practitioners nor is it able to explain 
the limitations to group or organisational learning: 
Although the meaning of the term "learning" remains essentially the 











different at the organisational level. A model of organisational 
learning has to resolve somehow the dilemma of imparting 
intelligence and learning capabilities to a non-human entity without 
anthropomorphising it (Kim in Argyris 1999:9). 
Argyris also believes that anyone who adopts such a position faces the rather 
daunting task of explaining how the "fundamentally different" processes can interact 
to produce the phenomenon that we have come to recognise as group or 
organisational learning. 
For Argyris a key concept to achieve this is that of inquiry: 
the intertwining of thought and action carried out by individuals in 
interaction with one another on behalf of the organisation to which 
they belong in ways that change the organisation's theories of 
action and become embedded in organisational artefacts such as 
maps, memories, and programmes (Argyris 1999:8). 
He further argues that it is possible for individuals to think and act on behalf 
of a team because teams are political entities in the fundamental sense of the term. 
This occurs when they are able to meet three constitutional capabilities: to make 
collective decisions; to delegate authority for action to an individual in the name of 
the team; and to say who is and who is not a member of the team. Under these 
circumstances it makes conceptual sense to say that individuals can act on behalf of a 
group or organisation. 
But what is even more important for Argyris, is that it also makes conceptual 
sense to say that "on behalf of a group or organisation individuals can undertake 
learning processes that can in turn yield learning outcomes as reflected in group or 
organisational theories of action and the artefacts that encode them" (Argyris 1999:8-
9). 
Having gained a much better understanding of current learning theory and of 
the overall concept of co-operative learning in particular, I shall now investigate, in 
my next section, issues that I believe are affecting the enthusiasm shown for the 
concept of co-operative learning by management theorists and educational policy 
makers alike. I shall also investigate what evidence there is available that might in 











education - seem to have joined forces in support of cognitive sciences' promotion of 











Chapter 5: Globalisation and the 'New Capitalism' in support of 
collective learning 
Recent events of historic import 
Trying to gain a better understanding for the enthusiasm of business and 
education for the concept of collective learning, suggested that I look at some of the 
developments, which have taken place in our global society in the recent past. 
My research highlighted events emanating from two distinct sources during 
the twentieth century. On the one hand there were the new theories emanating from 
the world of science, which I investigated in chapter 3, some of which are being seen 
in various circles as providing possible solutions to some of the questions raised by 
one of the century's most significant events in the world of international politics the 
collapse of Soviet style communism. 
In 1989 when the Cold War between Western capitalism and the extreme 
socia1ist systems of the Soviet Union and its Eastern Block allies came to an end, 
providing the momentum for a new global system, which we have now come to know 
as "Globalisation". And on the other hand, we have the ideas that have been 
emanating from the world of science. New scientific theories such as relativity, chaos, 
quantum and complexity, all contributing to what is now referred to as "New-age 
science" or more simply "the New Science" (Wheatley 1992). 
Globalisation 
In a UN press release at the turn of the 21 st century, globalisation was 
described as 'one of the most talked-about issues of the late twentieth century and the 
new millennium. The article also states that this phenomenon has attracted more 
significant global attention than perhaps any other issue in recent memory' (UN press 
release June 15,2000). 
In their book 'Defining Globalization', Stromquist and Monkman make a 
similar claim that the concept has entered the consciousness of most people and 
describes it as a phenomenon, which comprises multiple and drastic change in all 
areas of social life. They do however emphasise that its meaning varies depending on 











Thomas Friedman (2000) in his book "The Lexus and the olive tree" refers to 
a full-page advertisement that was placed by Merrill Lynch in major newspapers 
throughout America in October 1998. The advertisement claimed that the world is ten 
years old and that it was born when the 'Wall' fell in 1989. The 'coming down' of the 
Berlin wall marked the end of the slow, fixed and divided Cold War system that had 
dominated international affairs since 1945 and its replacement by a new, very greased 
inter-connected system, called globalisation. 
Friedman claims that there has been a large body of literature, which has tried 
to define the post-Cold War world. Each ofthese works he believes became 
prominent because they each tried to capture the one big thing, the one central event 
that would drive international affairs in the post-Cold War period. He has a different 
argument suggesting that if you want to understand the post-Cold War world, you 
have to start by understanding that a new international system has succeeded the Cold 
War system and that new system is globalisation. Ifwe didn't fully understand that in 
1989, when the Berlin Wall came down, then surely, as Friedman points out, we 
understood it a decade later. It was this point that Merrill Lynch wished to drive 
home, that prompted them to run their ad on October 11 1998 at the height of the 
global economic crises. The advertisement stressed, "It was no surprise that the 
world's youngest economy the global economy is still finding its bearings". It also 
emphasised that the intricate checks and balances that stabilise economies are only 
incorporated with time and that many world markets are only recently freed, governed 
for the first time by the emotions of the people rather than by the "fists ofthe state" 
(Friedman 2000:xvi). 
In trying to understand how this relatively recent phenomenon is influencing 
learning theory I shall start by looking at the phenomenon itself in a little more detail; 
how various authors describe it and what appears to be its most significant features. I 
hope that this will help create a platform for understanding the roles of knowledge and 
learning in this new world or new work order and how this is impacting and might 











A variety of views 
Globalisation has been applied to cover debates centring on 
convergence/divergence, homogenisationiheterogenisation, and 
local/global issues. Despite its ability to capture, in its unfolding 
changes, the involvement of the entire world in one way or another, 
globalisation remains an inexact term for the strong, and perhaps 
irreversible, changes in the economy, labour force, technologies, 
communication, cultural patterns, and political alliances that it is 
imposing on every nation. (Stromquist and Monkman 2000:3). 
However as might be expected, despite Stromquist and Monkman' swords 
there are still some observers who are quick to argue that external forces have always 
impacted on the world's nations but as Stromquist and Monkman point out, most 
people recognise that the degree on interconnectedness and speed brought about by 
current technologies, economic actors, and economic production, vastly surpasses 
such previous exchanges on this planet (p. 3). This view is supported by Friedman 
who emphasises that whilst the Cold War system was characterised by one 
overarching feature -- division; globalisation's overarching feature tends to be 
integration: 
The world was divided up and both your threats and your 
opportunities tended to grow out of - from whom you were divided 
... The world today has become an increasingly interwoven place 
with your threats and opportunities being derived from - to whom 
you are connected (Friedman 2000:8). 
Gibson-Graham presents a similar opinion whilst restricting it to a purely 
economic environment: 
A set of processes by which the world is rapidly being integrated 
into one economic space via increased international trade, the 
internationalisation of production and financial markets, and the 
internationalisation of a commodity culture by an increasingly 
networked global telecommunications system (Gibson-Graham in 











Or as Friedman quips "During the Cold War we reached for the 
'Hotline' whereas now we go 'On-line'" (Friedman 2000:8). 
Gonzalez Casanova on the other hand, sees the term globalisation as hiding 
the effects of economic policies, which he submits, are creating major social problems 
in many of the developing countries. This opinion is supported by Amin, who claims 
that not only does globalisation effect trade, productive systems, technology and 
financial markets, but many other aspects of social life. So far, because there are 
people outside the modem economy, globalisation has not affected the lives of every 
person in every country, but it appears that ultimately, all groups will be brought into 
conformity with the structure and goods of the glob ali sed society (Casanova and 
Amin in Stromquist and Monkman 2000:4). 
Another supporter ofthe economic dimension is Harris. He submits that the 
economic dimension is the centrifugal force of globalisation, a force sufficiently 
powerful that other dimensions of globalisation are subsidiary. (Harris in Walters 
2000: 198). Walters also cites Giddens in a slightly different approach to the subject -
"Globalisation is really about the transformation of space and time. It diminishes 
space and time dimensions of physical geography, thereby permitting, encouraging, 
and sometimes requiring new kinds of human interaction." (Giddens in Walters 
2000: 199). Castells describes these new kinds of human interaction as global, 
informational and based on networks (Castells 2000:2). 
Walters (2000) herself has her own definite views on the matter. Globalisation 
she feels is shorthand for describing a global capitalist economy. It reflects processes 
in which social relations, are not only linked at the economic level, but also permeate 
the political, social, cultural, and environmental spheres that impact on everyday life. 
However she introduces a totally new element into the understanding ofthe term by 
claiming that there is an argument from "people on the left", which describes at least 
two perspectives of globalisation. One is a "competitive globalisation" and the other 
"co-operative globalisation". Walters argues that any debate on globalisation cannot 
be separated from a debate on development and that in this context competitive 
globalisation is about the accumulation of capital and has a top-down approach. Co-
operative globalisation on the other hand, has the accumulation of human capacities 
as its objective and has a bottom-up approach to development, which is shaped by the 











Friedman (2000) echoes Walters' thoughts on the dualism of the phenomenon 
suggesting that "What is new is the system; what is old is power politics, chaos, 
clashing civilisations and liberalism. And what is the drama of the post-Cold War 
world is the interaction between this new system and all these old passions and 
aspirations. It is a complex drama, with the final act still to be written" (p. xxi). 
Friedman also supports Walters in her assessment of a "global capitalist 
economy". Globalisation he emphasises is not just some economic fad or a passing 
trend, it is an international system - the dominant international system that has 
replaced the Cold War system with its own rules and logic that directly or indirectly 
influences the politics, environment, geopolitics of virtually every country in the 
world and whose driving force is free-market capitalism (p. ix). 
Someone else who supports this view is Castells. In his 1999 paper "The 
social implications of information and communications technologies", Castells claims 
that we are certainly living in a capitalist economy. Indeed he believes that for the 
first time in human history, the entire planet is working along the lines of a capitalist 
economic system. However for Castells it is a new brand of capitalism, it is global, it 
is informational and it is based on business networks (Castells 1999:7). 
Irrespective ofthe variety, it seems clear that the driving force behind 
globalisation is American style free-market capitalism, which for Friedman simply 
means that the more you let market forces rule and the more you open your economy 
to free trade and competition, the more efficient and flourishing your economy will 
be. He also claims that the centrally planned, non-democratic alternatives 
communism, socialism and fascism were tested out on the world stage from 1917 to 
1989, and for Friedman, there is only one thing to say about these alternatives - they 
didn't work. So when it comes to the question of which system today is the most 
effective at generating rising living standards, the historical debate is over. The 
answer is free-market capitalism. Other systems may be able to distribute and divide 
income more efficiently and equitably, but none can generate income to distribute as 
efficiently as free-market capitalism. Today, as Friedman emphasises, there is only 
free-market vanilla and North Korea. You can adjust your society to it by going faster 
or slower. But if you want higher standards of living in a world without walls, the free 
market is the only ideological alternative left. "One road, different speeds, but one 











Friedman further emphasises that when your country recognises this fact and 
recognises the rules of the free market in today's global economy and decides to abide 
by them then it puts on what he describes as the "Golden Straightjacket" (p. 104). 
To fit into the Golden Straightjacket a country must either adopt or be seen to 
be moving toward, the following golden rules: 
• making the private sector the primary engine of economic growth 
• maintaining a low rate of inflation and price stability 
• shrinking the size of its state bureaucracy 
• increasing exports 
• privatising state-owned industries and utilities 
• deregulating capital markets 
• making its currency convertible 
• opening its industries, stock and bond markets to direct foreign ownership 
and investment 
• deregulating its economy to promoting as much domestic competition as 
possible 
• eliminating government corruption, subsidies and kickbacks as much as 
possible 
• opening its banking and telecommunications systems to private ownership 
and competition and allowing its citizens to choose from an array of 
competing pension options and foreign-run pension and mutual funds. 
When you stitch all of these pieces together you have the "Golden 
Straightjacket" and for Friedman the "Golden Straightjacket" is pretty much a "one 
size fits all" (p. 105). 
Today's global market system, the Fast World and the Golden Straightjacket 
were produced by large historical forces that have fundamentally reshaped how we 
communicate, how we invest and how we see the world. If a country chooses to resist 
these changes then that is that country's choice. But if a country thinks that it can 











increasingly high wall and without falling behind increasingly fast, then as Friedman 
points out, "they are deluding themselves" (p. 109). 
I believe that this ideology is not only being applied rigorously to products and 
services but to all factors included in the production process, and this includes human 
beings. It is this aspect of globalisation that is producing a powerful backlash to the 
system from the people who are brutalised or left behind. Walter's (2000) argument, 
regarding' competitive globalisation' and 'co-operative globalisation', as discussed 
above, is certainly one to consider in respect of this critical issue. 
Since the onset of globalisation, different countries and communities have 
seesawed between being attracted to the system's benefits and repelled by its 
negatives. Up until now, in the ebb and flow between globalisation and the backlash 
against it globalisation has consistently come out on top in every major country that 
has 'plugged' into the system. But according to Friedman it will be our ability to 
strike a balance between globalisation's inherently empowering and humanising 
aspects and its inherently disempowering and dehumanising aspects, which will 
determine whether or not it will be a passing phase or a fundamental revolution in the 
evolution of human society (Friedman 2000:433). 
A New Capitalist order for conceptions of learning 
In 1976 Bowles and Gintis attempted to demonstrate the ways in which 
conceptions of learning were closely involved and interrelated with structures of 
production. They submitted that specialised learning institutions and their curriculum, 
structure learning, so as to produce "good workers" who will fill various socially 
stratified occupations, thereby maintaining class-based inequities and benefiting the 
means of economic production and profit. They wrote: 
The structure of social relations in education not only inures the 
student to the discipline of the workplace, but develops the types of 
personal demeanor, modes of self-presentation, self-image, and 
social class identifications which are the crucial ingredients of job 
adequacy. Specifically, the social relationships of education the 
relationships between administrators and teachers, teachers and 











replicate the hierarchical divisions of1abour (Bowles and Gintis, 
1976:131). 
Now more than a quarter of a century later it is worth reflecting on the 
deliberations of Bowles and Gintis when considering Friedman's view in regard to the 
question of the alignment between conceptions of learning, globalisation and fitting 
into the Golden Straightjacket. 
Friedman asks the question "Is your country or company harvesting its 
knowledge"? We have moved from a world where the key to wealth is how you seize, 
hold and exploit territory to a world where the key to wealth is how your country or 
company amasses, shares and harvests knowledge. The pursuit of wealth is now 
largely the pursuit of information and its application to the means of production. In 
the next few decades the attraction and management of intellectual capital will 
determine which institutions and nations will survive and prosper, and which will not 
(Friedman 2000:219-220). 
In 1999 a fellow countryman of Friedman's, Castells, Professor of Sociology 
and Professor of City and Regional Planning at UCLA at Berkeley prepared a paper 
for UNESCO's World Social Science Report, 1999. The report examined the social 
implications of globalisation in regard to new information and communication 
technologies and their interaction with social and economic structures and cultural 
and political structures (Castells 1999). The report shows the emergence of a new 
form of social and business organisation based upon networks and tooled by 
communication technologies. Castells claims that education is the key element in 
making it possible for societies and individuals to reap the benefits from this new 
system. However he does emphasise that technology is not the answer. Education 
must be reformed and pedagogy transformed to be apt to the task of achieving what 
is required by the new system. And that is providing an education that will produce 
creative, flexible and autonomous individuals ( emphasis mine). Globalisation 
demands that our societies move faster, work smarter and take more risks. In order to 
achieve these things they need the sort of people that Castells describes. 
Castells is by no means alone in this opinion. Much has been written in recent 
times regarding educational reform and it comes from a pretty broad spectrum of 











Barber writing in the New Statesman about the British government's green paper-
"Teachers: Meeting the challenge of change" believes that the goals of education 
systems in this era of globalisation are broadly shared across the developed world 
(Barber 2000: 1). 
Another Englishman who confirms Castells views is Yorke, the director for 
the Centre for Higher Education Development, Liverpool John Moores University in 
England. In relating education to the labour market he notes that the pace of change in 
national and international economies requires education to encourage the 
development of people who can act effectively in turbulent circumstances (Yorke 
1999: 16). The British view is however slightly different to that of Castells in that 
Yorke uses Reich's four fundamental competencies which include collaboration 
communication and team-working skills - as a fundamental. 
Barber (2000) gives the British government's view on the subject in their 
determination to achieve a world-class education system for all British children. 
Barber records that every pupil should become literate, numerate, well informed, 
confident, capable of learning throughout life and able to play an active part in the 
workforce and the community. The government is also determined that all pupils 
should have the opportunity to become, in line with what Castells says, creative, 
innovative and capable ofleadership. For this they will need education for a world of 
rapid change in which both flexible attitudes and enduring values have a part to play 
(p. 1). 
Similar attitudes amongst policy makers here in South Africa seem to add 
weight to Barber's view, as mentioned above, that the goals of education systems in 
this era of globalisation are shared across the developed world. According to Moore 
(2003), education in South Africa has been subject to a series of policy initiatives, 
which seek to reconstruct the field in various ways. There are two broad imperatives: 
a response to global developments and the changing role of higher education 
internationally, and a local concern for economic development, social reconstruction 
and development. Moore also points out that education is seen as a means of helping 
to integrate South Africa into the global economy on the one hand and as a vehicle for 
correcting the social and economic imbalances from apartheid on the other. It should 
also be noted, according to Moore, that these new policies imply an impetus for 










management to more concerted and co-ordinated practices, in other words towards 
more co-operative learning practices (emphasis mine)(Moore 2002:124). 
Breier (1998) cites the "Programme for the Transformation of Higher 
Education" produced by the South African Department of Education in 1997, which 
lists as one of the major national goals of higher education the production of graduates 
with certain skills and competencies including "critical, analytical, problem-solving 
and communication skills as well as the ability to deal with change and diversity" (p. 
76). The country's Minister of Education at the time Kadar Asmal in the Revised 
National Curriculum Statement (RNCS) submits that this approach is in line with "our 
idea of ourselves as a society and our vision as to how we see the new form of society 
being realised through our children and learners" (RNCS 2002:1). 
Considering the views expressed above, it is hardly surprising that there are 
educators who claim as Stromquist and Monkman (2000) do, that education reform is 
being argued only in terms of preparing students/or the workplace, or as it is more 
usually termed in South Africa - developing human resources (emphasis mine), 
which will render curriculum an additional form of contemporary cultural production 
through which the concept of new capitalism is expressed (p. 12). 
These same educators also submit that the criteria employed in companies for 
efficiency and productivity are being extended to schooling, and the focus has shifted 
from leamer-centred curriculum to economy-centred vocational training, a trend 
which Walters argues is already evident in leading nations such as Japan, the United 
States, the UK, Germany and Scandinavian countries and also in important new 
players such as China and Russia (Walters 2000:200-202). 
Perhaps, because of this situation, people such as David Holcberg (2002) hold 
the view that government should not be in the education business. As a political 
institution and not an educational one, its function is to protect people's rights to 
pursue an education not to provide them with one. 
Muller would seem to support this line of thinking, suggesting that the global 
economy and a rise ofneo-liberal consensus demands not only a new relevance from 
educational provision but also a new accountability on the part of educators to 











advantage and what skills are required for economic innovation is according to 
Muller, the insistent refrain for the focus of education (Muller 2000:41). 
Edwards (1997) also joins this debate by suggesting that there has been a shift 
in public policy from conceiving learning as part ofthe social domain, to constructing 
it more specifically as an aspect of the economy. But claims Edwards; this 'shift' is 
not just about conception. What is more significant is that it is about responsibility: 
Nation states are losing effective and exclusive 'control' of their 
economies and cultures, and their ability to use this control 
politically for the fulfilment of collective goals of social betterment. 
This redrawing of relations between the state and civil society has 
been marked by a shift towards the market rather than the state as 
responsible for the provision of learning opportunities (Edwards 
1997:89-93). 
Stromquist and Monkman do however point out that most discussions about 
the state under globalisation are typified by very divergent views. Some they agree 
support Edwards' view that the state is rendered powerless and obsolete as the market 
economy progressively fulfils the state's function; but other observers consider that 
although new capitalism/globalisation is bringing a change to the role of the state, it 
will nevertheless remain an important player. Castells for example suggests that 
"The State does not disappear. It adapts and transforms itselfby building partnerships 
between nation states, and sharing sovereignty to retain influence." (Castells 
1999:10). 
But sharing sovereignty with whom? Castells seems convinced that the state in 
the New World order will be a networked State, made out ofa "complex web of 
power-sharing and negotiated decision making" between international, multi-national, 
national, regional, local and non-governmental, political institutions (p. 10). 
Stromquist and Monkman clarify this view by arguing that the unfolding 
dynamics of globalisation has brought some new players into the economic and 
political decision making process, not least of these being the transnational 
corporations (TNC's) with indisputable roles in the market and politics (Stromquist 
and Monkman 2000:4-5). According to Stromquist and Monkman, some forty 











Stromquist and Monkman 2000:6), and it is estimated thatjustfour hundred 
(emphasis mine) of them own two thirds of the planet's fixed assets and control 70% 
of world trade. These somewhat awesome statistics are indeed supported in other 
literature; Simmons (1995) for example states that today's free market is largely 
dominated by a handful of private companies the 100 largest of which control over 
one third of all foreign investment and 40% of world trade (Simmons 1995: 15). 
It is therefore not surprising that the emergence ofTNC's as major players in 
the New World order has, as Stromquist and Monkman point out, "implications for 
education". They suggest, in line with Friedman's views, that the State is now 
disciplined by international markets and with business and profitability as the main 
referent, social and public service interests are devalued. At local levels there is an 
increased presence of business in co-operation with learning institutions, determining 
what constitutes quality and what is needed (Stromquist and Monkman 2000:6). 
Stromquist and Monkman also claim that TNC's are already making broad 
demands on universities for engagement in research and development. In a situation 
where universities will be linked more to the market and less to the pursuit of truth, it 
is likely that the definition and establishment of quality will become the prerogative 
of managerial rather than academic enterprise (Cowen in Stromquist and Monkman 
2000:14). 
Whilst in support ofthese views, Gee et a1. (1996) take an even stronger 
position. In their book "The new work order: behind the language of the new 
capitalism", they suggest that talk of networks, connections, interconnections and the 
breakdown of hierarchy is now all-pervasive within society and as such is having a 
significant impact on current ideas about conceptions of learning and knowledge and 
educational reform. What they suggest can only be described as an 'unholy alliance' -
"Basically our claim is this: ... there is a growing alignment between the business 
world in the new capitalism and various non-business spheres of interest, including 
schools and academic disciplines promoting educational reform efforts" (Gee et al 
1996:49). 
Gee and his colleagues believe that distributed systems - with complex 
interactions, flexible adaptation to the 'outside world', and litHe top-down control-











alignments across various domains such as business, science, politics and education 
can and will emerge (p. 52). 
Historically, for them, the discipline of psychology has been largely 
responsible for developing viewpoints on thinking and learning and then translating 
these into educational practice. But more recently a new "megadiscipline" has 
emerged - cognitive science, which is influenced in many ways by the ideas emerging 
from the 'New Science' that I investigated in chapter 3. These fundamental features, 
Gee et al. argue, are fast becoming "major motifs" of a new common sense about 
education (p. 53). 
Whilst supporting Bowles and Gintis' (1976) view that specialised learning 
institutions and their curriculum, structure learning, so as to produce 'good workers', 
Gee et al emphasise that education has always represented broader issues such as 
social justice, cultural integrity, citizenship and critique. They also point out that an 
academic discipline such as cognitive science, which seeks to control curricula and 
pedagogy in education, has complex issues of its own. These issues they contend 
partly conflict with the interests of other sectors such as business, churches, 
government and indeed teachers and learning institutions, "all of which can broadly 
be seen as competing to educate people and to define what counts as knowledge worth 
having" (Gee et al. 1996:54). 
But let us return to the argument presented by Gee and his colleagues of the 
'unholy alliance' between two former antagonists - business and education - and their 
idea that cognitive science currently influenced by the 'New Science' provides "the 
glue" for such an alliance. 
An "unholy alliance"? 
"Whole swaths of academic disciplines are retooling themselves around 
common themes. All are now intensely concerned with unpredictable properties that 
emerge out of myriad bits and pieces interacting within complex systems". So say 
Gee et al. (1996) in their book - "The new work order: behind the language of new 
capitalism", in which they suggest that old-style systems based on authoritarian 
hierarchy, which we once thought we wanted in our organisations and institutions, are 
out. And in are systems with non-authoritarian hierarchy where self-controlled local 











assisted by a 'top' that cannot directly control them and their actions. It should be 
noted claims Gee et aI, that in new capitalist businesses this 'top' is sometimes the 
boss/coach, sometimes the consumer andlor the market, and sometimes both. Gee et 
al refer to such non-authoritarian hierarchies as "distributed systems" in which control 
is distributed throughout the system and not centred in any entity that monopolises 
power, knowledge or control (po 50-51). 
A very simple example used by Gee et al to illustrate the sort of intelligence 
and control that can be found in a distributed system is that of a robot designed to 
collect beer and cool drink cans in a lab at MIT. The "mobot", as it is referred to, has 
no central brain but rather intelligence and decision-making capacities are distributed 
throughout its mechanical body. It simply roams around until its video camera spots 
the shape of a can. This signal triggers the wheels of the mobot and propels it in front 
of the can. The arm of the robot is wired to its wheels so that when it sees that the 
wheels are not moving it must be in front of a can. The arm reaches out and picks up 
the can. If the can is heavier than an empty can it is left. If it is light then it is 
collected. The mobot then roams until it comes across the recycling station. Then it 
stops its wheels in front of the station. The arm looks at its hand to see ifit is holding 
a can; if it is it drops it. If not it begins to wander again until it spots another can. The 
mobot is interesting because it demonstrates that distributing control over many parts 
rather than in a central brain can lead to a system that behaves as if it has some 
centralised intelligence when in fact it doesn't (po 51-52). 
Their contention therefore is that - "Contemporary educationally relevant 
cognitive science, and many related educational reform efforts, are in the process of 
aligning themselves more and more with the themes and interests on the new 
capitalism" (p. 54). 
A two-pronged approach 
Their argument as to how this is "playing out" is twofold. Firstly in what 
constitutes knowledge and real understanding and secondly the nature of control, 
objectives and values in distributed systems whether these are in new classrooms or 
new workplaces. 
Contemporary cognitive science, claim Gee et aI, has replaced an earlier 











socioeconomic and minority students, with a new and somewhat initially startling 
critique: that "it's not just minorities that fail, but in actual fact all students do" (Bruer 
and Gardner in Gee et al. 1996:54-55). 
They also emphasise that students in traditional learning institutions master 
only basic, rote, low-level skills at best. While such students may be able to pass tests 
and carry out basic computations, they really do not understand in any very deep way 
what they are doing. This opinion is substantiated by Davis et al. (2000) in "Engaging 
Minds: Learning and Teaching in a Complex World": 
A range of studies has demonstrated, for example, that students are 
often unable to make use of their classroom based learning in their 
lives outside of schools. In fact, it seems that many students are not 
even able to generalise their learning from one course of study to 
another or even from one topic to another in the same course 
(Davis et al. 2000: 173). 
Gee and his colleagues find it interesting to note that new capitalism offers 
much the same critique of its traditional workers. These two "symmetrical critiques" 
they argue are part of the process of alignment between the two projects. But it is over 
the issue of what constitutes 'real understanding' that they claim that one can best 
trace current processes of alignment (p. 55). 
They cite Gardiner, a leading educational cognitive scientist, as claiming to 
have diagnosed the problem with today's students. Gardner believes that even though 
they are able to answer tests correctly their school-based knowledge falls apart in the 
face of their well-entrenched, but unexamined, "folk theories" when they are moved 
to a slightly different problem or to a new domain. Gardiner proposes that only 
experts can avoid this so what learning institutions must do is produce students who 
learn to think and act like disciplinary experts: 
... the disciplinary expert (or skilled person) [is] an individual of 
any age who has mastered the concepts and skills of a discipline or 
domain and can apply such knowledge appropriately in new 
situations. Included in the ranks of the disciplinary experts are those 
students who are able to use the knowledge of their physics class or 











not limited to the usual text and test setting, and they are eligible to 
enter the ranks of those who 'really' understand (Gardner in Gee et 
al. 1996:55-56). 
To Gee and his colleagues, this would suggest that cognitive science has come 
to believe that there is no such thing as 'good thinking' in general; rather good 
thinking is tied to deep experience of specific domains and differs from domain to 
domain. To think well is to have in one's head the same sort of mental representations 
as a disciplinary expert. 
Breier (1998) points out that research carried out by cognitive science on the 
games of grand master chess players showed that their tactics depended on an 
enormous knowledge base of important patterns. She also claims that these 
experiments in chess led to similar studies in a number of areas with parallel findings, 
which led to a general profile of expertise, which entailed 
(a) a large knowledge base of domain-specific patterns; 
(b) rapid recognition of situations where these patterns apply, and 
(c) reasoning that moves from such recognition directly toward a solution 
by working with patterns. 
Work in artificial intelligence also showed that "generic programmes were not 
helpful in complex problem-solving domains whereas programmes designed 
specifically for those domains scored significant successes" (Breier 1998:79). 
However as both Breier and Gee et al point out, cognitive science has 
progressively shifted its notion more recently away from disciplinary or academic 
expertise to a broader notion more compatible, according to Gee, with the worldview 
of the new capitalism. This somewhat cautious return to a more generalist approach to 
good thinking has rendered the convergence of cognitive science and the new 
capitalism closer and more overt. 
Bereiter and Scardamalia claim that people must become "expert at becoming 
experts" by developing the ability to work in non-routine ways on ever more 
demanding problems in whatever domain they are confronted with. They connect 
their ideas directly with the notion of 'quality' that plays such a prominent role in the 











Gee and his colleagues also believe that the same sort of progression can be 
seen in the work of Perkins. Perkin's view of intelligence they claim, is almost 
entirely in business-orientated terms and his view of reflective, strategic intelligence 
as the goal of education is entirely in keeping with the goals of the new capitalism 
with its emphasis on efficient problem solving, productivity, innovation, adaptation 
and non-authoritarian distributed systems (Perkins in Gee et al 1996:58). 
But the convergence is certainly not yet finished according to Gee et aL 
Bereiter they claim has begun to question the mental, internal and individual focus of 
education. In the new capitalism it is not really important what individuals know on 
their own, but rather what they can do with others in a co-operative way (emphasis 
mine) to effectively add value to the enterprise. As Gee et al point out the emphasis in 
new capitalism is on distributed systems as demonstrated above, whereby knowledge 
and productivity should be distributed across 'teams' so that they need not reside 
inside anyone entity that can control the process. In fact if they did reside too heavily 
inside individuals then those individuals could take their knowledge and sell it to the 
highest bidder a real fear according to Gee and his colleagues in the new 
knowledge-driven capitalism (p. 58-59). 
Because of the distributed nature of knowledge in the new capitalism Bereiter 
distinguishes between 'learning' where the goal is to change and assess individual 
minds the traditional goal of education and knowledge building: 
[Knowledge building's] ... objective is not to influence the contents 
of students' minds but to produce immaterial objects explanations, 
theories, solutions, algorithms. Students are expected to learn 
something in the process, and this may well be evaluated at some 
time. But the actual work is not directed at improving their minds 
but toward improving the knowledge that is being collectively 
created. The important point is that their focus is outward on the 
objects themselves and the world they relate to, rather than on their 
own mental states and social roles. They feel a kinship with scholars 
and scientists, but it is a kinship based on shared goals, not on 











Here we see, according to Gee et aI, a movement away from education as 
reproducing the identities and practices of disciplinary experts, away form education 
as producing individually 'smart people'. They see rather a movement towards people 
who can work co-operatively in teams (emphasis mine) to produce results and add 
value through distributed knowledge and understanding. Such students are better 
suited, emphasises Gee et ai, to be parts of a "smart mobot"; better suited to be 
modules in a distributed non-authoritarian system than are traditional students (p. 59). 
But Gee and his colleague's point out that non-authoritarian distributed 
systems run into the problem of what will make teams work in the service of the 
whole? This question suggests that they do not believe that collaboration is something 
which students do naturally. Ants in an ant colony behave in the interests of the 
colony because evolution has programmed them to do so. But what plays the role of 
evolution, asks Gee et aI, in colony-like businesses and classrooms? This collectivist 
ideology as espoused by Marxism is now, as Pinker (2002:296) points out, almost 
universally recognised as an experiment that failed. In fact the verdict of the world's 
leading expert on ants E. O. Wilson is "Wonderful theory, wrong species" (Wilson 
in Pinker 2002:296). 
Competing solutions 
Considering the issues discussed above, Gee and his colleagues suggest that 
there are two competing answers to this problem. One being "new-style visionary 
leadership" whilst the other is "the creation of core values", the internalisation of 
which would ensure that everyone will work in the best interests of the group as a 
whole. It is perhaps a little hard to understand why Gee and his colleagues consider 
these answers as competing. One might argue that it requires "visionary leadership" to 
help establish "core values", which can be internalised within any type of group-
"Enlightened business leaders around the globe intuitively understand the importance 
oftimeless core values" (Collins and Porras 2000:xvi). 
Both of the answers advocated above involve forms of indirect control, an 
approach that according to Gee et al can easily take on the tones of manipulation. In 
fact they stress that this is what they believe to be the core dilemma of the new 
capitalism: how to control empowered partners in the absence of visible overt top-











exactly the same problem. However, cognitive science has a "particularly attractive" 
solution to the problem and one that just happens to be quite compatible with the new 
capitalism. In fact they argue that such classrooms may easily become sites at which 
the new capitalism will seek to solve its dilemma (p. 60). 
Communities of practice 
To illustrate their claim Gee and his colleagues use as an example a classroom 
application of cognitive science directed by Brown and Campione. According to Gee 
et aI, Brown and Campione create "learning communities" based on the idea that 
knowledge does not reside in the minds of individuals but rather "is situated in 
activities and is distributed" (Brown and Campione in Gee et aI1996:61). Or as Lave 
expresses it - "stretched over - not divided among - mind, body, activity and 
culturally organised settings" (Lave 1988: 1). This of course is what Gee et al claim to 
the theme of distributed systems. 
Brown and Campione's classrooms, according to Gee et aI., use a wide variety 
of methods to ensure that knowledge and understanding is public, co-operative and 
distributed. Attempts to clarify problems occur opportunistically using skills such as 
questioning, summarising and predicting; core components as identified by cognitive 
science. This they suggest is similar to 'quality circles' used in the new capitalism 
where teams are made to publicly display and share knowledge for the benefit of the 
group (p. 61). 
Also according to Gee et aI., all elements of the classrooms used by Brown 
and Campione are put in place to "subserve" what they take to be both the crucial 
concept behind their classrooms and their most important tie to the new capitalism. 
Namely Vygotsky's (1987) concept of the 'zone of proximal development' which was 
discussed earlier in chapter 2. 
Gee and his colleagues believe that it is this notion, which allows Brown and 
Campione to offer a solution to "the core dilemma of the new capitalism". Their 
classrooms are designed so that "learners can mutually appropriate beliefs, skills and 
practices from the activity in the classroom zone of proximal development" (p. 62). 
Although Vygotsky's notion ofa zone of proximal development and the focus 
on social cognition, co-operation and dialogue are often associated with liberal 











and his colleagues are able to see how they can be used as devices "to manipulate 
people" into accepting, trusting and committing themselves to the goals and values of 
the leader (teacher) and the organised social system in which the leader operates. 
They also believe that Brown and Campione's classrooms are "a way station" 
towards a system, in which core values and goals are "seeded" into social practices, 
activity systems, technologies and flexible roles of the participants, as well as into the 
vision of non-authoritarian leaders (coaches), to be internalised as part and parcel of 
one's very participation in the overall system. In fact they specifically point out that 
the "real source of goals and values" is not the teacher, but the "invisible cognitive 
scientists who have seeded the whole system with goals, values and 'knowledge 
structures' to be 'mutually appropriated'" (p. 64). 
In the end, what Gee et al claim and what seems of utmost importance; is the 
way that immersion into a 'community of practice' can allow individuals or 'teams' to 
internalise values and goals. And that often this is happening without a great deal of 
negotiation or reflection and without the exercise of very much top-down authority: 
Given the core dilemma of the new capitalism, such notions as 
'communities of practice' , learning communities, and mutual 
appropriation of thought, belief, skills and practices from a rich 
flow of activity in a zone of proximal development are central 
themes around which cognitive science and the new capitalism will 
align to their mutual benefit (p. 64-65). 
It would appear that this view is rather similar to the claim made by Davis et 
aI., that "a child adopts the prevailing opinions of a social group not by giving into 
peer pressure but rather by a fluid and non-conscious integration of sensibilities, 
assumed in much the same way that accents and mannerisms tend to be taken on (or 
lost)" (Davis et al. 2000: 174-175). 
A final caution from Gee and his colleagues on the issue of knowledge. They 
contend that in communities of practice, whether in the classroom or in new-capitalist 
workplaces, people develop what Nonaka, Konno and Toyama (2001 :14) refer to as 
"tacit" knowledge. This knowledge is not always easily expressed and generally can 
only be learned through immersion in 'communities of practice'. However, 











bidder. The trick of business claims Gee et al is how to capture this knowledge in a 
way that makes it increasingly accessible to other people in the organisation, whilst 
retaining it when workers change or leave. They believe that the solution is to 
distribute the knowledge across people and technology in such a way that no 
individual has any large part of it but rather that each person functions as part of a 
"knowledge system" (smart mobot). It is because of this, that Gee and his colleagues 
maintain the new capitalism will focus more and more on "sociotechnical practices ", 
rather than on people: 
The new capitalism makes full contact with sociocultural theories of 
language, learning, and literacy theories of the sort that in one guise 
underpin the work of people like Brown and Campione; theories 
that are very close to our own hearts, as all three of us have worked 
to help develop them. Both the new capitalism and sociocultural 
theory alike disown the idea of knowledge and learning as locked 
into and 'owned' by private minds. They both for different 
reasons argue that knowledge and learning are social and 
distributed across people and technology beyond individual minds 
and bodies. But the connections between the new capitalism and 
sociocultural theories run deeper yet: both of them ... advocate 
educational reform centred on co-operative learning with a stress 
on communication skills (emphasis mine) .... As educators we 
must ensure ... that all students come to understand the formation 
of social identities and the nature of social practices in their full 
cultural and historical contexts. By so widening the frame we allow 
our students to understand the complex systems of the new world 
in a deeper sense than the new capitalism might care to endorse (p. 
67). 
With these concluding words of Gee and his colleagues 1 hope that my 
research will show in the next two chapters what all educators need to know when it 












Chapter 6: Team dissatisfaction - explaining the "gaps" 
"There can be no happiness if the things we believe in are different/rom the 
things we do" (Freya Stark). 
In the previous sections ofthis research report I have tried to gain a better 
understanding as to the current enthusiasm of both management theorists and 
educational policy makers alike for co-operative learning. I have looked at current 
thinking on learning theory as well as investigating what I have considered to be some 
of the fundamental issues that possibly underlie the present thinking of the bodies 
mentioned, whilst also considering the argument of a possible "unholy alliance" 
between two historically opposed camps -- business and education. 
In spite of all the evidence in support of co-operative learning why is it that 
much of my experience with groups leaves me feeling "disappointed or frustrated" 
(Schwarz 2002), and usually in environments where the educational authority 
professes to be "learner-centred"? Evidently I'm not alone in my frustration - "We 
have seen roommates stop speaking to one another as a result of project teamwork" 
(Gundry & Buchko 1996:64). 
In this section I believe that my research will provide at least one possible 
explanation why this could be so. The explanation I present is essentially based on the 
simple premise as quoted above by Freya Stark; that there can be no happiness; no 
consillience; no learning; no justice; in fact little of anything positive, which can take 
place if "the things we believe in are different from the things we do". 
In providing this explanation I intend concentrating on the work of Chris 
Argyris and Donald Schon. Their work on "theories of practice" is, according to 
Smith (2001), a very significant development that has important implications for 
educators. However despite this significance it has gone largely unnoticed, according 
to Smith, in the various fields of education. This is as a result, in part, of rather 
blinkered reading by professionals and academics within these areas, and also because 
Argyris and Schon did not address education directly but rather focused on more 












In the beginning 
Robert Putnam a long-time colleague of Chris Argyris has a slightly different 
slant on Smith's claim: 
In the '70s when Chris moved from Yale to Harvard he had a co-
appointment in the Business School and the School of Education, 
where he was when we worked with him. He thought that if you 
could change school systems, and therefore educate young people in 
Model II, you could really change the world. Unfortunately he 
found the education system impenetrable. It was enormously 
difficult to get traction with school system administrators and 
faculty. The business world was much more receptive to him 
(Putman in Creelman 2003). 
It is my contention as I discussed earlier in this report that the majority of the 
work done by Argyris and Schon although largely focused on corporate "learning 
organisations"; is nevertheless applicable to groups of any size. This is the premise on 
which I have based the findings of my research: 
Human beings have 'theories-in-use' that will make it likely that 
they will inhibit their own and other's double-loop learning. If 
individuals reflected on their actions correctly (which is unlikely 
because oftheir theories-in-use), they would become aware of the 
counterproductive aspects oftheir actions .... Human beings are not 
unaware of the inconsistencies in other's behaviour, but they are 
programmed to withhold feedback on this lest they be held 
responsible for upsetting others (Argyris and Schon 1978:27). 
Argyris and Schon - issues of significance 
Argyris and Schon's work over the past thirty years has, according to 
Anderson (1997) and Smith (2001), been concerned with examining conscious and 
unconscious reasoning processes particularly in relationships between individuals and 
organised groups to produce more "effective" learning environments. In the opinion 
of Argyris and Schon (1978) the more efficient an organised group is at learning the 
more likely it is that they will be able to detect and correct errors, and to see when 











However, Argyris and Schon have also shown that learning is particularly 
difficult when the problems faced are seen to be difficult, embarrassing or threatening. 
This is as a result of the reasoning processes that they suggest are crucial to effective 
learning namely causal reasoning, which they describe as "the key to everyday life" 
and productive reasoning which "subjects its conclusions to continual tests in the 
world of practice" (p. 2). For Argyris and Schon, making effective use of productive 
reasoning can become a problem when the advice and actions that are advocated are 
seen as embarrassing or threatening. Under these circumstances people resort to what 
they refer to as "defensive reasoning". When defensive reasoning is activated the 
organisational defences build to protect the defensive reasoning which helps to ensure 
that little learning will occur that questions the causal reasoning (p. 3): 
I think that it is fair to say that we are intentionally creating a world 
full of self-reinforcing, anti-learning processes that will overprotect 
the players so that it will be difficult to detect and correct difficult 
and embarrassing problems .... Social science should not only 
describe reality as accurately as possible, it should also pay 
attention to producing knowledge about virtual worlds that provide 
liberating alternatives that endow human beings with competencies 
that reverse and undo these self-fuelling, anti-learning, 
overprotective processes (p. 3-4). 
Smith (2001) suggests that it is out of this work that the ideas regarding 
"theories of action" can be seen to have grown. These theories are based on the belief 
that people are designers of their own actions. In the words of Argyris and Schon 
"people hold maps in their heads about how to plan and implement their actions and 
they design action in order to achieve intended consequences and monitor it to learn if 
their actions are effective". Argyris himself argues that few people are aware that the 
maps they use to take action are not the theories they explicitly espouse and even 
fewer people are aware ofthe maps or theories they do use (Argyris and Argyris and 
Schon in Anderson 1997:2). 
The most significant aspect of what is being suggested is not merely that there 
is a difference between what people say and do but that there is a theory consistent 
with what people say and a different theory consistent with what they do. The 











different "theories of actioll"(emphasis mine)(Argyris, Putnam & McLain Smith, 
1985:82). 
Another significant aspect of their work is highlighted by Robinson who 
suggests that the research in the field of co-operative learning has two quite distinct 
strands each with its own variations and that the work of Argyris and Schon "straddles 
both strands" (Robinson 2001 :58). Robinson distinguishes between what she terms on 
the one hand the "descriptive strand" with its roots in social psychology and 
increasingly, as suggested earlier, in cognitive and neuropsychology; pursuing the 
sorts of issues that would reveal more about the nature of groups and organisations 
and organising. On the other hand is what she describes as the "normative strand" of 
research, which is more commonly referred to as research on the learning organisation 
and is less concerned with how groups learn than with their capacity to direct their 
learning in ways that bring them closer to their stated objectives (p. 58). 
It seems pretty evident, as Robinson points out, that there should be a close 
connection between the two strands. However, in practice she claims that there is little 
scholarly exchange between the two. Conversely whilst Argyris and Schon's 
commitment to the improvement of practice places them in the "normative" camp, 
Robinson believes that they have "breached the partition in the field by their 
methodological commitment to the development of theory that is both rigorous and of 
high quality" (Robinson 2001 :58). A belief, which I hope, is supported by the content 
of my own research. 
Theories of action: theory in use and espoused theory 
"A theory of action is first a theory: its most general properties are properties 
that all theories share, and the most general criteria that apply to it such as 
generality, centrality and simplicity are criteria applied to all theories" (Argyris and 
Schon 1978:4). The distinction that Argyris and Schon make between the two 
contrasting theories of action is between those theories that are implicit in what we do 
as individuals and those ideals or core values in which we claim to believe. The 
former are described by Argyris and Schon as our "theories-in-use" and they govern 
our actual behaviour. These tend to be tacit structures and their relationship to action 











about self, others and the environment these assumptions constitute a microcosm of 
science in everyday life" (Argyris and Schon 1978:30). 
On the other hand when someone is challenged as to how they might behave 
under certain circumstances, the answer they usually give is their "espoused theory" 
of action. This conveys what a person believes they would do or what they would 
have other people think they would do, in any given situation. This is the theory of 
action to which we claim allegiance and which upon request we communicate to 
others. But the theory that actually governs our actions is our theory-in-use (Argyris 
and Schon 1978:6-7): 
All theories of human nature are based upon a thesis of rationality 
or reasonability. Human beings are rational in that they keep their 
actions in consonant alignment with their beliefs and they co-
ordinate their actions and expectations in the light of the best 
information they have .... There is rationality in the espoused 
theories and in the theories-in-use but what makes understanding 
rationality more complex is that the rationality embedded in the 
theories-in-use is often counter to the rationality embedded in the 
espoused theories (Argyris and Schon 1978:44). 
Anderson (1997) points out that Argyris and Schon believe that these theories 
of action determine all deliberate human behaviour. But what is critical to this belief 
is that they also believe that all human behaviour (emphasis mine) is deliberate. An 
example from Argyris' own research may serve to clarify the distinction between the 
two theories of practice: 
When asked about how he would deal with a disagreement with a 
client, a management consultant responded that he would first state 
his understanding of the disagreement, then negotiate what kind of 
data he and the client could agree would resolve it. This represents 
his espoused theory (or the theory behind what he says), which is of 
joint control of the problem. A tape recording of the consultant in 
such a situation however, revealed that he actually advocated his 
own point of view and dismissed the client's. This indicated his 











closely approximates his unilateral control of the problem and a 
rejection of valid information exchange (Argyris 1987:93). 
Argyris and Schon claim, as I mentioned earlier, that one reason for insisting 
what people do is consistent with a theory, is that what people do is not accidental. 
People design the action they take and are therefore responsible for the design: 
Fundamental to the theories of action that people use are their 
reasoning processes which are those activities by which we create 
premises which are assumed, or are proven, to be valid and from 
which we draw conclusions about how to act. Popper (1969) has 
suggested that it is these reasoning processes that are at the core of 
how individuals construe reality (Argyris and Schon 1978:7). 
However, although people design the action they use they are often unaware 
of the design of that action and of its difference from their espoused theory - "We 
become unaware ofthe programmes in our heads that keep us unaware" (Argyris 
1999:57). 
In response to this issue Anderson raises the question that if people are 
unaware of the theories that drive their action (their theories-in-use), then how can 
they effectively manage their behaviour (Anderson 1997:3)? In response to Anderson, 
Smith (2001) suggests that we do so by asking questions of ourselves about the extent 
to which our behaviour fits our espoused theory and the extent to which our inner 
feelings become expressed in our actions. In other words, is there congruence between 
the two? 
Argyris' contention is that effectiveness in life results from developing such 
congruence between our theory-in-use and our espoused theory (Argryis in Anderson 
1997:3), which compliments Freya Stark's view on happiness with which I opened 
this section of my research. 
The models and conceptualisations developed by Argyris and Schon are for 
the purpose of helping people make more informed choices about the action they 
design and implement. To this end, according to Anderson (1997), they have 












Models of theories-in-use 
The construction Argyris and Schon developed in order to explain theories-in-
use is shown in figure 1 (Anderson 1997). 
Figure 1. Model explaining the process of developing theories-in use. 
Governing variables are values, which a person is trying to keep within some 
acceptable range. We all have many governing variables and any action we choose is 
likely to impact on a number of these variables. Therefore any situation may 
necessitate a trade-off between our governing variables ( emphasis mine). 
Action strategies are strategies used to keep our governing values within the 
acceptable range. These strategies will have consequences, which are both intended 
and unintended. An example illustrates this point: 
A person may have a governing variable of suppressing conflict, 
and one of being competent. In any given situation she will design 
action strategies to keep both these governing variables within 
acceptable limits. For instance, in a conflict situation she might 
avoid the discussion of the conflict situation and say as little as 
possible. This avoidance may (she hopes) suppress the conflict, yet 
allow her to appear competent because she at least hasn't said 
anything wrong. This strategy will have various consequences both 
for her and the others involved. An intended consequence might be 
that the other parties will eventually give up the discussion, thereby 
successfully suppressing the conflict. As she has said little, she may 
feel she has not left herself open to being seen as incompetent. An 
unintended consequence might be that the she thinks the situation 
has been left unresolved and therefore likely to recur, and feels 











To sum up, we can see that there are a number of elements to Argyris and 
Schon's model, which help explain how we link our thoughts to our actions. These 
elements are: 
Governing variables (or values); 
Action strategies; 
Intended and unintended consequences for ourselves; 
Intended and unintended consequences for others; and 
The effectiveness of our action strategy. 
These conceptual frameworks have implications for our learning processes. 
As mentioned previously, the consequences of any action may be intended or 
unintended. When the consequences ofthe strategy employed are as the person 
intends, then there is a match between intention and outcome. Therefore the theory-
in-use is confirmed. However, when the consequences are unintended, and more 
particularly when they are counterproductive to satisfying their governing values, then 
there is a mismatch. Argyris and Schon suggest two possible responses to such a 
mismatch. These responses are represented in their concepts of "single and double-
loop learning". 
Single-loop learning 
"Single-loop learning - Whenever an error is detected and corrected without 
questioning or altering the underlying values (variables) of the system (be it 
individual, group, intergroup, organisational or interorganisational)" (Argyris and 
Schon 1978:7). 
The first response to a mismatch between intention and outcome is to search 
for another strategy, which will satisfy the governing variables (Argyris, Putnam & 
McLain Smith in Anderson 1997:7). For instance in the example that was used above, 
a new strategy to suppress conflict might be to reprimand the other people involved 
for wasting time, and suggest they get on with the task at hand. This may suppress 
the conflict and allow feelings of competence as the fault has now been passed on to 
the other party for wasting time. In such a case the new action strategy is used in 











in the governing variable itself. Such a process is an example of single-loop 
learning. See Figure 2. 
Another possible response would be to examine and change the governing 
variables themselves. For example, the person might choose to critically examine the 
governing value of suppressing conflict. This may lead to discarding this value and 
substituting a new value such as being open to inquiry. The associated action strategy 
might be to discuss the issue openly. Therefore in this case both the governing 
variable and the action strategy have changed. This would constitute double-loop 
learning (Anderson 1997:7). See Figure 2. 
Double-loop learning 
"Double-loop learning - When questions are asked as to why; or the 
underlying values of the system are altered" (Argyris and Schon 1978:8). 
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Figure 2. Single and double-loop learning 
Anderson suggests that in this sense, single and double-loop learning bear 
close resemblance to what Watzlawick, Weakland and Fisch call First and Second 
Order Change. First Order Change exists when the norms of the system remain the 
same and changes are made within the existing norms. Second Order Change 
describes a situation where the norms of the system themselves are challenged and 
changed (Watzlawick, Weakland and Fisch in Anderson 1997:8). 
It would appear that both 'First and Second Order Change' and 'Single and 
Double Loop Learning' are related to how Argyris comments in his criticism of the 











Writers on the learning organisation tend to focus on first-order 
errors, due to mistaken or incomplete action strategies and 
assumptions of the sort that practitioners ordinarily detect and try to 
correct. They tend to be selectively inattentive to second-order 
errors, which are due to the organisational designs that make people 
systematically unaware of the behavioural phenomena that underlie 
the production and reproduction of first-order errors (Argyris 
1999:6). 
There seems little doubt that Argyris (1999) believes that double-loop learning 
is the more effective way of making informed decisions about the way we design and 
implement action; consequently the focus of much of his research has been to explore 
how groups are able to increase their capacity for double-loop learning. He 
emphasises that it is double-loop leaming, which is necessary if individuals and 
groups are to make informed decisions in our current "rapidly changing and often 
uncertain contexts" (Argyris 1974; 1982; 1990): 
The underlying theory, supported by years of empirical research, is 
that the reasoning processes employed by individuals in 
organizations inhibit the exchange of relevant information in ways 
that make double-loop leaming difficult and all but impossible in 
situations in which much is at stake. This creates a dilemma, as 
these are the very organizational situations in which double-loop 
learning is most needed (Edmondson and Moingeon in Smith 2001). 
Unfortunately, as Argyris and Schon are quick to point out, human beings 
have theories-in-use that make it likely when working in groups that they will in 
fact inhibit their own and other members double-loop learning (emphasis mine). If 
individuals reflected on their actions correctly, which they believe is unlikely because 
of their theories-in-use; they would become aware of the counterproductive aspects of 
their actions. They further claim that we are not unaware of the inconsistencies in 
other people's behaviour, but we are programmed to withhold feedback on this in case 
we are held responsible for upsetting other people (Argyris and Schon 1978:27). 
However what would appear to be even more disturbing in Argyris and 











To date all individuals that have entered learning environments 
that are specifically designed to facilitate double-loop learning 
and who are aware of their theories-in-use and who have learned 
about a theory of action that can in fact facilitate double-loop 
learning and who have chosen to learn according to it and who try 
to do so under supportive conditions, are unable to do so when left 
to their own devices (emphasis mine) (p. 28). 
Model I and Model II 
Argyris and Schon have developed two models that describe features of 
theories-in-use that on the one hand inhibit double-loop learning and on the other 
enhance it. It should be noted that it is their belief that all people utilise a common 
theory-in-use in situations, which are either threatening or embarrassing or may 
become threatening or embarrassing. This theory-in-use they describe as Model I and 
it can be said to inhibit double-loop learning. 
On the other hand Model II is where the governing variables/values associated 
with theories-in-use enhance double-loop learning. It should be noted that whilst 
Argyris has demonstrated through his research that there is a large variability in 
people's espoused theories and action strategies, there is almost no variability in their 
theories-in-use (Argyris 1999:56). 
So the governing values associated with our theories-in-use can be grouped 
into those, which inhibit double-loop learning (Model I) and those, which enhance it 
(Model II). Let's now look more closely at these two models. 
Model I theories-in-use 
Model I, the group that Argyris identifies as inhibiting double-loop learning, 
has been described as predominantly competitive and defensive (Dick & Dalmau, 
1990). As was mentioned above, all individuals in the studies that Argyris has carried 
out over the years have operated from theories-in-use consistent with Model I and as 
also emphasised, Model 1 ensures that individuals construct their positions, 
evaluations, and attributions in ways that will inhibit enquiry by the use of 
independent logic. The consequences of these Modell strategies, Argyris submits, are 
likely to be "defensive reasoning, misunderstanding, self-fulfilling and self-sealing 











Argyris also believes that as human beings we learn our theories-in-use early 
in life and therefore, the actions that our Model I theories-in-use produce are highly 
skilled. They are also produced without our being conscious of them since any 
conscious attention might inhibit our producing them effectively. As a consequence of 
this we have become "unaware ofthe programmes in our heads that keep us unaware" 
(p.57). 
It is also important to note that according to Argyris, Putnam and Mc Lain-
Smith (1985), most of our social systems are driven by Model I theories-in-use (p. 
89). This assumption implies predictions about the kinds of strategies people will 
employ in a social environment, and about the resulting consequences. These 
predictions have been tested repeatedly by Argyris and not been unconfirmed 
(Argyris, 1982:Chap. 3), although neither Anderson (1997) nor Smith (2001), to name 
but two researchers, are aware of studies by anyone other than Argyris, which have 
tested these predictions. 
The defining characteristics of Model I are summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1. Model I theory-in-use characteristics 
The governing values of Model I are: 
• Achieve the purpose as the actor defines it 
• Win, do not lose 
• Suppress negative feelings 
• Emphasise rationality 
Primary strategies used to achieve these governing values are: 
• Control environment and task unilaterally 
• Protect self and others unilaterally 
Usually operationalised by: 
• Unillustrated attributions and evaluations, e.g. "You seem 
unmotivated" 
• Advocating courses of action, which discourage inquiry, e.g. "Lets not 











• Treating ones' own views as obviously correct. 
• Making covert attributions and evaluations Face-saving moves such as 
leaving potentially embarrassing facts unstated. 
Consequences of these include: 
• Defensive relationships 
• Low freedom of choice 
• Reduced production of valid information and 
• Little public testing of ideas (Argyris, Putnam & McLain Smith 
1985:89). 
Argyris and Schon believe that this Model I world view has the effect of 
restricting a person to single-loop learning with the result that being unaware of what 
is driving one's behaviour may seriously inhibit the likelihood of one's increased 
effectiveness in the long-term (Argyris and Schon in Anderson 1997:9-10). As 
mentioned previously, the primary action strategy of Model I is unilateral control of 
the environment and task, and unilateral protection of self and others. This underlying 
strategy of control over others inhibits communication and is likely to produce 
defensiveness. Defensiveness is the main mechanism used to protect the individual 
and Model I theories-in-use inform individuals how to design and use defensive 
reasoning unilaterally, whether to protect themselves or others (Argyris in Anderson 
1997: 1 0). Holmer describes this issue as follows: 
Because defensive routines have their roots in tacit, untested 
assumptions, psychological defences, and norms of 
undiscussability, they are insidious in that their dysfunctionality is 
often unrecognised or is accepted as normal. Defensive routines 
result in what Argyris calls 'skilled incompetence', in which people 
used learned skills to produce unintended and undesirable results . 
... People achieve skilled incompetence when their well-practised 
and culturally acceptable behaviour cause them to produce the very 
consequences they intend to avoid (Holmer 2001 :591-592). 
So in order to protect themselves, individuals must distort reality and such 











themselves and others unaware oftheir defensive reaction (Argyris in Anderson 
1997:10). Furthermore, the more that people expose their thoughts and feelings the 
more vulnerable they become to the reactions of others. This is particularly true if 
these others are also programmed with Model I theories-in-use and therefore also 
seeking to achieve the same objectives. 
In summary, Model I has been identified as a group of characteristics which 
inhibit double-loop learning. It is seen as being predominantly defensive and 
competitive, and therefore unlikely to allow an honest evaluation of a person's 
motives and strategies, and less likely to lead to personal growth. Defensiveness 
protects individuals from discovering embarrassing truths about their incongruent or 
less-than-perfect behaviour and intentions. It also protects the person by reinforcing 
conditions such as ambiguity and inconsistency, which further helps to mask a 
person's incongruence from themselves and others. Becoming awar~ of this 
incongruence is difficult, as is doing something about it. According to Argyris this is 
due to the strength of the socialisation of Model I and the fact that the prevailing 
culture in most social systems is ModelL An added complication is that anyone 
trying to inform someone of the incongruence in his or her Model I behaviour is likely 
to use Model I behaviour to do so, and therefore trigger a defensive reaction (Dick 
and Dalmau in Anderson 1997:11). 
Despite all the evidence, which suggests that peoples' theories-in-use are 
consistent with Model I, Argyris (1999) has found that most people hold espoused 
theories, which are inconsistent with Model I. In fact, most people espouse Model II 
theories, the defining characteristics of which are summarised in Table 2. 
Model II theories-in-use 
The underlying objectives of Model II are to help people produce valid 
information, make informed choices and develop an internal commitment to those 
choices. Embedded in these values, Argyris argues, is the assumption that power the 
power for double-loop learning - comes from having reliable information, from being 
competent, from taking on personal responsibility and from monitoring continually 
the effectiveness of one's decisions (Argyris 1977: 122). 
He further emphasises that Model II is not the opposite of Model 1. For 











give control to everyone, or to de-emphasise the intellectual and emphasise the 
emotional aspects at the expense of problem solving (p. 122). He also recognises that 
some significant misunderstandings have arisen in our society because the distinction 
between Model I and Model II was not taken seriously. 
Since Model lover emphasises ideas and rationality, many people in 
organisationalleaming go to the other extreme and emphasise the expression of 
feelings even to the point of suppressing ideas. Not only does Argyris believe that this 
polarisation is ineffective, he believes it misses the point that "feelings have meanings 
and meanings are intellectual phenomena". Without focusing on meanings he believes 
that it's not possible to ascertain whether feelings are valid or productive (p. 122). 
Another example Argyris cites of a "misplaced emphasis" is the recent push 
towards participation by employees in organisations; citizens in communities; and by 
students in educational institutions. The idea he submits is to give these groups more 
power in the decision-making process. It was assumed, according to Argyris, that 
students or employees could enhance the effectiveness of the decision-making process 
(an assumption that I believe I have been guilty of myself). But this policy, according 
to Argyris, overlooked the fact that "such participation would probably increase the 
number of people with Model I assumptions, wllich, in turn, would create even 
more complicated learning systems" (emphasis mine). 
If students and employees had genuinely different views, neither they nor their 
managers or administrators would deal with them effectively. Argyris claims that we 
are now coming to realise "participation should be related to competence to solve 
problems effective(v; and such competence in turn is related to internal 
assumptions, not to whether people are superiors or subordinates, male or female, 
young or old or members of a minority or the majority" ( emphasis mine) (p. 122-
123). 
I strongly suspect that it is this particular issue that may be at the root of my 
own frustration and dissatisfaction and possibly the frustration and dissatisfaction of 
many other students when it comes to working co-operatively in teams. I wonder if 
Holmer might agree: 
There were five of us comprising our term project team .... We had 











team or any process management tools .... After it became clear 
that one member of our group was not contributing to the group 
product in a manner acceptable to the rest of us, our "team" quickly 
degenerated into a frustrating, painful and guilt-ridden exercise in 
human frailty .... The pedagogical and interpersonal 
incompetencies that were at work in this scenario persist in the 
classrooms and workplaces of today (Holmer 2001 :590). 
For Argyris, a key result of using Model II is the ability to combine the skills 
of advocacy with those of encouraging enquiry and confrontation of whatever is being 
advocated and that "embarrassment and threat are not covered up, they are engaged" 
and the end result should be increased learning effectiveness (Argyris 1977: 123). 
Every significant Model II action is evaluated in terms of the degree 
to which it helps the individuals involved generate valid and useful 
information (including relevant feelings), solve the problem in a 
way that it remains solved, and do so without reducing the present 
level of problem solving effectiveness. (Argyris 1976:21-22) 
Model II theory-in-use characteristics 
The governing values of Mode1 II include: 
• Valid information 
• Free and informed choice 
• Internal commitment 
Strategies include: 
• Sharing control 
• Participation in design and implementation of action 
Operationalised by: 
• Attribution and evaluation illustrated with relatively directly 
observable data 
• Surfacing conflicting views 











Consequences should include: 
• Minimally defensive relationships 
• High freedom of choice 
• Increased likelihood of double-loop learning (Anderson 1997: 12). 
Anderson claims that whilst Argyris offers no reason as to why most people 
espouse Model II, the challenge for him and I hope for many other concerned 
educators, is to help individuals transform their espoused theories into theories-in-use 
by learning a new set of skills and a new set of governing values (Anderson 1997: 13). 
Since many individuals espouse Model II values and skills, these traits are not totally 
new to them. However, as Argyris is quick to point out "the empirical fact to date is 
that very few individuals can routinely act on their espoused values and skills; yet 
they are often unaware of this limitation" (Argyris 1999:60). 
Regrettably this premise is rarely more evident than when we get together to 
work in organised groups or teams. 
Working effectively in teams a cognitive enterprise 
Argyris and Schon (1978) suggest that each member ofa team constructs his 
or her own image of the theory-in-use of the team as a whole and that the picture they 
construct is always incomplete. As a result of this, team members are continually 
working to add information in order to get a better picture of the whole in order to 
help them get to know their place within the team. In order to emphasise my 
contention that the work of Argyris and Schon is equally applicable to organised 
groups of any size I have taken the liberty of substituting the word team in the 
following extract oftheir work. 
A team (organization) is like an organism each of whose cells 
contains a particular, partial, changing image of itself in relation to 
the whole. And like such an organism, the team's practice stems 
from those very images. Team is an artefact of individual ways of 
representing teamwork. 
Hence, our inquiry into team learning must concern itself 











teamwork which is, at root, a cognitive enterprise. Individual 
members are continually engaged in attempting to know the team, 
and to know themselves in the context of the team. At the same 
time, their continuing efforts to know and to test their knowledge 
represent the object of their inquiry. Teamwork is reflexive 
mqmry .... 
[Members] require external references. There must be public 
representations ofteam theory-in-use to which individuals can refer. 
This is the function of team maps. These are the shared descriptions 
of the team, which individuals jointly construct and use to guide 
their own inquiry .... 
Team theory-in-use, continually constructed through 
individual inquiry, is encoded in private images and in public maps. 
These are the media of team learning (Argyris and Schon 1978:16-
17). 
Smith (2001) claims that from these writings one can see how Argyris and 
Schon connect the world of the individual team member with that of the team; their 
focus being on individual and team interactions and defences rather than on systems 
and structures. Also, according to Smith, by looking at the way people jointly 
construct their "maps", it is possible to talk about team learning the detection and 
correction of error and a team's theory-in-use (Smith 2001: 1O). For as Argyris and 
Schon point out, for team learning to occur, "'learning agents', discoveries, 
inventions, and evaluations must be embedded in organizational memory" (Argyris 
and Schon 1978:19). Ifit is not encoded in the images that individuals have, and the 
maps they help construct with others, then "the individual will have learned but the 
organization (team) will not have done so" (Smith 2001: 1O). 
But as one might suspect the greatest problem with regard to team or group 
learning is, as Argyris and Schon (1978) emphasise, that members programmed with 
Modell theories-in-use, impose these theories-in-use on any team or group in which 
they participate (p. 29). In order to differentiate organisational or group theories-in-











Model I theories-in-use". I shall take another liberty in my research by using the term 
GI to refer to "group or team Modell theories-in-use" (p. 29). 
This condition is further aggravated by what Argyris refers to as the change 
models currently in good currency that are being used by many in the field of 
organisational and group learning, both in the commercial and public domains: 
For twenty years or more institutional leaders have believed that the 
key to better performance is better communication and have used a 
score of communication tools to convey and gather the information 
needed to bring about change .... What is news is that these familiar 
techniques, used correctly, will actually inhibit learning and 
communication (emphasis mine)(Argyris 1994:77) 
Argyris submits that these models being used have serious "gaps" in them. 
These he lists as follows: 
1. The old model (of organisational learning) assumed that individuals 
had the skill to learn new behaviour, or at least the skills to learn new 
skills. It now appears that this is not necessarily the case for double-
loop learning. 
2. The pervasiveness with which individuals are unaware that they do not 
have the skills that they may value. This lack of awareness may not 
simply be due to some void or missing knowledge, but may actually be 
tacitly designed, largely automatic, and hence, a highly skilled action. 
3. The third gap is related to the belief held by many of us dealing with 
experientialleaming that unawareness is primarily related to some 
foml of repression, especially of feelings. This is partially valid but 
incomplete. It appears that the basis for human beings not being in 
touch with their feelings or being reluctant to express them, is not 
simply defensiveness or resistance. Rather, human beings may use 
reasoning processes that unknowingly distort the necessity to be in 
touch with and express their feelings. In order to express feelings we 
must first alter our reasoning processes. 
4. A forth gap is the assumption that one can understand the values that 











behave consistently with the values they espouse, then that is usually 
seen as an error to be corrected. It now appears that a somewhat more 
complex interpretation is more valid. If such errors are not errors then 
they must be the consequence of some design. If this is so then there 
must be some sort of map, schemata, or micro-theory that they use to 
inform their design. Since this design or theory is different to their 
espoused theory, a differentiation must be made between espoused 
values and theory on the one hand and the theory-in-use (Argyris 
1999:70-71). 
As with individuals, the better groups are at learning the more likely it is that 
they will be able to detect and correct errors, and to see when they will not be able to 
do so (Argyris and Schon 1978: 1). However Argyris and Schon emphasise that 
double-loop learning will not occur naturally in groups with a Modell theory-in-use 
of "unilateral control, win-lose competitive dynamics, and a focus on rationality of 
ideas to the exclusion of rationality of feelings" (p. 28). 
An example of this would be a situation where the requirements of the group's 
Modell theories-in-use are contrary to the group's technical requirements. A conflict 
occurs and the automatic response of the group members is to hide the conflict and 
play the Modell "political games" that the group members have learned in order to 
"cover themselves". In other words they activate their "defensive routines" (p. 29). 
Defensive routines 
Culturally ingrained defensive routines that operate below the level of 
conscious awareness to produce learning and performance barriers such as pretended 
agreement, unresolved power struggles, social loafing, cultural incompetence, and so 
on: 
Because defensive routines have their roots in tacit, untested 
assumptions, psychological defences, and norms of undiscussability, 
they are insidious in that their dysfunctionality is often unrecognised 
or is accepted as normal. Defensive routines result in what Argyris 
calls 'skilled incompetence', in which people used learned skills to 











Defensive routines, Argyris reminds us, discourage reflection in yet another 
significant way. Since we practice these strategies for most of our lives, we are all 
highly skilled at carrying them out and since highly skilled actions are automatic we 
rarely reflect on what we take for granted: 
In studies carried out on more than 6000 people, I have found this 
kind of defensive theory-in-use to be universal, with no measurable 
difference by country, age, sex, ethnic identity, education, wealth, 
power or experience. All over the world, in every kind of business 
and institution, in every kind of crises and dilemma, the principles 
of defensive reasoning encourage people to leave their own 
behaviour unexamined and to avoid any objective test of their 
premises and conclusions (Argyris 1994:81). 
It is this defensive reasoning or group defensive routines as they are 
referred to in a collective environment; that according to Argyris, inhibit 
genuine learning taking place within a team. As with our personal master 
programmes or mental modules; group defensive routines consist of all the 
policies, practices and actions that prevent people from having to experience 
embarrassment or threat within a group. At the same time they also prevent 
them from examining the nature and causes ofthat embarrassment or threat 
(p.81). 
Argyris and Schon emphasise that apart from being one of the richest hunting 
grounds for paradoxes, group defensive routines differ in other important ways from 
our personal psychological defensive routines. They list these differences as follows: 
1. group defensive routines are taught through socialisation; 
2. they are taught as strategies to deal with threat or embarrassment; 
3. they are supported by the culture of the group; and 
4. they exist over time even though the individuals move in and out of the 
group (Argyris and Schon 1978:41). 
A typical example of a group defensive routine is "mixed messages". Mixed 











imprecise and precise and Argyris and Schon suggest four rules that are used in 
designing and implementing such messages: 
1. Design a message that is inconsistent. 
2. Act as if the message is consistent. 
3. Make the inconsistency in the message and the act that there is no 
inconsistency undiscussable. 
4. Make the undiscussability of the undiscussable also undiscussable. 
Argyris and Schon believe that group defensive routines can take on a life of 
their own in that they maintain, reinforce and proliferate themselves causing them to 
eventually become unmanageable (p. 42). The simple explanation for such paradoxes 
they claim is found in the governing variables of Modell and G-l theories-in-use 
which they describe in a little more detail than was given above: 
• Human beings seek, in an interaction, to control the relationships in such 
a way as to attain their intended consequences. 
• The theory of control embedded in Model 1 and reinforced by G-l is one 
of unilateral control. We gain control by taking it away from others. No 
one should be able to use the reciprocal of Modell theory-in-use and 
design actions that are consistent with Modell. 
• Acting in ways to control that takes away the control of others triggers 
the defensive routines of others. These in tum protect the parties 
involved, and at the same time, blunt the defensive routines or inhibit the 
attempts of individuals to act effectively. All parties now use defensive 
routines that escalate error, and create self-fulfilling and self-sealing 
processes. 
• The result of mutually reinforcing defensive routines is to combine 
wishful thinking with anticipatory face-saving which, in tum, results in 
systematic distortions. These distortions result in paradoxical 
consequences because, as we have seen, they result in conditions where 
individuals (or social entities) are effective and ineffective; they 
experience success and failure; the consequences are productive and 











With these issues in mind I should like to investigate two of the mistakes that 
Argyris believes are made when trying to create and implement organised collective 
learning environments. 
Mistakes made in creating learning environments for groups 
Argyris himself maintains that most organised social entities in trying to create 
more effective learning environments make two mistakes. Firstly they define learning 
too narrowly as mere "problem-solving", so the focus is on identifying and correcting 
errors in their external environment. Whilst he agrees that solving problems is 
important he stresses that if learning is to persist, participants in group learning 
situations should firstly look within themselves. People need to reflect critically on 
their own behaviour and try to identify ways in which they may be contributing to 
their group's problems, and then change how they act. In particular he emphasises 
that "they must learn that the very way they go about defining and solving problems 
can be a source of problems in its own right" (Argyris 1991:99-100). 
The second mistake is the assumption that getting people to learn is largely a 
matter of motivation and when people have the right attitudes and commitment, 
learning automatically follows. As a result of this attitude, groups tend to focus on 
creating new structures that are designed to create motivated and committed group 
members. But as Argyris points out, effective double-loop learning is not simply a 
function of how people feel, it is a reflection of how people think that is, "the 
cognitive rules or reasoning they use to design and implement their actions" (p. 100). 
As a result of this, "defensive reasoning can block learning even when the 
individual commitment to it is high, just as a computer programme with hidden bugs 
can produce results exactly the opposite of what its designers had planned" (p. 100). 
But the good news is that organised groups can learn how to resolve this learning 
dilemma by making the way group members think about their behaviour a focus of 
group learning and improvement programmes "Teaching people how to reason 
about their behaviour in new and effective ways breaks down the defences that block 
learning" (p. 100). 
Despite its strength, Argyris and Schon believe that organised groups can 
break out of this viscous circle of defensive reasoning. People, in their opinion, 











self-esteem is intimately tied to behaving consistently and perfonning effectively. 
They also believe that groups can use these universal human tendencies (emphasis 
mine) to teach group members how to reason in a new way in effect, to change the 
master programmes in their heads and thus reshape their behaviour (Argyris and 
Schon 1978:94). 
However, having said that, Argyris himself admits that in his experience 
changing how we behave is just about as difficult as learning how to play the piano or 
the game of tennis reasonably well. It is this aspect which I shall now investigate 
what needs to be done in practice in order to maximise the likelihood of effective 
learning environments being created when we decide to promote "collaborative 











Chapter 7: Learning to collaborate in co-operative learning 
environments such as student project teams (SPT) 
Although the concept of collaboration, as I have identified it, is highly 
acceptable from a social perspective and highly desirable in the "new-age" global 
workplace; it would seem from my research that the practical implementation of the 
concept, particularly in circumstances that involve second-order errors and double-
loop learning, is much more problematic than given cognisance by policy makers and 
management theorists alike: 
Over the years we've discovered that giving everyone brief training, 
even when it starts at the top, is not a good approach. People do the 
workshops, find the tools (for working collaboratively) easy to 
understand, and assume that good intentions are all it takes to use 
them. But they look around and see that others that have had the 
same programme still get frustrated and in the heat of the moment 
make the same imperious, unilateral moves that they have learned to 
hate. Then they say, "See, the stuff doesn't work", and it falls into 
disuse (Putnam in Creelman 2003:3). 
My research suggests (as outlined in chapter 2:55-57), that one reason for this 
is that working collaboratively is not something that comes naturally, instinctively or 
spontaneously to our human species as does co-operation; collaboration, whilst 
appearing to contain aspects of co-operation, moves much more towards what Breen 
refers to as "a collegial and consultative framework" (Breen 2000: 100): 
"Collaboration assumes the development of a model of joint planning, joint 
implementation and joint evaluation where responsibility and authority for basic 
policy decision making is shared" (Breen 2000: 1 00). 
One condition that now seems abundantly clear to me, is that this distinction, 
between what Pinker refers to as the logic of reciprocation - co-operation and 
collaboration, is not always evident in the literature, be it academic or popular. In fact 
it is not unusual for the terms to be used interchangeably. I however have adopted the 
position in my research that what the literature refers to as co-operative Icollaborative 
or even collective learning can be divided into two categories. On the one hand are 











improve the skills and competencies ofthe individual members within the group. An 
example of this would be where group members practice these individual skills and 
competencies within a competitive environment such as team sports. 
In this type oflearning environment individuals are rewarded for the 
competence they show in the performance of their individual skills and the team's 
performance is deemed to be as a result of the sum ofthe individual skills of the 
team's members. There is little recognition for the team's performance but rather for 
the performance of the team's members. Also in this method of practice, if team 
members change there will be little difference to team performance provided that the 
team can acquire the services of an equally individually skilled member. This 
category I classify as a co-operative learning environment. 
Olson suggests that a good example of this co-operative learning environment 
is "getting an education" in a higher learning institution such as a university, where 
there is a transfer of information between lecturer and student to the benefit of both 
(Olson in Breen 2000:96). This co-operative approach would appear to be by far the 
most prevalent form of group work currently practiced across most fields of 
endeavour from the business world to academia. 
On the other hand is the method of practice where groups are formed with the 
purpose of developing group learning. From the example I used on page 57 of this 
research report from my own experience of coaching hockey, this approach can also 
be achieved using a competitive environment. When this is done the emphasis is not 
on the development of skills that improve the competence ofthe individual, but rather 
on each member learning and developing the skills required to improve the group 
functioning more effectively as a team. In this environment the team is judged as a 
unit and not by the abilities of its individual members since the members display 
collaboration skills as a priority over and above individual skills. Also, in this 
environment, when a member leaves, the team is significantly affected unless a new 
member can be found who has the collaboration skills, which fit in with the rest of the 
team. It is this category to which I reserve the distinction of collaboration. 
Recognising current behaviour 
One of the most critical issues to being successful in such circumstances is 











behaviour with which they are familiar; the behaviour that they know and feel safe 
with; the behaviour that comes naturally to them: is not the behaviour required to 
achieve success collaboratively as a team. 
In the example of my hockey experience, the learners truly believed that the 
only way that their teams would improve was for them, as individuals, to become 
more skilled at playing hockey. But this they were unable to do since most of them 
believed that they had reached their hockey-playing peak, as individuals. Now to be 
told by a new, middle-aged, male coach that what they had previously learned was at 
best only of limited value to them if they wanted to improve as teams was 
understandably somewhat difficult for them to accept 
But it is these very issues, which my research suggests are the most 
significant, if one wishes to achieve collaboration. Yet it is these very issues, 
awareness and more importantly acceptance that our current behaviour, motivated by 
our ingrained Model I theories-in-use, is at best, of only limited value in being more 
effective at achieving collaboration in any co-operative learning environment And it 
is these very issues, which remain so neglected, so understated in the literature, which 
Argyris (1999) in his review of both "the practice-orientated, prescriptive literature, 
mainly promulgated by consultants and practitioners; and the predominantly sceptical 
scholarly literature ... produced by academics" (p. 1); highlights as two ofthe gaps" 
he discovered "in the models of learning currently held in good currency" (p. 69): 
1. The models assume that individuals have the skill to learn new 
behaviour, or at least the skills to learn new skills. It now appears that 
this is not necessarily the case for double-loop learning. 
2. The pervasiveness with which individuals are unaware that they do not 
have the skil1s that they may value. This lack of awareness may not 
simply be due to some void or missing knowledge, but may actually be 
tacitly designed, largely automatic, and hence, a highly skilled action 
(p.70-71). 
It was this discovery that caused Argyris to further comment as to how 
"authors speak ofthe importance of double-loop learning but without serious attention 
to the behavioural conditions for its achievement" (emphasis mine)( Argyris 










A paradigm shift needed in the acquisition of new behaviour 
Argyris points out that we are already in possession of many of the theoretical 
tools required by the new behaviour needed for collaboration. They are embedded in 
our espoused Model II theories of practice as illustrated in chapter 5. But although we 
may have some understanding of the concept valid information, free and informed 
choice, sharing control and participation in design and implementation how familiar 
are we with the behaviour that accompanies these theoretical tools? According to 
Argyris we are not: 
To date all individuals that have entered learning environments that 
are specifically designed to facilitate double-loop learning and who 
are aware oftheir Modell theories-in-use and who have learned 
about a theory of action that can facilitate double-loop learning and 
who have chosen to learn according to it and who try to do so under 
supportive conditions, are unable to do so when left to their own 
devices (Argyris 1999:83). 
In spite of the critical nature for the need to "learn" new behaviour to improve 
practice; the literature prefers to emphasise such abstractions as attitude changes; 
developing new concepts; and paradigm shifts; but has very little to say on the more 
practical aspect of teaching new behaviour. Or for that matter exactly what the new 
behaviour should be or how one should go about acquiring it. This situation it would 
appear goes beyond the literature. 
In his paper "Re-searching teaching: changing paradigms to improve 
practice", Breen (2000), having explored "the traditionally accepted options available 
through higher education" has found nothing that he believes meets the teacher's 
"real needs" in regard to improving practice. He concludes that "the problem for the 
teacher wanting to improve her own practice is that the theoretical tools (the content) 
are foregrounded rather than the classroom practice" (the behaviour) (p. 96). Perhaps 
it is the widespread prevalence of this condition that is the cause of the claim that 
Davis et a1. (2000) make in that "students are often unable to make use of their 
classroom-based learning in their lives outside of schools" (p. 173). They have failed 











Breen proposes a methodology which he refers to as "becoming more 
experienced" that he has based on Mason's "Discipline of Noticing" (Mason in Breen 
2000). This proposed methodology is dependent on participants forming objective 
"accounts-of' events for consideration by colleagues (fellow teachers). This is done, 
according to Breen, so that colleagues can give "differing possible interpretations". 
The ultimate aim of this exercise being to "increase the number of possibilities for a 
teacher to act in the moment". The teacher therefore becomes more aware of what he 
or she does in the moment and also more aware of the different possibilities offered 
by colleagues since choices are limited to his or her experience of life and by allowing 
others to enter the story, "creates the possibility for different possibilities" (Breen 
2000:101). 
But Argyris (1993) argues that "the type of data used as the learning vehicle is 
crucial". In order to get at participants theories-in-use and their defensive reasoning, 
the narrative must be as directly observable as possible - "Data that are inferences 
from talk do not activate the theories-in-use. Moreover, generalized stories of what 
happened are inadequate, in that these do not provide data from which the listeners 
can make up their own minds as to what was said" (Argyris 1993:8-9). 
Ifwe are to accept Argyris' (1999) argument that "everyone seems to create 
diagnostic frames that contain the same features that they tell everyone else not to 
use" (p. 80), then generalised stories are inadequate, since all participants' behaviour 
is motivated by their Model I theories-in-use and all that is likely to be gained from 
the stories of other colleagues are slightly different strategies that have been used to 
achieve the same Model I objectives. 
Mason (2002), in support of Argyris, emphasises that professional 
development is about "changing habitual reactions, which were developed in order to 
cope in certain situations" (p. 1). In other words "changing practices (emphasis mine) 
by choosing to act differently" (p. 17). There seems little merit in adopting a 
colleagues Model I behaviour whilst retaining one's own Model I theories-in-use? 
Varela, another author to whom Breen refers, makes a similar appeal - "We 
have failed to pay attention to the extent to which our actions and observations are 
ruled by our habits, which in tum are an integral part of our structures" (Varela in 











Thomas Kuhn used the word paradigm to refer to the webs of belief 
and assumption that prompt researchers in a particular discipline to 
agree on the issues within that discipline. A paradigm might be 
described as the commonsense of an era or setting. It consists of the 
entrenched habits of association that render some ideas sensible, 
other silly, and still others unthinkable. 
This tacit accord is understood in large part rooted on the prevailing 
language, which imposes on speakers already established sets of 
interpretations and associations. Hence for knowledge to evolve 
language must change. We must learn to speak differently - to 
invent new words or appropriate old words - to open new 
interpretative possibilities (emphasis mine) (Davis 2004: 140). 
These sentiments from Mason, Varela and Davis would seem to support the 
conclusions drawn by Argyris and Schon that co-operative groups will be unlikely to 
learn because the participants are ruled by their Modell theories-in-use, which create 
Model I (G-I) learning systems, which in turn, requires or sanctions Modell theories-
in-use. This further creates a circular, self-reinforcing system that leads to "self-
fulfilling, self-sealing, escalating error whenever double-loop issues are involved" 
(Argyris and Schon 1978:33). 
Argyris and Schon also stress that none of these error-escalating processes 
they have identified, appear to be due to any unconscious or deep personality factors. 
They believe that they are related to skills and people can learn new skills. However 
they do support the contention that co-operation is a necessary condition for creating 
environments for collaborative learning to occur and that as people learn the 
collaboration skills of Model 2, they necessarily create a Model 2 group learning 
system, which feeds back to reinforce the new theory-in-use (p. 33). 
The process that Argyris and Schon believe is required to help teams become 
collaborative learners is firstly, as we have already discussed above, they need as 
individuals to become aware of their Modell theories-in-use and automatic reasoning 
processes that lead to their current "counterproductive skilled responses" (p. 33). 
Secondly, team members need to be made aware how they create and/or maintain 











Modell theories-in-use. They also need to understand that in order to learn a new set 
of skills to help them behaviour collaboratively which for Argyris and Schon is 
Model 11 theory of action individuals don't discard Modell. Quite the contrary-
"They develop rules that state under what conditions Model 1 and Model 11. theories-
in-use would be preferable" (p. 34-35). 
One aspect Argyris and Schon emphasise that is critical in implementing the 
process into a team, irrespective of its size, is that collaborative learning within any 
co-operative environment must begin with the individual and then spread to the 
group. This assumption they claim implies that it should not be possible to alter 
Model 1 theories-in-use and Model I group learning systems by intervening at a group 
level with a new structure or policy (p. 35). "Structural changes that are congruent 
with Model II and G-II will not work until they become part ofthe theory-in-use of 
individuals and until people act in ways to create conditions congruent with G-II 
learning systems" (Argyris 1999:85). 
But if we are to support these ideas as proposed above what then is the role of 
the teacher and teaching in this critical issue oflearning new behaviour in order to 
improve our ability to behave collaboratively? 
Research on intervention suggests that it is possible to help 
individuals learn new theories-in-use and to create new learning 
systems. The intervention requires the creation of a dialectical 
learning process where the participants can continually compare 
their theories-in-use, and the learning systems in which they are 
embedded, with alternative models. This requires that 
interventionists make available alternative models with significantly 
different governing values and behavioural strategies (Argyris and 
Schon 1978:37). 
Teaching to improve collaboration 
"If we are sincere in our interest to improve and develop learning then we 
need to shift our gaze towards teacher and student activities and actions. We need to 
put the teacher-student relationship at the centre oflearning" (Gunter 2001:140). This 
view of Gunter's is hardly an isolated one and is supported by many theorists in the 











learn new skills (emphasis mine) and that their time will be spent differently. It will 
also mean, he continues, that some lecturers will have to make a radical shift in their 
orientation from a view of teaching as transmitting information and ideas to one of 
directly attending to "the process of learning" in their students (Ramsden 1998: 18). 
Breen might add that it's not just about attending to "the process oflearning" as 
referred to by Ramsden but perhaps even more importantly, attending to the practice 
of learning. 
This research is targeted at those who are concerned specifically with the issue 
of "student project teams" (SPT's) and particularly faculty members who wish to 
"shift their gaze towards teacher and student activities and actions" and consider using 
SPT's, either because of their own personal convictions towards them, or due to the 
dictates of some higher authority. However as Jones (1996) points out, irrespective of 
the authority, there should only be one reason for the use of SPT' s and that is to 
improve the process - and I would argue the practice - of education; so as to increase 
the likelihood of students reaching their educational goals. 
One of those goals I would submit, iftoday's students take any cognisance of 
the expectations of their social environment and the economic imperative, is likely to 
be to achieve competency in the skills required for working and living co-operatively. 
In their recent book "Developing management skills 5th edition", Whetten and 
Cameron claim that almost eighty per cent of Fortune 1000 companies reported that 
they used "self-managing" work teams, with an incredible ninety-one per cent 
reporting that "employee work groups were being utilised" causing them to conclude 
" that the most desired skill of a new employee today is the ability to work in a team" 
(Whetten and Cameron 2001 :456-457). 
This would suggest that the educator who is considering the use of SPT's 
needs to have little doubt that their use will make a significant contribution in helping 
students acquire a reasonable degree of competency in the skills required for 
collaboration so that they can work effectively in co-operative learning environments. 
However in order to have a chance at achieving such change, both in attitude 
(espoused theories) and behaviour (theories-in-use), it is imperative that one is 
convinced ofthe merits of collaborative work, which Senge et al (1994) describe as 











spiritually" (355). They also advise that one should not even think of starting this 
work until its implications have been thought through, since the process of learning 
collaboratively is so unfamiliar and "most o/us have had no previous practical 
training in the concept (emphasis mine)(p.355). In this regard Senge et a1. believe 
that SPT's can develop these skills faster if they have the benefit of a facilitator who 
is trained in the "techniques for building reflection and inquiry skills as well as 
dialogue facilitation" (p. 355). According to Schwarz (2002), these facilitation skills 
are increasingly becoming a core competency for anyone who works with groups (p. 
x). 
Judging by these opinions it seems mandatory that if one wishes to fulfil the 
role of teacher facilitator or coach effectively with respect to SPTs, then that 
person needs to become competent in the facilitation/teaching skills necessary to 
ensure that the use of SPTs will indeed "improve the process and the practice of 
education". This issue is of particular relevance in South Africa where according to 
Louw (2003): 
The PEl (The President's Education Initiative Research Project) 
research reports and the submissions to the Review Committee 
indicate clearly enough that the way in which group work is 
practiced in most classrooms (in South Africa) works to the 
detriment of all learners achieving the learning outcomes and in the 
final analysis achieving the long term goals 0/ education (emphasis 
mine) (Louw 2003:80). 
I should remind the reader that the long term goals referred to as expressed by the 
Minister of Education at the time, Kadar Asmal, were to develop learners who are 
"knowledgeable and multi-faceted" and are able "to respond to and act upon the many 
challenges that will still confront South Africa in the twenty-first century". This 
would be achieved in part by "nurturing a culture of communication and 
participation" in the country's learning institutions (Policy Overview 2002: 1-7). 
But a word of caution from Hackman (2002). Even in those circumstances 
where the prerequisite criteria are in place, he advises that before making the final 
decision to use teams, one still needs to be very clear about certain issues, some of 











Constraining technologies or team-unfriendly institutional values 
occasionally can make it nearly impossible to form stable teams that 
have a compelling direction, an enabling structure and a supportive 
context. When this is the case, even highly skilled coaching cannot 
make much difference in team performance. . .. I would rather not 
use teams at all than risk inviting the kinds of problems that so 
often develop when one forces theformation of teams in 
circumstances where they cannot be designed or supported well ... 
even when the conditions are reasonably favourable; creating, 
supporting and leading teams well, requires no small measure of 
knowledge, skill, and political savvy" (emphasis mine) (Hackman 
2002:254-255). 
Favourable conditions 
From the comments made above by Hackman, it would seem that the first and 
possibly most significant responsibility of a teacher/facilitator is to ensure that certain 
favourable conditions are and remain in place; not as any guarantee of good 
performance but merely to increase the probability of a team being effective (p. 237). 
In this regard Hackman cites five criteria, which he believes will increase the chances 
that a team will achieve and sustain a higher level of effectiveness. 
Teacher/facilitators need to: 
1. Ensure that the team is a real team rather than a team in name only. 
2. Provide a compelling reason for the team's work. 
3. Ensure that the team's structure facilitates rather than impedes 
co llaboration. 
4. That the team can operate within a supportive context. 
5. That the team has available to it ample expert coaching in learning the 
skills of collaboration (p. 31). 
It is this collaborative aspect, Schwarz (2002) argues, which is the critical 











ability of group members to reflect on what they are doing, to create the conditions 
necessary to achieve their goals" (p. 5). Schwarz also believes it is because groups 
find it so difficult to "openly examine behaviour on their own" that they need a 
teacher/facilitator to help with this process (Schwarz 2002:5). 
This need of groups to openly examine their behaviour is, as Argyris and 
Schon emphasise ~ "to help individuals become aware of their automatic reasoning 
processes that lead to counterproductive skilled responses" (Argyris and Schon 
1978:34). Hackman (2002) in support of Argyris and Schon and Schwarz adds that if 
there is to be any substantial improvement in the effectiveness of SPTs, it requires a 
fundamental "recasting" of member's "theories-in-use" (p. 204). 
Holmer adds her weight to this argument by suggesting that without coaching 
and encouragement in the practises of self-awareness and skilful honesty, students 
will, she believes, instinctively resort to learned, culturally ingrained habits of 
avoiding discomfort. Rather than risk being wrong or being seen as uncooperative, 
students will dismiss perceptions that the group is, for example, not doing the 
assigned task. Holmer also makes the point that the failure of students to see their own 
complicity in group dysfunction, contributes to a sense of helplessness and cynicism 
about SPTs in general (Holmer 2001 :594-595). 
In line with Holmer's claim, Argyris recognises that many students' sense of 
competence, self-confidence, and self-esteem are indeed highly dependent upon their 
Modell theories-in-use and defensive reasoning. But this dependence he argues, 
practically guarantees that when those same students are acting to learn, the 
consequences will be skilfully counterproductive, because the Modell theories-in-use 
motivating their behaviour will not allow Model 1 governing values to be changed. It 
is this behaviour to which Argyris refers as "skilled incompetence" (Argyris 1999:59-
60). 
Model II behaviour has as its basis productive reasoning as opposed to the 
defensive reasoning of Model 1. Understanding productive reasoning, according to 
Argyris, means that "the premises are explicit; the inferences from the premises are 
also made explicit; and finally, conclusions are crafted in ways that can be tested by 
logic that is independent of the group member" (p. 60). What is also important is that 











"What can be done" (Argyris 1999:143) 
Most experiential learning, at its best, helps individuals change their behaviour 
without changing the defensive reasoning or their theories-in-use. This can be 
accomplished, according to Argyris (1999), by helping individuals behave in the 
opposite manner to the way they presently behave. For example, if a person is 
dominant they learn to become more passive. If they talk most of the time they learn 
to listen more. But being passive or listening more is not a change to a new theory-in-
use. It occurs by suppressing the old behaviour and as Argyris points out, such 
changes usually "wash out the moment the individual is bewildered, threatened or 
feels betrayed" (p. 65). 
Research can begin, Argyris continues, with identifying either the theories-in-
use or the defensive routines. It does not matter which because one will necessarily 
lead you to the other. One must make the choice "on the basis of which of the two is 
most likely to generate the participants' internal commitment to the research and to 
the eventual intervention" (p. 61): 
Even the most 'anti' applied researchers value a society in which 
they are free to conduct research. Such societies would have to 
value experimentation and learning, which if truly unfettered, would 
also require the valuing of risk-taking and trust. Such a society is 
unlikely to come to exist without human beings who are willing to 
accept responsibility for their actions (p. 429). 
Before closing this chapter I should like to cite an example of how Argyris 
helped a group of 'faculty' (who had expressed a desire to be helped) develop new 
behaviour with suggestions for its practice so that they might improve their 
competence in teaching/facilitating their own student project teams. And whilst 
Argyris himself admits how difficult the conditions for collaboration are to create; 
that one of the most promising strategies for their development is student project 
teams (Argyris 1999: 1 08). 
The case study 
As we know, faculty learns a lot by talking directly to students. 
Often the outcome is so rewarding that faculty members wonder 











institutional and personal defensive routines that prevented them 
from talking to students in the first place? What norms did people 
learn that would blind them from the obvious (Argyris 1999: 143)? 
In this case a group of faculty members at a higher learning institution decided 
to begin to change their own group defensive routines by beginning with the ones that 
they create in their own meetings. The first step towards change was a two-day 
session away from the institution. The agenda of the sessions were the cases that 
faculty were asked to write ahead oftime. The purpose of the case was two-fold. 
Firstly they allowed the organisers to develop a collage of the kinds of problems 
thought to be critical to the group. In this particular instance the participants wrote on 
issues related to course content versus student affairs. Secondly the cases provided a 
window into the prevailing rules and routines used by the faculty. 
The form of the cases was as follows: 
1. In one paragraph describe a key faculty problem as you see it. 
2. Assume you could talk to whom ever you wish to begin to 
resolve the problem. Describe in a paragraph or so, the strategy 
that you would use in this meeting. 
3. Next split your page into two columns. On the right hand side 
write how you would begin the meeting; what you would 
actually say (word for word). Then write what you believe the 
other(s) would say. Then write your response to their response. 
Continue writing this scenario for two or so double spaced type 
written pages. 
4. In the left-hand column write any idea or feeling that you had 
that you would not communicate for whatever reason. 
In short the case includes: a statement of the problem; the intended strategy 
intended to begin to solve the problem; the actual conversation that would ensue as 
envisioned by the writer and the information that the writer would not communicate 
for whatever reason. The faculty members reported that they became highly involved 











The cases, crafted and written by the faculty members themselves become 
outstanding examples of skilled incompetence. They vividly illustrate the skill with 
which each faculty member tried not to upset the other and to persuade them to 
change their position. They also illustrate the incompetence component since the 
results by their own analysis, were to upset the others and make it less likely that their 
views would prevaiL 
The cases are also extremely important learning devices since it is so difficult 
for anyone to slow down the behaviour they produce in milliseconds during a real 
meeting in order to reflect upon it and change it. The danger is that others might grab 
the airtime and run with it Moreover it is difficult for the human mind to pay 
attention to the interpersonal actions and to the substantive issues at the same time. 
Reflecting on the cases In analysing the left-hand columns oftheir cases, the 
faculty members found that they blamed others for the difficulties that existing within 
their group and that they all used the same reasons: 
You do not really understand the issues. 
If you persist in your position, you will harm the morale that I have 
built. 
Don't give me that line. You know what I'm talking about. 
It upsets me when I think how they think. 
I'm really trying hard but I'm beginning to feel this is hopeless. 
These results illustrate once more the features of skilled incompetence. 
Crafting the cases with the intention not to upset others while trying to change their 
minds requires skilL Yet we have seen that the skilled behaviour that they used in the 
cases had the opposite effect. The others in the case became upset and dug in their 
heels about changing their minds. 
I can now add an additional finding. These individuals and all the others we 
have studied to date should not be able to prevent the counter-productive 
consequences until and unless they learn new skills. Nor will it work to bypass the 
skilled incompetence by focusing on the academic problems although several faculty 











"What surprises me " said one faculty member, "is how these cases have 
captured the issues beautifully. That's us and that's what we must work on". 
"No, I do not agree with you", responded another member. "if we are not to 
waste these two days, we ought to focus on something concrete. We ought to focus on 
the practical and urgent matters we have and create a solution that will unite us". 
The group was split and their view represented by another member who said: 
"But how are we ever going to listen to each other if we hold the views that we have 
about each other and if we talk the way we talk to each other the way we do in the 
cases"? 
Note that the members are recreating the dynamics that get them into 
difficulty. I intervened and suggested that they try to answer the questions about what 
kind of working environment they wished to have and what should they do to achieve 
this. 
The next requirement at the two-day session was to redesigning their actions 
as written - faculty turned to their cases and each selected an episode that they wished 
to redesign so that it would not have negative consequences. As an aid to their 
redesign, faculty were given some handouts that described a different set of 
behaviours. 
One technique that was used was that each faculty member crafted by himself 
a new conversation to help the writer ofthe episode (An approach that seems similar 
to what Breen (2000) is attempting in his "Researching teaching:changing paradigms 
to improve practice"). After taking some time they shared their designs with the writer 
of the episode. In the process of discussing these; the writer learned much about how 
to redesign his words. But the designers also learned much as they discovered the 
bugs in their suggestions and the way they made them (p. 147). 
This dialogue according to the participants was very constructive, co-operative 
and helpful. But what is of vital importance is that the new language that has been 
developed for a particular instance has to be practiced. Practice is important. Most 
people required as much practice as is required to playa not-so-decent game of tennis. 
But it does not need to occur all at once. The practice can occur in actual meetings 











outside facilitator could help them examine and redesign their actions just as a tennis 
(or hockey) coach might do. 
There are several consequences to this type of change programme. The faculty 
members begin to experience each other as more supportive and constructive. People 
still work very hard during meetings, but their conversation begins to become 
additive; it flows to conclusions that they all can own and implement. Crises begin to 
be reduced. Soon the behavioural change leads to new values, and new structures 
and policies to mirror the new values (emphasis mine) (Extract from "What can be 
doneH Argyris 1999:143-147). 
Argyris - Some final thoughts 
Argyris (1999) is quick to admit that it is not clear to him as to why most 
people are able to produce advice easily, yet are unable to follow their own advice 
when they write their scenarios for his case studies and why they appear unaware that 
this is the case. He suggests that it may be because people are unaware that their 
advice involves a "very high level" of inference. Another possible answer is that there 
is so little variance in the reasoning processes and actions that most people use that: 
that: 
All individuals must distance themselves from the relatively directly 
observable data in order to design and manage their actions. It is not 
possible to react in an organised manner without first extracting 
from, and organising from, what occurs. This is what is meant by 
'constructing or enacting reality'. High levels of inference are 
necessary because they make possible on-line management of 
reality (Argyris 1999:80). 
In this regard, Argyris cites the work of Simon and Miller who both suggest 
The environment is more complex than the human mind can deal 
with directly and that beyond the relatively small number of bits of 
information that it can process simultaneously, new and more 
abstract concepts are needed which subsume the lower level units of 
information; suggesting that there is a hierarchy of concepts which 
makes it possible to organise, make sense out of, and enact reality . 











high levels of inference from the raw data (Simon and Miller in 
Argyris1999:80). 
It therefore seems perfectly logical to Argyris that people must hold theories in 
their heads about effective action, which they bring to bear on any given situation; 
since it is unlikely that they are able to design complex actions for every event that 
occurs (p. 81). 
Einstein believed that nature would not play tricks on the physical world by 
permitting two theories to be valid that contained fundamental views about physical 
reality that were contradictory. However although nature may not play tricks Argyris 
believes that we human beings are perfectly (or imperfectly) capable of creating 











Chapter 8: Conclusion - collaboration: great idea wrong 
species. 
H We should distrust any Jormula Jar changing society Jrom the top down" 
(Pinker 2002:289). 
From the outset the most compelling issue motivating my research has been to 
try and find a logical explanation, which in some way might account for the 
dissatisfaction that I have often found when asked to work in groups as opposed to the 
apparent enthusiasm for this form of educational practice expressed by educational 
policy makers and management theorists alike. I asked myself if perhaps my own 
experience was unusual and was I the exception rather than the rule? Could it be that 
co-operative learning through teams was in fact the preferred choice of most students 
and members of the business community or did most people, most of the time, find 
working in teams as difficult as I did? And finally if the latter was the case what then 
is needed to make my co-operative learning experience both more pleasurable and 
more productive? 
In trying to find satisfactory answers to these questions I begin my research in 
chapter 2 by looking at what the literature had to say about learning theory what is 
currently in vogue and how supportive it is ofthe use of collective learning 
environments. Almost without exception I found that there was significant support for 
the benefits this method of instruction produced. However I also found that the most 
popular forms of current learning theory are not without their critics. 
This aspect I investigate more thoroughly in chapter 3, where I introduce two 
new theories on learning enactivism and evolutionary educational psychology - that 
have developed as a result of the criticisms of current constructivist ideologies. My 
research suggests that many of these criticisms are influenced by the ideas emanating 
from the world of science, particularly science related to the microscopic world of 
quantum mechanics. I look at some ofthese topics more closely before investigating 
enactivism and evolutionary educational psychology to see how these new learning 
theories have interpreted the ideas gained from what Wheatley (1992) refers to as the 
New Science. 
As a result of these investigations the case for collective learning 











very different reasons. However my research suggests that much of the enthusiasm for 
collective learning is for environments that develop the individual within a collective 
rather than for the development of the collective. 
This finding prompts me to conclude chapter 3, by drawing a distinction 
between two types of collective learning environments that educators might wish to 
pursue; a co-operative learning environment - were the learning is primarily for the 
benefit ofthe individual learner or a collaborative learning environment - were the 
learning is primarily for the benefit ofthe group. 
In chapter 4 my research takes a closer look at how this distinction is 
understood in the literature and 'played ouC in practice. Once again most of my 
findings where supportive of the concept of collective learning in theory but several 
writers, including Hackman, expressed serious reservations regarding its practical 
implementation "Creating the conditions that promote effective teamwork almost 
always involves change ... and therefore is certain to threaten the turf, prerogatives, 
or preferences of currently advantaged organisational actors" (Hackman 2002:243). 
But in spite of the evidence provided by my research from my investigations 
on learning theory there still seemed to be one issue for which my research hadn't 
given a satisfactory explanation. 
Learning theory whilst being highly supportive of collective learning 
environments for the development of individual learning was relatively inattentive to 
the concept of collective environments for the development of the collective learning 
collaboration. Yet it appears to be the concept of collaboration, which seems to be 
of utmost importance to both educational policy makers and big business alike. 
In chapter 5 I researched the literature for possible reasons for the support of 
education and business for this aspect of the concept of collective learning, which 
seems in opposition to the understanding of most learning theorists. This critical and I 
dare say somewhat controversial issue I discuss in some detail and as a result I believe 
my research suggests the dominance of an economic imperative together with a 












Is education now being used, as Stromquist and Monkman suggest, in the 
development of human resources rather than human beings? And is this happening 
with the approval of science in their avid support of collective learning? 
However, whether or not there is an alliance between education and the New 
Capitalism does little to detract from the support that the concept of collective 
learning has throughout the literature. But what is equally evident in the literature, is 
that the support there is, is for a concept, an ideal. This aspect is well expressed by 
Senge, when he suggests that at some time in our lives we have all probably 
experienced what it is like to be part of a great team. But he, together with almost 
every other supporter, is quick to point out the difficulties involved in successfully 
implementing the eoncept. My research suggests that it is left largely to the work of 
Argyris and Argyris and Schon to explain why this is the case. This work I investigate 
in detail in chapter 6. 
A real~life learning experience 
I think that there are moments in one's life when you hear a suggestion or 
receive a piece of information and for you it's similar to someone switching on a light 
in a dark room. I am pleased to admit that my experience in investigating the work of 
Argyris and Argyris and Schon was for me one such moment. 
People focus on identifying and correcting errors in their external 
environment. Solving problems is important but if learning is to 
persist, then people must also look inward. They need to reflect 
critically on their own behaviour, identifying the ways they often 
inadvertently contribute to ... problems, and then change how they 
act. In particular they must learn that the very way they go about 
defining and solving problems can be a source of problems in its 
own right (Argyris and Schon 1978:84). 
For years I have wondered why the responses I get to my behaviour are 
often not what I expected or intended. This aspect has been of particular 
interest to me in my personal relationships. How often have I been asked by 
my spouse "Do you still love me?" and I have responded with an "of course I 
do, why do you need to ask, don't I show it?" Unfortunately, the response to 











distress. Prior to starting my research I sincerely believed that I showed my 
affection everyday through my behaviour. But according to the interpretation 
of my spouse I was not doing so and this was certainly not my intention. My 
intention was to show her how much I care and yet I seem to fail to do this 
most of the time. 
Similarly, whenever I have questioned my partner about her feelings 
towards me, her response has been similar to mine and she has also been 
somewhat surprised that I have needed to ask. This aspect of our personal 
relationships is, I believe, of immense significance. Having now studied the 
work of Argyris and Schon, it has certainly helped both myself and my partner 
understand how, in interpreting each other's behaviour, both of us draw 
inferences, which tend to lead to outcomes neither of us intended. Now we are 
learning that when this begins to happen, we need to be more conscious of 
how we both continue to behave: 
The criterion for success should not be a change in behaviour or 
attitudes. The criterion should be changes in defensive reasoning 
and the theories-in-use that produce skilled unawareness and skilled 
incompetence and the resulting organisational defensive routines 
(Argyris 1999:65). 
What I believe is critical to this situation is that I have come to accept that I 
am behaving in ways contrary to that in which I claim to believe. I also accept that the 
reason why I behave in such a way is largely due to my Model I theories-in-use. And 
finally, I also accept that if I really want to behave differently I need to learn new 
behaviour. However it is this issue, which I believe my research shows is the 
'Achilles heel' of collaborative learning. 
Not 'top of the pops' 
During the course of my research I began to wonder why the work of Argyris 
and Argyris and Schon has not been more widely recognised. When I tried to find an 
answer to this I discovered that others had asked the same question. Below is an 
excerpt, which offers one explanation and comes from an interview with one of 
Aryris' close former colleagues, Robert Putnam, voicing some of his thoughts 











The problem is that the tools are so conceptually straightforward 
and so easy to stick into a training program that in minutes 
somebody will say, "Oh, I understand that." They think they've got 
it but the tools are profoundly difficult to put into practice in the 
heat of the moment. I've been in organizations where they've 
trained hundreds or thousands of people in these tools and ironically 
it's almost as if they've inoculated the organization against the deep 
learning the tools can provide. People think, "We've already done 
that." 
Over the years we've discovered that giving everyone brief training, 
even when it starts with top management, is not a good approach. 
People do the workshops, find the tools easy to understand, and 
assume that good intentions are all it takes to use them. But they 
look around and see that their boss, who had the same program, still 
gets frustrated and in the heat of the moment makes the same 
imperious, unilateral moves they have learned to hate. Then they 
say, "See, the stuff doesn't work," ... and it falls into disuse. 
The strategy that does make a profound difference is to have a small 
number of people who make a much larger commitment to learning 
to use the tools in practice. Then you get the genuine behavior 
change even under a significant degree of stress. That's when you 
begin to see sustainable change (Putnam in Creelman 2003:3). 
The last point from this Putnam extract is I believe pertinent to the work that is 
being promoted by those supporters of an enactivist view of education. For a few 
educators to work towards becoming truly professional in educational practice by 
achieving genuine behaviour change. These professionals, working in what Breen 
(2000) refers to as "the teaching" paradigm would then be able to help others improve 
their practice from a position of "those that know teaching to those that want to 
know". While, at the same time, those that know collaborate to create opportunities 
for this to happen by developing a language appropriate to a 'body of practice'. In 












This aspect is emphasised by Varela who writes, "we have failed to pay 
attention to the extent to which our actions ... are ruled by our habits, which in tum 
are part of our structures". According to Breen (2001), Varela makes a plea for us to 
focus some of our energy on what he terms "the hinges that provide windows of 
opportunities for us to consider alternative actions" (Varela in Breen 2001 :5). 
One further issue that could be influencing not only dedicated educators but 
educators generally as well as policy makers and management theorists, is the view of 
behaviour espoused by visionary psychologist William James The greatest 
discovery of my generation is that human beings, by changing the inner attitudes of 
their minds, can change the outer aspects oftheir lives. I wish it were so. 
How critical the biological? 
The second most significant learning experience that I have gained from my 
research on collaboration, has been the view from science of the import of a 
biological influence on our behaviour and possibly even more importantly, our 
motivation, or lack of it, in acquiring new knowledge. 
Most of my life I have been encouraged to support the concept advocated by 
educators such as Senge, who claim that "not only ... is it our nature to learn but we 
love (emphasis mine) to learn" (Senge 1994:4). But, as with my experience in 
working in groups, this has not always been how I felt or continue to feel about 
learning. For countless years I have failed to understand what went wrong with my 
education as a young person. In junior school I was an above average student a 
condition that persisted well into high school until I was introduced to several "new" 
subjects such as calculus, Latin, French, co-ordinate geometry and trigonometry and 
applied physics. It wasn't very long after this introduction before I started to believe 
that not only wasn't I particularly bright but that I might even be impaired, if one was 
to consider the rate at which the scores on my report card started to tumble. Part of the 
problem, according to some of my teachers, was that I asked too many "stupid 
questions". But now after having completed my research I realise that perhaps the 
problem was a much more complex one. 
Of course it is quite irrational even to attempt an explanation for my 'fall from 
grace' after so many years. However, the work of Geary and Genovese has made me 











did came easily and was perhaps much more relevant to my life's development at the 
time. Whereas the new subjects required of me a very different approach such as that 
proposed by the evolutionary educational psychologists. An approach, with which I 
was perhaps at the time, ill equipped. 
Should this sort of example indeed be the case, then I would submit that it has 
far-reaching implications for education and higher education in particular. For us as 
educators to realise that for the majority of learners, many subjects are exceptionally 
difficult to learn, and without the necessary motivation, which possibly needs to be 
social in nature, the exercise could prove somewhat less than successful. This seems 
to be fairly evident amongst high school students today, who often fail to see the 
purpose of studying certain subjects as Davis points out: 
Despite technologies that mean we will never have to perform long 
division outside the classroom, the suggestion that the months spent 
on this skill could be given over to other topics, is rarely 
entertained, let alone the dozens of other concepts jammed between 
the covers of contemporary textbooks (Davis 2004:81). 
Do policy makers consider learners 'too stupid' to see this anomaly because of 
their 'natural love ofleaming'? Is it this attitude on behalf of policy makers that 
prompted Holt to comment "We don't have to make human beings smart. They are 
born smart. All we have to do is to stop doing things that make them stupid" (Holt in 
Meyers 1986:9). 
Associated with this issue of 'what comes naturally', is the somewhat equally 
contentious issue of co-operation or as it's often referred to by biologists "reciprocal 
altuism" (Evans 1999:65). If, as the evolutionary biologists and their supporters 
contend, working co-operatively is on a "what's in it for me tit-for-tat" basis, then the 
knowledge required to co-operate already exists in some basic form for almost anyone 
who has reached puberty. Therefore, for a co-operative learning approach to be 
implemented all that should be required is that this 'natural' basic knowledge or 
reciprocal altruism be given the opportunity to develop. 
However, if what is required is collaboration - which requires that we set 
aside individual aspirations for the benefit of the collective - then I contend that this 











I investigated in chapter 7. A position that I suggested was the' Achilles heel' of 
collaborative learning and which, my research suggests, will be for most people, as 
popular as it is for them to learn calculus! 
Concluding opinion 
In summary, my research has helped me understand why education and 
business are both so enthusiastic in their support of collective learning environments. 
It has shown me that the best chance a country has to improve the lives of its citizens 
economically, is to be competitive in our new global world markets. It has also has 
shown me that one of the best ways of achieving this is to have a competitive edge in 
the production of knowledge. 
I have also learned that science claims the best way of producing innovation -
creating new knowledge - is by people working co-operatively in groups. 
Unfortunately it appears that this concept is only being considered from an economic 
imperative through the development of a country's human resources. This would 
suggest that the sole purpose of development is to equip citizens with the kind of 
skills required by a global labour market which are those 'leadership type' skills that 
business believes are necessary for people to work collectively in groups. 
All of these findings convince me that developing human resources to satisfy a 
nation's economic imperative now seems to be of greater importance than the 
development of human beings to improve a nation's moral condition. 
The other major issue for which my research has provided me with an answer 
is why I find working in student groups so problematic. I have learned that in order 
for groups to be effective certain criteria need to be in place. But more importantly I 
have learned that even when these criteria are met from a structural point of view, 
most of us do not have the appropriate behaviour in order to work collaboratively; 
especially in situations that need to address or correct 'second-order errors'. 
My research has also shown me that the only way to improve this situation is 
for those people wanting to initiate collective learning environments to ensure that 
they have the necessary skills to firstly: be able to structure organised collective 
environments and secondly: to facilitate such organised groups. Without these skills 











implemented, will more than likely only provide an opportunity for all those 
participating to practice their 'Model I theories-in-use'. 
When I put all these factors together I conclude that collaborative learning 
through student project teams whilst in theory being a wonderful concept, which on 
occasion can work; the effort required for its implementation is so substantial that 
many will find it insurmountable. 
However, having made this claim, I also believe that if one is willing to make 
the effort and can find equally motivated participants, there is no doubt, as I myself 
have experienced, collaborative learning can work and when it does, the rewards are 
significant. But the question remains - who is prepared to make the effort because as 
Richard Hackman points out: 
I would rather not use teams at all than risk inviting the kinds of 
problems that so often develop when one forces the formation of 
teams in circumstances where they cannot be designed or supported 
well. Even when the conditions are reasonably favourable, creating, 
supporting and leading teams well requires no small measure of 
knowledge, skill, and political savvy. At least at this point in the 
evolution of work cultures, creating and sustaining the conditions 
that foster team effectiveness can be something of an uphill battle 
even for well-intentioned and well-motivated leaders (Hackman 
2002:255). 
Strong words but possibly not strong enough. To add to this argument I would 
like to cite a comment made by leadership researcher Abraham Zaleznik, in an 
interview with Thomas Kiely published in the October 15, 1993, issue of CIO. 
Although from the world of commerce I believe it is equally applicable throughout all 
sections of our community: 
The trend toward teams and collaboration is eroding both leadership 
and accountability in contemporary organisations; and Sinclair 
(1992) suggests that team ideology can tyrannise individual 
members "by camouflaging coercion and conflict with the 











Perhaps the way one considers the future prospects of collaborative 
learning will be largely detennined by the view one adopts of our human 
species. The thoughts expressed above by Hackman are probably in keeping 
with what Pinker refers to in his recent publication "The blank slate" as a 
"Tragic" vision of humanity: 
In the Tragic Vision humans are inherently limited in knowledge, 
wisdom and virtue and all social arrangements must acknowledge 
these limits. In the Utopian Vision, psychological limitations are 
artefacts that come from our social arrangements and we should not 
allow them to restrict our gaze from what is possible in a better 
world (Pinker 2002:287). 
Ending on such a tragic note seems so pessimistic and it also seems 
inappropriate not to save the last word for the people who have had such a significant 
influence on my research Chris Argyris; a possible 'Utopian' who hopes that human 
nature might radically change in some imagined society of the future and his long-
time colleague Donald Schon: 
Worlds that encourage the production of empirically testable 
knowledge, the enhancement of infonned choice, and the 
strengthening of personal responsibility are worth designing and 
trying to implement. These basic values are not new. What is likely 
to be new is that we can help create worlds were they are not rare 
but part of the practice of everyday life (Argyris and Schon 1978:4). 
I must admit that when I read words like these it does still inspire me to work 












Anderson, L. (1997). Argyris and Schon's theory on congruence and learning 
Available on-line at http://www.scu.edu.au/schools/sawdJarr/argyris.html 
Argyle, M. (1991). Co-operation: The basis of sociability. Routledge: London. 
Argyris, C. (1974). Behind the front page. Jossey-Bass: San Francisco. 
(1976) Increasing leadership effectiveness. Wiley Interscience: New York. 
(1977) Double-loop learning in organisations. Harvard Business Review 
Sept/Oct 1997, 115-125. 
(1982) Reasoning, learning and action: individual and organisational. 
Jossey-Bass: San Francisco. 
(1987) Reasoning, action strategies, and defensive routines: the case of 
OD practitioners. In Woodman, R.A. and Pasmore, A.A. (Eds), 
Research in organisational change and development. 1987 Vol. 1, 89-
128. 
(1990) Overcoming organisational defences: facilitating organisational 
learning. Allyn and Bacon: Boston. 
(1991) Teaching smart people how to learn. Harvard Business Review 
May/June 1991,99-109. 
(1993) Education for leading-learning. Organisational Dynamics 21(3), 
5-17. 
(1994) Good communication that blocks learning. Harvard Business 
Review July/August 1994, 77-85. 
(1999) On organizational learning. Blackwell Publishing: U.K. 
Argyris, C., Putnam, R. and Mc Lain Smith, D. (1985). Action research: concepts, 
methods and skills for research and intervention. Jossey-Bass: San Francisco. 
Argyris, c., and Schon, D. (1978). Organizational learning: a theory of action 











Barber, M. (2000). How to build world-class schools (educational reform in England). 
New Statesman (1996) October 2, 2000. Available on-line at 
http://www.findarticles.comlp/artic1es/mi_ mOFQP/is _ 4506 _129/ai _ 66383220 
Begg, A. (2000). Enactivism: a personal interpretation. Seminar presented at Stirling 
University, 22 August 2000. Available on-line at 
http://www.ioe.stir.ac. uk! docs/BeggEnactivism.doc 
Bennett, N. (1994). Co-operative learning. In Kutnick, P. and Rogers, C. (Eds) 
Groups in schools. Cassell Education: London and New York. 
Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. (1976). Schooling in capitalist America: educational reform 
and the contradictions of economic life. Basic Books: New York. 
Breen, C. (2000). Re-searching teaching: changing paradigms to improve practice. In 
Clements, K., Tairab, H. and Young, W. (Eds.) Science, mathematics and technical 
education in the 2dh and 2Ft centuries. Universiti Brunei Darussalam: Brunei. 
(2001). Researching teaching: telling the hole'd truth and nothing but my 
truth? In Rogerson A. (Ed.) Proceedings of the International Conference of the 
Mathematics Education into the 2Ft Century Project. Palm Cove, Australia, August 
19-242001. 
Breen, C., Agherdien, G., and Lebethe, A. (2003). A case for collaborative staff 
development: a path layered while walking. In Peter-Koop, A., Santos-Wagner, V., 
Breen, C., and Begg, A (Eds), Collaboration in teacher education: examples from the 
context of mathematics education. Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht I Boston / 
London. 
Breier, M. (1998). The role of the generic skill in lifelong learning: panacea or pipe-
dream? Journal of Education (South African), No 23. 73-100. 
Campbell, D. (1969). Variation and selective retention in socio-cultural evolution. 
General Systems 16,69-85. 












Castells, M. (1999). The social implication of infonnation and communication 
technologies. Available on-line at http://www.chet.org.za! 
(2000). Materials for an exploratory theory of the network society. 
Article for the special millennium issue of the British journal of 
Sociology Vol. No. 51 Issue No.1 (January/March 2000) 5-24. 
Chisholm, L. (Chairperson) (2000). A South African Curriculum for the Twenty First 
Century: Report of the Review Committee on Curriculum 2005. 
Choo, C. W. (1995). Infonnation management for the intelligent organisation: the art 
of scanning the environment. In Information Today for the American Society for 
Information Science: Medford, New Jersey. 
Collins, A., Brown, J. S., and Newman, S. (1989). Cognitive apprenticeship: teaching 
the craft of reading, writing and mathematics. In Resnick L.B. (Ed), Knowing, 
learning and instruction: essays in honour of Robert Glaser. Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates: Hillsdale, Nl. 
Collins, lC. and Porras, 1.1. (2000). Built to last: successful habits of visionary 
companies. Random House Business Books: London. 
Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. (1997). Evolutionary psychology: a primer. Available on-
line at http://www .psych. ucsb.edulresearch/cep/primer.html 
Creelman D. (2003). Interview: Robert Putnam, applying Argyris. By David 
Creelman of HR. com. Available on-line at 
http://www.actiondesign.com/resources/theorylhr.com _interview.doc 
Davis, B. (2004). Inventions of teaching: a genealogy. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: 
London. 
Davis, B., Sumara, D. and Luce-Kapler, R. (2000). Engaging minds: learning and 
teaching in a complex world. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: London. 
De Geus, A. (1997). The living company: growth, learning and longeVity in business. 











Dick, B., & Dalmau, T. (1990). Values in action: applying the ideas of Argyris and 
Schon. Interchange: Brisbane. 
Dixon, N.M. (1992). Organisational learning: a review of the literature with 
implications for HRD professionals, Employee Relations 17(1),9-23. 
Edwards, R. (1997). Changing places? Flexibility, lifelong learning and a learning 
society. Routledge: London and New York. 
Evans, D. (1999). Introducing evolutionary psychology. Icon Books: London. 
Fiol, C.M., and Lyles, M.A. (1985). Organizational learning. Academy of 
management review 10,803-813. 
Freed, J. E. (2001). Why become a learning organization? About Campus, January-
February 2001, 16-21. 
Friedman, T. (2000). The Lexus and the olive Tree. HarperCollins: London. 
Garvin, D. (1993). Building a learning organization. Harvard Business Review, 
JullAug 93, Vol. 71 Issue 4, 78-91. 
Geary, D. (2002). Principles of evolutionary educational psychology. Learning and 
individual differences, 12 (2002) 317-345. 
Gee, J.P., Hull, G. and Lankshear, C. (1996). The new work order: behind the 
language of new capitalism. Allen & Unwin: Sydney. 
Genovese, J. (2003). Piaget, pedagogy and evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary 
Psychology 2003:1, 127-137. 
Greene, B. (2000). The elegant universe: superstrings, hidden dimensions and the 
quest for the ultimate theory. Vintage: London. 
Guile, D. and Young, M. (1998). The question of learning and learning organisations. 
In Kelleher, M. (Ed), Understanding organisations. Oak Tree Press: London 
Gundry, L. K., & Buchko, A. A. (1996). Field casework: methods for consulting to 
small and startup businesses. Sage Publications Ltd: London. 












Hackman, R. J. (2002). Leading teams: setting the stage for great peiformances. 
Harvard Business School Press: Cambridge, Mass. 
Hedberg, B. (1981). How organisations learn and unlearn. In Nystrom, P. C. and 
Starbuck, W. H. (Eds), Handbook of organisational design. Vol. 1: Adapting 
organisations to their environments. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Holcberg, C. (2002). Freedom is the solution for quality in education. Available on-
line at http://www.capmag.com/article.asp?id=628 
Holmer, L. (2001). Will we teach leadership or skilled incompetence? The challenge 
of student project teams. Journal of Management Education, Vol. 25 No.5, October 
2001,590-605. 
Huber, G. P. (1989). Organizationallearning: an examination of the contributing 
processes and a review ofthe literature. Prepared for the NSF-sponsored conference 
on organizational learning, Carnegie-Mellon University, May 18-20. 
(1996). Organizational learning: a guide for executives in technology-
critical organisations. International Journal of Technology Management, special issue 
on unlearning and learning for technological innovation 11 (7/8), 821-832. 
Jones, D. W. (1996). Empowered teams in the classroom can work. Journalfor 
Quality & Participation 19, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 1996),80-86. 
Kanuka, H and Anderson, T (1999). Using constructivism in technology-mediated 
learning: constructing order out of the chaos in the literature. Radical Pedagogy 
Available on-line at http://www.icaap.orgliuicode?2.1.2.3 
Kofinan, F. and Senge, P. (1993). Communities of commitment: the heart oflearning 
organizations. Organizational Dynamic 1993, Vol. 22 No.2 Autumn, 5-23. 
Kormanski, C. and Mozenter, A. (1987). A new model ofteam building: a technology 











Lave, J (1988). Cognition in practice: mind, mathematics and culture in everyday life. 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
(1996). Teaching as learning in practice. Mind, Culture, and Activity Volume 
3, No.3, 149-164. 
Leavitt, B. and March, lG. (1988). Organisational learning. Annual review of 
sociology 14, 319-340. 
Lloyd, P (1995). Cognitive and language development. British Psychological 
Association: Leicester. 
Louw, D. (2003). What is the question that group work is the answer to? 
Master's dissertation: University of Cape Town. 
MacGill, V. (2004). The third great leap for mankind. An introduction to 
chaos and complexity. Available on-line at http://www.vmacgilLnct/#chaos 
Marsick, V.J. and Watkins, K.E. (1999). Envisioning new organisations for learning. 
In Boud, D. and Garrick, J. (Eds), Understanding learning at work. Routledge: 
London and New York. 
Mason, J. (2002). Researching your own practice: the discipline of noticing. 
Routledge Falmer: London. 
Matthews, J. and Candy, P.c. (1999). New dimensions in the dynamics ofleaming 
and knowledge. In Boud, D. and Garrick, J. (Eds), Understanding learning at work. 
Routledge: London and New York. 
McTaggart, L. (2001). Thefield. HarperCollins: London. 
Meyers, C. (1986), Teaching students to think critically. Jossey-Bass: San Francisco 
and London. 
Moore, R. (2003) Policy driven curriculum restructuring: academic identities in 
transition? In Prichard, C. and Trowler, P. (Eds.), Realising qualitative research into 
higher education. Ashgate: Aldershot. 
Morrison, K.R.B. (2002). School leadership and complexity theory. Routledge 











Muller, J. (2000). What knowledge is of most worth for the millennium citizen? In 
Kraak, A (Ed), Changing modes: new knowledge production and its implications for 
higher education in South Africa. HRSC: Pretoria. 
National Research Council of America (2000). How people learn: brain, mind, 
experience and school. Bransford, J.D., Brown, AL. and Cocking, R.R. (Eds.). 
National Academies Press: Washington. 
Nelson, R. and Winter, S.G. (1982). An evolutionary theory of economic change. The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University: Cambridge, Mass. 
Nonaka, I., Konno, N., and Toyama, R. (2001). Emergence of "Ba": a conceptual 
framework for the continuous and self-transcending process of knowledge creation. In 
Nonaka, I. and Nishiguchi, T. (Eds.), Knowledge emergence: social. technical, and 
evolutionary dimensions of knowledge creation. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Papineau, D. (2000). Introducing consciousness. Icon Books: London. 
Penrose, R. (1999). Can a computer understand? In Rose, S. (Ed), From brains to 
consciousness? Essays on the new sciences of the mind. Penguin Science: London. 
Pinker, S. (2002). The blank slate. Penguin Science: London 
Policy Overview ofthe Revised National Curriculum Statement Grades R-9 
(Schools )(2002). The Department of Education of South Africa. Available on-line at 
http://education.pwv.gov.za 
Popper, K.R. (1969). Conjectures and refutations: the growth of scientific knowledge, 
3rd edition revised. Routledge and Kegan Paul: London 
Pratt, D.D. (1992). Conceptions of teaching. Adult Education Quarterly, Volume 42, 
Number 4, Summer, 1992, 203-220. 
Pulaski, M.AS. (1971). Understanding Piaget: an introduction to children's 
cognitive development. Harper and Row: New York. 
Ramsden, P. (1998). Learning to lead in higher education. Routledge: London and 
New York. 
Report of the Review Committee on Curriculum 2005 presented to the South African 
Minister of Education in May 2003. Available on-line at 











Revised National Curriculum Statement (2002). The Department of Education: 
Pretoria, South Africa. 
Robinson, V. (2001). Descriptive and normative research on organisational learning: 
locating the contribution of Argyris and Schon. The International Journal of 
Educational Management 1512, 58-67. 
Rogoff, B. (1990). Apprenticeship in thinking: cognitive development in social 
context. Oxford University Press: New York and Oxford. 
Schwarz, R. (2002). The skilled facilitator: new and revised. Jossey-Bass: San 
Francisco. 
Searle, 1. (1999). Mind, language and society: philosophy in the real world. Phoenix: 
London. 
Senge, P. M. (1994). Thefifth discipline. Currency Doubleday: New York. 
Senge, P. M., Kleiner, A., Roberts, C., Ross, R., and Smith, B. (1994). The fifth 
discipline fieldbook. Currency Doubleday: New York. 
Shoffher, M. B., Jones, M. and Harmon, S. W. (2002). Paradigms restrained: 
implications for new and emerging technologies for learning and cognition. The 
Journal of Electronic Publishing September, 2000 Volume 6, Issue 1. Available on-
line at http://www.press.umich.edu/jep/06-01/shoffher.html 
Simmons, P. (1995). Stacking the odds against the poor Brave new world. 
Extract from Words into Action. Oxfam: UK and Ireland. 
Sinclair, A. (1992). The tyranny of team ideology. Organisational Studies, 13, 
611-626. 
Smith, M. K. (2001). Chris Argyris: theories of action, double-loop learning and 
organizational learning. In the encyclopedia of informal education. Available on-line 
at http://www.infed.orglthinkers/argyris.htm 
Southwood, S. and Kuiper, J. (2003). A journey towards collaboration. In Peter-Koop, 
A., Santos-Wagner, V., Breen, C. and Begg, A. (Eds), Collaboration in teacher 












Stark, F. Available on-line at 
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/f/freyastarkl05589.htm1 
Stromquist, N.P. and Monkman, K. (2000). Globalization and education: integration 
and contestation across cultures. Rowman and Littlefield: London and New York. 
Trump, M. A. (1998). What Is chaos? An interactive online course for everyone. verso 
2.0, 14 Aug., 1998. Ilya Prigogline Center for Studies in Statistical Mechanics and 
Complex Systems. University of Texas at Austin. Available on-line at 
http:// order. ph. utexas.edu/ chaos 
UN Press Release (2000). Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of 
human rights. UN Press Release EICN.4ISub.212000/13 June 15, 2000. 
von Glaserfeld, E. (1989). Cognition, construction of knowledge, and teaching. 
Synthese, 80, 121-140. 
Vygotsky, L. S. (1987). The collected works of L. S. Vygotsky: Vol. 1, Problems of 
general psychology. Including the volume Thinking and speech. Plenum: New York 
Wallace, P.R. (1996). Paradox lost: images of the quantum. Springer: New York. 
Walters, S. (2000). Globalization, adult education, and development. In Stromquist, 
N. P. and Monkman, K. (Eds), Globalization and education: integration and 
contestation across cultures. Rowman and Littlefield: London and New York. 
Wheatley, M. (1992). Leadership and the new science: discovering order in a chaotic 
world. Berrett-Koehler: San Francisco. 
Whetten, D. A. and Cameron, K. S. (2001). Developing management skills 5th edition. 
Prentice Hall: London and New York. 
Yorke, M. (1999). Assuring quality and standards in globalised higher education. 
Quality Assurance in Education, Vol. 7 No.1 1999, 14-24. 
155 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
